Asean redional forum

The Association of South East Asian Nations’ (Asean) Regional Forum (ARF), nearly a decade-and-a-half old, is pretty well known on the global political stage. It has often expanded but never strayed from the collective hold of the 10-member Asean, which not only floated but also continues to pilot Asia’s premier security-dialogue group.

Established powers, emerging players, and small countries have jostled for space within the forum, their common identity being that of Asean’s dialogue-partners. But, until the ARF’s 14th annual meeting in Manila on August 2, no one really tried to address the unspoken question about the Forum’s basic identity.

The emergence of the ARF coincided with the end of the Cold War. And, China traces its own “new thinking on security” to the unsettled realities of post-Cold War politics across the world. Looking afresh at the ARF in this light, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi described it as a “non-aligned” forum and equated it with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Both, in his view, “are not targeted at any third country and do not define friend and foe on ideological ground.”

The ARF and the SCO “are good examples” of the “new thinking on security.” This punch-line has a transparent political meaning.

The ARF brings together such diverse players as the United States, China, Russia, Japan, India, and the European Union in the sub-category of major powers and emerging activists. And, this sub-group consists of countries that do not share a common political ideology.

China’s perception

So, a relevant question, sparked by China’s portrayal of the ARF, is whether some countries in this sub-group are now banding themselves as “friends” on “ideological ground” within or outside this collective forum. At Tokyo’s initiative, four countries — the U.S., India, Japan itself, and Australia — are now exploring the possibility of forming, at the least, an exclusive dialogue forum of democracies and militaries.

To a question from this correspondent, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte said in Manila on August 1 that the four “have no plan to meet on a quadrilateral basis at this particular time” at the ministerial level. Their senior officials had already met in Manila several weeks earlier.

The possible equation among these four democracies dominated the mood behind the ARF scene on this occasion. Unsurprisingly, Japanese spokesman Mitsuo Sakaba said: “We are not taking into account, in any sense, the Chinese relations [with] these four countries. We are talking about functional cooperation, including disaster mitigation … maritime security issues, counter-terrorism aspect, or humanitarian support. So, those non-political issues are on the agenda.”

India has clarified that its dialogue with the U.S., Japan, and Australia, in a quadrilateral framework, is not directed against any country, China in particular. Australia also assertively insists that any such arrangement of major Asia-Pacific democracies will have no anti-China focus.

Indeed, Canberra has indicated its wariness about rushing to form such a new group, howsoever window-dressed.

The idea of a U.S.-India-Japan-Australia forum of democracies and militaries has not been abandoned, of course, at this stage.

Nonetheless, the issue, concerning only a sub-section of the ARF, was not mentioned by Philippines Foreign Secretary Alberto Romulo in his Chairman’s Statement on the latest deliberations of the larger Forum.

Relevant to China’s vision of the ARF as a new “non-aligned” forum, and to Mr. Yang’s denunciation of the lingering “Cold War mentality” in some quarters, is a counter-view from the west. Articulated most recently by Azar Gat, a security affairs specialist, the western counter-view is that China and Russia might, in due course, emerge as a new “Second World” with, what is described as, a “non-democratic” political complexion.

Second World

Such a Second World could, it is argued, “emerge as an attractive alternative to liberal democracy” in the global arena. In China’s world view, this should also smack of a divisive “Cold War mentality.”

It is significant, therefore, that Mr. Yang has told the ARF that the SCO, which links China and Russia to some Central Asian states as full members as also India and Pakistan as observers, is “non-aligned,” too. The central theme of such non-alignment is the avoidance of any ideological fraternities or groups altogether in inter-State relations.

The non-aligned movement largely remained outside the competing ideological blocs of the Cold War period. The ARF, in contrast, contains within its own fold countries with varying domestic political agendas or even with opposing ideological affinities.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, the ARF is still struggling to come up with agreed action plans. Not to be discounted, though, is its potential ability to encourage engagement across the divide over difficult issues.