terrorism

Terrorism : An Indian Perspective

Guest Column-by R.Swaminathan

1. The "global war on terror" is a good phrase and is an excellent concept. In actual practice, it is not as if all the terrorist organisations have a joint "global" headquarters or if such organisations hold any defined territories from which they operate. Many of them may follow similar methodologies and techniques; and many may exploit the idea of Islamic jihad as a motivating factor. All the same, it would be a big mistake to try and evolve a grand plan of macro solutions to the terrorist problem. Ultimately, every group that uses terrorism to achieve its political or religious objectives focuses on specific local-oriented politico-economic-religious issues; and has to be tackled through specific and customised approaches that include the addressing of genuine grievances.

2. In a recent article, B.Raman has said that "Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, India, Israel, South-East Asia, Russia and the USA would be the main theatres of jihadi terrorism of a strategic nature during the year 2005". There may be sporadic incidents of jihadi terrorism of a tactical nature in other parts of the world. According to Raman, terrorism of a strategic nature has an enduring impact in the short, medium or long-term. Terrorism of a tactical nature has only a temporary effect. The success of the jihadi terrorist operations in December 2004 (in Jeddah, Riyadh and Mosul), and the re-emerging high profile of bin Laden show that the command and control mechanism of Al Qaeda and the International Islamic Front (IIF), is functional once again. The need of the hour is an International Democratic and Secular Front against the International Jihadi Terrorist Front of bin Laden, al-Zarqawi, bin Mahmud and their Pakistani jihadi cohorts. Are India and the US ready for such a partnership?

South Asian Region

3. Many of the internal security problems faced by South Asian states also have cross-border dimensions. For instance, the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka, the increasing use of Bangladeshi territory by Islamic extremists, the menace of drug trafficking and narco-terrorism etc. have a spill-over effect in their neighbourhood. Nepal and Bhutan continue to engage terrorist and extremist organisations, as well as subversive elements, which are based on their soil and operate against India.

4. South Asia Terrorism Portal has compiled the following comparative figures of fatalities due to terrorist acts in South Asia, during 2000-2004.

Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total

India 5555 6383 4306 4171 2897 23312

Pakistan NA NA 57 154 878 1089

Sri Lanka 3791 1822 15 59 109 5796

Nepal 175 1051 4896 2105 2451 10678

Bhutan NA NA NA NA NA NA

Bangladesh NA NA 59 88 249 396

Total 9521 9256 9333 6577 6584 41271
5. One cannot help noting that, in Pakistan, total fatalities in terrorism-related violence rose from 154 in 2003 to 878 in 2004. Bangladesh also saw a rise from 88 to 249. It would seem that states that have sought strategic gains through terrorist enterprise are finding it increasingly unprofitable. It is doubtful if they have the intention or the capability to put the genie back in the bottle.

6. Pakistan has been using terrorism as an instrument of state policy and a strategic weapon against India since 1956. It has been sponsoring acts of terrorism against India in J&K and in other parts of India. Pakistan’s emergence and recognition as a frontline state in the US-led global war on terror has not stopped it, through its Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), from continuing to aid terrorist organisations operating against India. The proportion of non-Kashmiris involved in the militancy in J&K has been steadily rising from about 6% in 1992 to about 60% in 2002. Pakistani nationals belonging to four Pakistani organisations, (which are all affiliated to bin Laden's IIF), operating under the guise of Kashmiris, are responsible for a majority of the terrorist acts in J&K. Their jihad is not just against the Govt. of India, but against Hindus in general. Their ultimate objective is the formation of an Islamic caliphate in South Asia.

7. There has been increase in communal tension and Islamic extremism in Bangladesh since the return of the BNP to power in October 2001. Some international Islamic terrorist groups have established their presence in Bangladesh, in alliance with various indigenous fundamentalist organisations. Various terrorist groups operating in India’s Northeast often find safe haven and operational bases on Bangladesh territory. There are reports that some of the BNP leaders have business linkages with leaders of terrorist organisations such as ULFA.

8. Nepal has witnessed a Maoist (CPN-M) insurgency since 1996, resulting in the loss of over 8,000 lives. It reached unprecedented levels in November 2001. With the Maoists and the security forces dramatically escalating violence after the breakdown of the cease-fire and the 'peace negotiations' in August 2003, total fatalities in Nepal increased from 2,105 in 2003 to 2,451 in 2004. The linkages between the Maoists in Nepal and those in the bordering states in India would remain a major concern in 2005 also.

9. Though Bhutan is itself largely free from terrorist violence, the existence on Bhutanese soil of camps of terrorist organisations that operate in India’s Northeast continue to arouse serious apprehensions. The Royal Government of Bhutan has, however, been applying pressure on the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) to remove their camps from Bhutanese territory.

10. Authorities in India have been following the dual path of negotiation on grievances and firm handling of violence. The near and long term prospects of this approach would very much depend on the intentions and capabilities of the two primary state sponsors/supporters of terrorist groups in India - Pakistan and Bangladesh. Terrorism based on Islamic extremism would eventually fail in South Asia as Muslims as well as power structures within the sponsoring/supporting states are increasingly targeted. The immediate decisions on the extent of support by the current state sponsors would be critical in determining how long it will take to reach this unavoidable termination. The concerned state sponsors seemingly support the ideological (or religious) presuppositions of the Islamic terrorist groups.

11. External factors have encouraged such ambivalence and support. The ultimate outcome of US actions in Iraq will be important in defining the future capabilities and activities of Islamic terrorism in India and the rest of South Asia. The experience in Iraq so far has been a severe disappointment for all those that have a stake in the success of the Global War on Terror. This has been compounded by the tolerance extended to Pakistan's two-faced approach to terrorism and Islamic extremist mobilisation. The ideology of jihad continues to be taught in a majority of educational institutions in that country. Extremist forces in Bangladesh have also flourished under the benign neglect of the international community.

The Indian Scene

12. India remains one of the most terrorist affected countries. The greatest of non-military threats to her national security stem from terrorist enterprises that fall into the following four broad categories:

· State-sponsored and state-supported trans-border terrorist campaigns in J&K and the Northeast;

· Disruptive influence of pan-Islamic extremist and terrorist outfits;

· Activities of Maoist insurgent groups; and

· Ethno-centric militancy, including possible spillover from Sri Lanka.

13. According to figures available in the public domain, the total fatalities caused by insurgencies and terrorist violence in India showed a marked decline in 2004 - down to 2,897 from 4,171 in 2003. The most significant decline was in J&K, from 2,542 in 2003 to 1,810 in 2004. There has been a reduction (by about 60%, according to the Union Home Minister) in the scale of intrusions in recent months. The reduction may be due to various causes including US pressure on Pakistan, ongoing Indo-Pakistan dialogue, India's improved border security infrastructure, and the efforts to redress genuine grievances. Whether this reduction would continue in 2005 would depend on India's handling of the local issues, the projection of her determination and firmness in handling trans-border intrusions and on the judgment of Pakistan based on her own cost-benefit analysis. One should, however, be aware of the danger of Iraqi terrorist alumni replacing the Afghan terrorist alumni of the 1990s vintage in the vanguard of jihadi terrorism.

14. Declines in total fatalities were witnessed in Assam (from 505 to 354); Tripura (from 295 to 167) and Meghalaya (from 58 to 35). As for left wing extremism, which is now prevalent in as many as 13 States, the fatalities reduced from 539 in 2003 to 259 in 2004. Marginal increases were, however, registered in Manipur (from 198 to 214) and in Nagaland (from 37 to 58). Ongoing efforts to address genuine grievances, more efficient counter-measures and a downscaling of cross-border camps and other support may be contributory causes for this welcome decline in fatalities. It remains to be seen whether this is a clear trend or only a temporary respite. There is, therefore, no cause for complacency or dilution of efforts on all relevant fronts.

15. The year 2004 saw the initiation and/or persistence of a number of processes of negotiation with terrorist and insurgent groups. The limited Indo-Pakistan détente has made the erection of an effective fence along the Line of Control and international border in J&K possible. The central government has continued the efforts to have a meaningful dialogue with separatist elements in J&K. The peace process in Nagaland has been going on for nearly seven years and the Govt of India is actively seeking the involvement of a number of other insurgent groups. Andhra Pradesh has for long been the heartland of Naxalite violence - particularly by the erstwhile People's War Group (PWG, or CPI-ML), known as People's War or Communist Party of India-Maoist after its merger with the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in September 2004. The most significant actors in the insurgency in that State have started negotiations with the State Government. The peace process initiated by the Congress Government after it assumed office in May 2004 has resulted in a steep decline in Naxalite violence. The encounters came down from 57 upto 14 May to five in the remaining period of 2004. Fatalities declined from 45 extremists, seven police personnel and 59 others to four. The Naxalites, however, continue to exploit the opportunities offered by the peace process to consolidate and expand their activities; and have repeatedly reiterated their commitment to armed revolution. The Naxalite movements, which get little support from outside, accounted for less than ten per cent of total fatalities in 2004.

16. The future of the various peace processes will largely depend on the relative strengths (real and perceived) of the government and the militant groups. If the latter are able to consolidate their positions and secure an advantage over the state - as has been happening in Sri Lanka - they may be tempted to escalate their demands to the point of a breakdown and reversion to violence. On the other hand, if the state negotiates from a position of demonstrated strength, these groups could weaken with the passage of time and may be inclined to accept the maximum benefits offered and rejoin the mainstream.

17. In my view, one of the greatest risks in 2005 would be an increase in suicide terrorist missions. With the hardening of soft targets and the authorities adopting the dual path of negotiation and hard response to violence, suicide missions may become the preferred low-cost option. Special efforts are needed to reduce the casualties in such attacks, even while ensuring zero-escapes, so that the costs of such missions also become prohibitively and unacceptably high.

18. Terrorism can be contained and could even be defeated. India has to overcome the general inability of democracies to put together the political will, the resources and the strategies that are necessary to prevail over terrorism. Most of the indigenous terrorism can be handled through required reforms that would remove economic and caste-based inequalities, good and honest governance and effective policing. The Govt of India should be prepared to raise the threshold of tolerance in relation to cross-border terrorism and to serve credible notice that India is ready to exercise her right of hot pursuit. The determination should be made evident that, if left with no other viable alternative, India would not be averse to adopting the Bush doctrine of pre-emption and take suitable overt or covert action to neutralise the bases of terrorism outside of our national borders. Once India's capabilities and determination are made clear, the state sponsors of terrorist acts against Indian interests would realise the prohibitively high and unacceptable cost of such sponsorship.