IRAN: UNITED STATES� STRATEGIC OPTIONS RE-EXAMINED

IRAN: UNITED STATES� STRATEGIC OPTIONS RE-EXAMINED

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

More than quarter of a century has passed since Iran slipped out of the United States strategic and military grasp. It was and remains a strategic trauma for the United States as the loss of Iran from the American geo-strategic orbit in the Middle East knocked off the �main pillar� of United States strategic formulations in this vital oil-rich region.

The United States policy establishment had allowed itself to be led by a delusionary belief that its massive strategic and political investments in the person of the Shah of Iran and his military machine would ensure an unending insurance for US strategic interests in the Gulf region. Little did the United States realize that the people of Iran and their aspirations mattered more than a pro-US ruler or dictator at the helm. One is seeing a repeat of history in US policies centered on General Musharraf and the Pakistan Army.

In these twenty five years, Iran has been in the strategic cross-hairs of the United States constantly and more intensely in the last six years.

The strategic animosity of the United States became more pronounced in the last three years when concrete evidence surfaced that Pakistan had actively assisted Iran in its nuclear enrichment programs along with those of Libya and North Korea.

The current United States � Iran confrontation on the Iranian nuclear program provides a strange contrast in American approaches, namely: (1) Pakistan, the �original sinner� of WMD proliferation to the US so-called �axis of evil� countries has not only been called to account by the United States but stands exonerated by the US Administration (2) Iran stands intensely �demonized� by the United States on the nuclear account for reasons which are more geo-political than legal (3) In marked contrast Libya and more specifically North Korea were never demonized and no massing of US military power against them has been ever put in place.

This author has covered the US-Iran confrontation from 2003 onwards in nearly a dozen papers and examined every conceivable option of the United States against Iran from Limited War to all out war and selective strikes against Iran�s nuclear facilities along with Israel.

A full paper �United States Imperatives for Rapprochement With Iran: A Perspective Analysis (http://saag.org/papers14/paper1352.html) dated 28.04.2005 examined in detail the imperatives.

In the last four years, the United States � Iran confrontation has shown no promise of reconciliation or resolution, despite the significant geo-strategic and geo-political changes that have taken place. On the contrary, the United States-Iran confrontation has become more venomous from both sides.

The United States has let no opportunity to slip to declare that �all options are on the table� implying that the military option was certainly open. Iran concurrently has been equally in open defiance of the United States maintaining that it will not be cowed down by American threats that Iran should cease its nuclear enrichment program.

The Middle East today has enough number of military flashpoints, all in open explosion. Can the United States afford one more significantly potent flashpoint?

In this intractable tinder-box of US-Iran confrontation, the spark that can ignite this explosive mix would inevitably, if it comes around, would come from the United States. Iran dare not ignite the Middle East tinder-box by any direct military misadventure.

Both sides are however engaged today in proxy war against each other. Iran uses the Shia militias in Iraq and Lebanon to strategically discomfit USA. The United States uses Pakistani bases for clandestine operations against Iran by its Special Forces and Iranian dissidents.

In such a disturbing environment it becomes pertinent to re-examine United States strategic options against Iran. The following aspects will be examined in this paper:

* United States Strategic Options on Iran: A Comparative Analysis of the Contextual Determinants in 2003 and 2007
* United States Military Option Against Iran in 2007 Stands Severely Restricted
* Iranian Counter-Responses in 2007 Could be Expected to be More Sharper
* US-Iran Rapprochement: The Only Workable Option Available

United States Strategic Options on Iran: A Comparative Analysis of the Contextual Determinants in 2003 and 2007

A comparative analysis of the contextual determinants in 2003 and 2007 which come into play in deciding United States strategic options on Iran can be briefly said to have restricted United States options today.

In 2003, the contextual strategic determinants that were in play were: (1) The United States had Iran in a military cleft-stick with its military deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan (2) United States entire political spectrum and public opinion was strongly supportive of US Administration strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan; it perceived them as part of the �global war on terror� and WMD proliferation (3) Russia�s strategic resurgence though in the offing but had not become fully assertive (4) Islamic Jehadi terrorism had not manifested itself in Europe as exemplified by the suicide bombings in Madrid, London etc.

In 2007 the contextual determinants for USA stand out in marked disadvantageous contrast to 2003, namely: (1) The United states is in a strategic imbroglio in Iraq and Afghanistan; the US 2003 military cleft-stick stands seriously weakened (2) US political spectrum and public support on Iraq and Afghanistan has become critically divisive (3) Russia�s strategic resurgence is in full effect and the United States cannot discount Russia�s strategic stakes in Iran (4) European allies of USA after the major bombing incidents in UK are mindful, if not fearful, of Islamic backlashes, should they get drawn into US plans of the military option against Iran (5) Rise in oil revenues has facilitated Iran�s military modernization and buildup in these last four years (6) Iraq as the main base for potential US and/or joint military operations against Iran is in the throes of a civil war: the first signs of a concerted Shia-Sunni upsurge against US military occupation of Iraq have manifested themselves (7) Pakistan as the other base of US operations against Iran is in a politically explosive situation today.

The above determinants would come heavily into play in US decision making on Iran as it ponders its options.

United States Military Option Against Iran in 2007 Stands Severely Restricted

United States military options against Iran were analyzed by the author in his paper �Iran in United States Military Crosshairs: Brief Analysis of the End-Game� (http://www.saag.org/papers13/paper1298.html) dated 25.3.2005).

The major observations made in this paper were: (1) Iran�s demonization over nuclear weapons issue makes the average Iranian convinced that Iranian nuclear weapons are the only credible deterrent against US military threats (2) Iranian nuclear weapons program will enjoy support even if tomorrow a �democratic regime� emerges in Iran (3) The Brazilian and South African models cannot come into play in Iran as in the case of the former two countries there was no �demonization campaign� against them for dissuasion from nuclear weapons program (4) Iran poses a politico-strategic threat to USA in the Gulf Region and not a military threat in the foreseeable future; hence USA has to approach the Iran issue in a politico-strategic context, rather than in the military context.

The contextual determinants in 2007 rule out an all-out military intervention by USA against Iran and so also a Limited War. Even resorting to �selective military strikes� against Iran�s nuclear infrastructure carries with it the dangers of Iran�s counter-responses in the asymmetric dimensions.

Iranian Counter-Responses in 2007 Could be Expected to be More Sharper

Iran enjoys a wide range of counter-responses to United States military intervention in Iran in whatever form. It doesn�t necessarily follow that a United States �Limited War� against Iran would draw �Limited counter-responses� from Iran in the asymmetric dimension.

The full range of Iranian counter-responses stand spelt out in this author�s paper �United States Israel Plans for Pre-emptive Military Strikes on Iran�s Nuclear Sires: An Analytical Survey (http://www.saag.org/papers16/paper1554.html) dated 29.09.2005.

In 2007, all indicators point that Iranian counter-responses to any United States planned military intervention in Iraq could be sharper than what was pointed out in 2005 for the following reasons. (1) Iran has tasted the success of Shia militias against the United States in Iraq (2) Iran has evidenced the success of Iran-supported Hezbollah in Lebanon against Israel supported by USA (3) US and Western fears of fighting on two fronts against a Pan-Islamic threat: the main one in the Gulf and an equally potent one in the rear i.e. within their respective homelands arising from Muslim population in millions in USA, UK, France and Germany. These countries do not have the physical numbers to fight the war on two fronts and their technological warfare superiorities are not effective against asymmetric warfare threats.

And as pointed out earlier by this author, in Shia theology martyrdom in the cause of a religious war is exalted and extolled much more than in Sunni theology. The entire spectrum of Iranian counter-responses to US military intervention against Iran needs to be viewed in this light.

What needs to be noted is that so far the Hezbollah has restrained attacking US targets in the Middle East, in Europe and in USA. It does not want to play its hand prematurely against USA and reserve it for the ultimate showing.

Rather tenuous now, but could come into play is pan-Shia and pan-Islamic outrage and vengeance against US and Western targets all over the world, should US exercises its military options.

Should the US and the West succumb to such an implicit threat or blackmail? The answer lies in USA and West finding answers to a vexing question � do they have the means and resources to fight a war on two fronts? No clear answers are forth conning, but all indicators point that the West is ill-equipped in terms of resources to deal with the threat on two fronts.

US-Iran Rapprochement: The Only Workable Option Available

What is dawning more forcefully with each passing day is that the United States exercise of the military option against Iran would be inadvisable.

Both the United States and Iran have to come to a political solution on the Iranian enrichment program. The political solution can only emerge if the United States makes efforts and expresses readiness for a political rapprochement with Iran. For this existing mindsets in Washington need to change.

All related aspects of this rapprochement stand analyzed in this authors paper; �United States Imperatives for Rapprochement With Iran: A Perspective Analysis� (http://saag.org/papers14/paper1352.html) dated 28.04.2005.

The United States history is replete with precedents of rapprochement with its arch-enemies as evident from the China and Vietnam cases. In both these cases, China and Vietnam had engaged in vicious military conflict. Both of them fought the United States to a military stalemate, despite US military technological superiorities and airpower.

In contrast, Iran has no history of armed conflict with USA. At the root of the USA-Iran confrontation is the United States mindset that stands frozen in the events of the ouster of the Shah of Iran and the US diplomats hostage crisis that followed.

Surely the US mindset can change in respect of Iran as it changed in the case of China and Vietnam.

The recent release of 15 British Navy personnel captured by Iran is a pointer that Iran when treated with respect and without disdain is amenable to international processes.

Fortunately today even within USA there are now more voices favoring a rapprochement with Iran than when this author penned his paper.

It is the only honorable option for the United States to adopt. The political leadership has to rise above the policy advisory groups views on Iran as their �knowledge (on Iran) too often is derived from the prevailed demonology of detachment and indifference.�

Concluding Observations

The stark strategic reality in 2007 that faces the United States and Iran is that the United States military option is not exercisable today and could be counterproductive. Similarly, Iran must recognize that it cannot endure and afford an endless confrontation with the United States and the West.

Ironically, it was the United States which launched Iran under the Shah of Iran on a sizeable nuclear program. One could even surmise that had the Shah of Iran not been displaced, an Iranian nuclear weapon arsenal with United States permissiveness would have been a distinct eventual possibility.

It is imperative for the United States to explore all possible avenues for rapprochement with Iran and jointly arrive at parameters within which Iran�s aspirations for regional power status and some credible deterrence can be accommodated / adjusted in a manner which is not prejudicial to United States strategic interests in the Gulf Region.

Lastly, it needs to be said that resolution of Middle East crises cannot be achieved without co-opting Russia in the process. In the case of Iran, Russia does exercise a significant influence and the United States should attempt to bring this influence into play.