PAKISTAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARSENAL AND ITS UNCERTAIN IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

PAKISTAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARSENAL AND ITS UNCERTAIN IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

by Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations:

South Asia’s overt nuclear weaponisation in 1998 has led to a large number of studies on their implications for regional security and that South Asia has emerged as the world’s hottest nuclear flashpoint. War-gaming in all possible scenarios stand widely discussed in strategic and academic circles.

Consequently, strategic think-tanks in the United States have focused on conflict resolution measures, nuclear risk reduction measures and nuclear signaling in South Asia.

In all such analyses, a common failure that emerges is that the basic parameters and underlying assumptions arise and are based on Western templates of the Cold War period.

The above does not apply to South Asia for a variety of reasons. The chief reason for global anxiety about the threat of a nuclear conflict in South Asia arises from the uncertain implications of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal as opposed to India’s. These need to be focused on in the context of the forthcoming India-Pakistan talks on nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs). They also need to be focused on to disabuse Western countries’ inclination to equate an unstable nuclear armed Pakistan with a stable and mature democracy like India.

South Asia’s Nuclear Weapons Environment Differs From That of the Cold War:

The striking differences between these two sets of environment can be listed as follows.

* United States and Russia (read former Soviet Union) as the two main adversaries were geographically separated by thousands of miles. Pakistan and India are geographically contiguous.

* United States and Russia fought the Second World War together as allies. Their subsequent Cold War confrontation still had available to them a number of back room channels for diplomacy and crisis management. Pakistan has adorned itself with a bitter legacy of hatred and animosity for India, making dialogue impossible. It has launched four wars against India.

* United States and Russia as nuclear powers never indulged in a direct armed conflict. Pakistan after becoming a nuclear weapon state launched the Kargil war in 1999.

* United States and Russia’s nuclear weapons were not in direct control of their military. Same is the case with India; but Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are directly controlled by the military.

* United States and Russia during the Cold War were involved in an ideological struggle ( Capitalism vs Communism). There were no territorial disputes with religious overtones. Pakistan’s ‘core dispute’ with India ( as the Pakistan’s Generals term it) namely Kashmir, is basically “Islamic” in character. Kashmir is claimed by Pakistan not on the basis of any historico-legal facts but on the basis of the pernicious “Two Nation” theory i.e. as a Muslim majority area, Kashmir or the Kashmir Valley in particular should have gone to Pakistan.

The above factors create a different set of complexities and overtones to the question of South Asia as nuclear conflict prone- region.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal has many uncertain implications in attendance which are Pakistan-specific and which need to be recognised by all international observers and particularly by the United States and the Western countries, who tend to equate Pakistan and India on the nuclear dangers issue. India can therefore, not adopt the Western path of nuclear CBMs. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and its uncertain implications are analysed below.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb or an “Islamic Bomb”:

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons initially were claimed as the “Islamic Bomb” and financed as such by Islamic countries like Libya, Saudi Arabia and probably Iran too.The quid pro quo was access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons technology. Of this, evidence of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons technology proliferation to Libya and Iran has surfaced lately. The Islamic World welcomed Pakistan’s nuclear weapons’ advent as an “Islamic Bomb.” Pakistan, therefore, has to make an official declaration that its nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence and defence of Pakistan. If Pakistan fails to make such an official declaration, then the implications of the Pakistani nuclear weapons transcend the confines of South Asia, impinging on United States strategic interests in the Greater Middle East and the security of Israel.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Arsenal as a Source for an Islamic Jehadi “Radiological Weapon”:

In the light of the following factors it is impossible to dismiss the possibility that Pakistan nuclear weapons arsenal could be a source for an Islamic Jehadi terrorist “radiological weapon”

* “Islamic Bomb” overtones.

* Pakistan’s nuclear scientists’ linkages with the Al Qaeda and their stay in Afghanistan with them.

* Pakistan’s record of rogue nuclear weapons technology proliferation.

* “Al Qaedist” elements within the Pakistan Army spiriting away nuclear weapons materials for a terrorist nuclear weapon.

Anthony H. Cordesman of the US think tank CSIS in one of his works has described three forms in which a “radiological weapon” can appear, two of which could apply to the Pakistani context.

* "Dirty Weapon" using fissile material with contaminated or low enrichment levels that would have limited heat and blast effects, but still produce yields of 3 to 5 KT, and which would effectively poison a city if detonated near the ground. Such a device would reduce some of the manufacturing and design problems inherent in creating clean or efficient nuclear weapons.

* Use radioactive material in micro- powder or liquid form as a terror or an unconventional weapon. Such a weapon may not generate substantial radio active lethality, but however have the capacity to contaminate a key area and to create panic.

Such weapons could be used by Islamic Jehadi terrorists against USA, Europe, Israel and in the South Asian context against India.

Pakistan’s rhetorical guarantees that its nuclear weapons arsenal is secure and well protected does not carry much credibility in view of Pakistan’s demonstrated propensity for opportunism when it comes to nuclear weapons. The international community has to find answers and solutions to the uncertain implications of Pakistan as a source of a ‘Dirty’ Bomb’ for Islamic Jehadi terrorists.

Pakistan Army’s Control of the Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Arsenal:

The most worrying and uncertain implication of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal is that it is totally under the control of Pakistan Army. This stands substantiated by Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister who is on record saying that: “Control over Pakistani nuclear capability has always remained with the military.” Even if there were to be a civilian Prime minister, a think-tank opines that “It has always been a military program. If it comes to it, the civilian Prime Minister would have to do as told by the military.”

How can nuclear confidence building measures be initiated or nuclear risk reduction measures be put into place in South Asia, when the Pakistan Army noted for its military adventurism against India is in control of the Pakistani nuclear weapons arsenal?

Owen-Bennet Jones of the BBC in one of his books on Pakistan makes the following pertinent observations in this regard:

* "No civilian Pakistani Prime Minister would be able to control the Pakistan Army’s decision to use nuclear weapons against India".

* "Difficult to imagine any Pakistani officer accepting an order to use the nuclear bombs from the Prime Minister without first clearing the instruction from the Army Chief".

* "Pakistan’s Armyofficers are tight lipped about dual control of Pak nuclear weapns".

In the South Asian context, India has no trust in the bonafides of Pakistan Army as a trustworthy organisation. Hence in any South Asian nuclear CBMs and “Nuclear Risk Reduction” measures or “Nuclear Signaling” between the two countries ( famous and favourite buzzwords of United States strategic analysts), the control of the Pakistani nuclear weapons arsenal by the Pakistan Army erodes any meaningful initiatives or advances in reducing the dangers of a nuclear conflict in South Asia.

The problem is further compounded when Pakistan is ruled by a Pakistani General who doubles or triples or quadruples as President, C-in-C of Pak Army, CEO and what not.

India cannot be expected to have any meaningful dialogue or nuclear CBMs with Pakistan against such a contextual background.

Pakistan’s Propensity for Nuclear Brinkmanship:

Pakistan had indulged in nuclear brinkmanship even when it had not overtly demonstrated its nuclear weapons capability. To disabuse the notion that this paper has an anti-Pakistan bias, Owen-Bennet Jones once again needs to be quoted to substantiate Pakistan's propensity to resort to nuclear brinkmanship.; His account emerges as under:

* Ex. Brass Talks. 1987

Pakistan conveyed a threat of a nuclear strike to India through the Pak. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Zain Noorani to Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad.

* 1990.

India and Pakistan came close to war due to Pakistan’s proxy war in Kashmir. USA became convinced that during the crisis:

1. Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was ordered to assemble at least one nuclear weapon.

2. Nuclear armed F-16s were deployed in South Pakistan.

* 1990.

Pakistan’s C-in-C General Mirza Aslam Beg, in an interview issued a warning to India:“If Israel hits us ( pre-emptive strike), you (India) shall be held responsible and Bombay will cease to exist.

* 1999. Kargil War.

Nuclear issue was in the back ground but Pakistan’s Senate leader and Minister for Religious affairs openly threatened the use of nuclear weapons. (Comment: It is strange that Pakistan had to convey a nuclear war through its “Religious Affairs” Minister.Was it the threat of use of the Islamic bomb?

*1999. Kargil War.

US former Special Assistant to the President, Bruce Reidel is said to have mentioned that USA believed that Pakistan military was preparing nuclear-tipped missiles and that too possibly even without telling the civilian leadership.

The nett. deductions from the foregoing are that:

* Pakistan Army obsessed with its “Jehadi” constructs against India could defy Pakistan’s civilian government and initiate a nuclear exchange against India.

* Nuclear brinkmanship will be an established feature of Pakistan Army’s operation of its nuclear weapons arsenal.

* Pakistan Army does not display any sensitivity towards Western concepts of nuclear CBMs; nuclear risk reduction measures and nuclear signaling.

If that be so, no sane Indian political leadership or Indian military hierarchy could invest much in Western concepts of prevention of the crossing of nuclear threshold by Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Reluctance to Adopt “No First Use” Principle in its Nuclear Doctrine:

In the nuclear deterrence calculus of Southern Asia, which includes China, the position of the countries on the principle of “No First Use” is as follows:

* China. “No First Use” of Nuclear Weapons against non-nuclear states.

* India. “No First Use” of nuclear weapons without riders.

* Pakistan. It refuses to adopt the principle of " No First Use" of nuclear weapons in any form.

Apologists for Pakistan have sought to justify Pakistan’s stand on the ground that Pakistan’s asymmetry with India, both conventional and nuclear, prompts this obsessive stand.

But the question that goes abegging is that in light of India’s “No First Use” commitment, maintained despite Indian public opinion to the contrary, what is the need for Pakistan not to abandon its “First Use” of nuclear weapons option? The answer simply is lack of trust and faith.

If the above be so then following the age old adage that “courtesy begets courtesy” one could add that “Trust begets Trust”. And if Pakistan continues to display the lack of mutual trust and faith, how can India proceed ahead on the Indo-Pak talks on nuclear CBMs in mid June 2004.

Pakistan’s stand not to accept the “No First Use” principle stood endorsed by even non-military Pakistan dignitaries in a joint signed article in the Pakistani newspaper Dawn by Agha Shahi, Zulfiqar Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar-two former Pakistani Foreign Ministers.

Pakistan’s obsessive reliance on a nuclear doctrine of “First Use”-what does it imply? Implicit in such an obsession could be to keep an option open for “pre-emptive nuclear strikes” against India. Is this credible against India’s established “second strike” capabilities? Or is it that Pakistan is convinced that its pre-emptive nuclear first strike against India would result in the complete destruction of India’s second-strike retaliatory capability This would be fallacious thinking on the part of Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Low Nuclear Threshold and High Risks of Inadvertence:

Both these nuclear conflict risks emanating from Pakistan are very high due to the following reason:

* Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal being under the exclusive control of the Pakistan Army.

* Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal being vulnerable to hi-jacking by Al Qaedist and Islamic Jehadi elements within the Pakistan Army.

* Pakistan's demonstrated pattern of behavior in terms of nuclear weapons brinkmanship and nuclear blackmail.

* Pakistan's refusal to adopt a “No First Use” principle in its nuclear doctrine.

Pakistan also seeks to use its nuclear weapons as an instrument to “internationalise”its disputes with India and force Western countries to pressurize India on Pakistan's behalf. Pakistan's propensity in this respect can lead to misreading of signals by India

Pakistan's Nuclear Targeting:

Pakistan's nuclear weapons when not operating as an “Islamic Bomb” are India-specific in terms of nuclear targeting. In the absence of intelligence and surveillance satellites and other sophisticated imagery intelligence, Pakistan’s nuclear targeting becomes confined to targeting India’s civil population centers and other critical infrastructure in and around India’s urban centers.

While Pakistan has signed an agreement with India on non-targeting of each others nuclear installations and facilities, Pakistan is unlikely to sign on the dotted line in terms of attack against civil population centers.

India needs to pin down Pakistan on this issue in any negotiations on nuclear CBMs.

Uncertain Implications of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Arsenal for India:

India should not fall into the trap of thinking that Pakistan will acquire Western mindsets in terms of approaches to nuclear CBMs in South Asia, and that Pakistan would come to the nuclear CBM negotiating table with that sort of revised mind-set.

The following need to be considered while formulating Indian approaches for such negotiations:

* Pakistan is grudgingly coming forward for nuclear CBM negotiations under tremendous US pressure.

* Pakistan would keep playing up the myth of Kashmir being a nuclear flash point.

* Both sides have a critical problem of “mutual trust and faith” in each others intentions and commitments.

* Pakistan would refuse to view India’s nuclear weapons arsenal through the perspective of India's national security requirements in relation to the China threat.

* Nuclear restraint cannot be forthcoming from Pakistan when all along so far Pakistan has indulged in both nuclear and conventional brinkmanship.

Keeping the uncertain implications of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal discussed earlier and the above considerations any India-Pakistan negotiations on nuclear CBMs in South Asia would stand reduced to long drawn out discussions on the theoretical aspects of nuclear CBMs, nuclear risk reduction measures and nuclear signaling.

However, dialogues must go on for, if nothing else, but to make Pakistan commence talking on nuclear CBMs, however dismal the prospects.

Concluding Observations:

Pakistan sought to acquire strategic symmetry with India by going in for a nuclear weapons arsenal. It thought that it’s conventional warfare asymmetries with India would be swept away by Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence flowing from its nuclear weapons arsenal.

However, the above is debatable, because India by virtue of its overwhelming economic and technological resources superiority can impose on Pakistan, both a nuclear arms race and a conventional arms race. Even the latter, singly, would bring Pakistan to economic ruin.

The above factor should prompt Pakistan to adopt a more adaptive approach to South Asia’s strategic realities. It should also impel Pakistan to remove the uncertain implications generated by its nuclear brinkmanship displayed for over a decade now.

That India did not call Pakistan’s nuclear bluffs was not because of any cowardice or fear of a Pakistani imposed nuclear conflict but because of “restraint” as a responsible and politically mature nation-state. But the Indian restraint cannot be read by Pakistan as an unending and open-ended policy of the Indian nation state.

Pakistan’s nuclear waywardness, its record of WMD proliferation, scant respect for honouring India-Pakistan Agreements of the past and other peace initiatives, do not generate much faith and trust in its approaches to nuclear CBMs in South Asia. This is especially so, when Pakistan considers its nuclear weapons as the “Great Equaliser” with India and also a tool for nuclear brinkmanship to internationalise its disputes with India.