Wednesday, November 7, 2007

Agriculture as a planned, systematic approach to food acquisition has existed for at least 10,000 years. Pinpointing its exact origin is problematic, as it pre-dates writing. Evidence points to the Fertile Crescent of the Middle East as the site of the earliest planned sowing and harvesting of plants that had previously been gathered in the wild. Independent development of agriculture occurred in what is today northern and southern China, Africa's Sahel, New Guinea and several regions of the Americas.
Origins of agriculture

Threshing machine from 1881
When major climate change took place after the last ice age c.11,000 BC much of the earth became subject to long dry seasons. These conditions favoured annual plants which die off in the long dry season, leaving a dormant seed or tuber. These plants tended to put more energy into producing seeds than into woody growth. An abundance of readily storable wild grains and pulses enabled hunter-gatherers in some areas to form the first settled villages at this time.
The practice of agriculture first began around 8000 BC in the Fertile Crescent of the Middle East, part of present day Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Jordan which was then greener. This region was home to the greatest diversity of annual plants and according to one study 32 of the 56 largest grass seeds.[citation needed]
Several of the first crops to be domesticated were all crops of edible seeds, wheat, barley, peas, lentils, chickpeas, bitter vetch and flax. These plants were all readily storable, easy to grow and grew quickly. They had to undergo few genetic changes to be of use to farmers, their wild relatives remaining easily recognisable to this day. Crop domestication took place independently in geographically distant human populations.
In China, rice and millet were domesticated by 10 000 BC, followed by the beans mung, soy and azuki. In the Sahel region of Africa local rice and sorghum were domestic by 5000 BC. Local crops were domesticated independently in West Africa and possibly in New Guinea and Ethiopia. Evidence of the presence of wheat and some legumes in the 6th millennium BC have been found in the Indus Valley. Oranges were cultivated in the same millennium. The crops grown in the valley around 4000 BC were typically wheat, peas, sesame seed, barley, dates and mangoes. By 3500 BC cotton growing and cotton textiles were quite advanced in the valley. By 3000 BC farming of rice had started. Other monsoon crops of importance of the time was cane sugar. By 2500 BC, rice was an important component of the staple diet in Mohenjodaro near the Arabian Sea. By this time the Indians had large cities with well-stocked granaries. Three regions of the Americas independently domesticated corn, squashes, potato and sunflowers.
Reasons for changing to agriculture
Humans in many different areas of the earth took up farming in what is, set against the 500,000 year age span of modern humans, a very short time.
Originally, the idea was that the obvious benefits for a switch to agriculture were so profound that it was just the lack of knowledge that prevented it. However it has been found that more energy is required per person to maintain an agricultural civilisation than to support a hunter/gatherer existence. Hunter/gatherers thus had more abundant food and leisure time than early farmers, as was shown by Ester Boserup. Jack R. Harlan showed that it was possible to hand gather enough wild wheat in 3 weeks in Turkey to more than sustain someone for a year[1]. However once a civilisation moves to agriculture, it is very difficult to move back because of the extra population it can support.
There are several competing theories as to what drove populations to take up agriculture. These are
• The Oasis Theory which was original proposed by Raphael Pumpelly in 1908, but popularized by Vere Gordon Childe in 1928 and summarised in his book Man Makes Himself[2]. This theory maintains that as the climate got drier, communities contracted to oases where they were forced into close association with animals which were then domesticated together with planting of seeds. It has little support now as the climate data for the time does not support the theory.
• The Hilly Flanks hypothesis. Proposed by Robert Braidwood in 1948, it suggests that agriculture began in the hilly flanks of the Taurus and Zagros mountains, and that it developed from intensive focused grain gathering in the region.
• The Feasting model by Bryan Hayden[3] suggests that agriculture was driven by ostentatious displays of power, such as throwing feasts to exert dominance. This required assembling large quantities of food which drove agricultural technology.
• The Demographic theories proposed by Carl Sauer[4] and adapted by Lewis Binford[5] and Kent Flannery. This leads from an increasingly sedentary population, expanding up to the carrying capacity of the local environment, and requiring more food than can be gathered. Various social and economic factors help drive the need for food.
• The evolutionary/intentionality theory. As proposed by those such as David Rindos[6] the idea that agriculture is an evolutionary adaptation of plants and humans. Starting with domestication by protection of wild plants, followed specialisation of location and then domestication.
Ancient agriculture
Agriculture is believed to have been developed at multiple times in multiple areas, the earliest of which seems to have been in Southwest Asia. Pinpointing the absolute beginnings of agriculture is problematic because the transition away from purely hunter-gatherer societies, in some areas, began many thousands of years before the invention of writing. Nonetheless, archaeobotanists/paleoethnobotanists have traced the selection and cultivation of specific food plant characteristics, such as a semi-tough rachis and larger seeds, to just after the Younger Dryas (about 9,500 BC) in the early Holocene in the Levant region of the Fertile Crescent. There is much earlier evidence for use of wild cereals: anthropological and archaeological evidence from sites across Southwest Asia and North Africa indicate use of wild grain (e.g., from the ca. 20,000 BC site of Ohalo II in Israel, many Natufian sites in the Levant and from sites along the Nile in the 10th millennium BC). There is even early evidence for planned cultivation and trait selection: grains of rye with domestic traits have been recovered from Epi-Palaeolithic (10,000+ BC) contexts at Abu Hureyra in Syria, but this appears to be a localised phenomenon resulting from cultivation of stands of wild rye, rather than a definitive step towards domestication. It isn't until after 9,500 BC that the eight so-called founder crops of agriculture appear: first emmer and einkorn wheat, then hulled barley, peas, lentils, bitter vetch, chick peas and flax. These eight crops occur more or less simultaneously on PPNB sites in the Levant, although the consensus is that wheat was the first to be sown and harvested on a significant scale.
By 7000 BC, sowing and harvesting reached Mesopotamia and there, in the super fertile soil just north of the Persian Gulf, Sumerian ingenuity systematized it and scaled it up. By 6000 BC farming was entrenched on the banks of the Nile River. About this time, agriculture was developed independently in the Far East, probably in China, with rice rather than wheat as the primary crop. Maize was first domesticated, probably from teosinte, in the Americas around 3000-2700 BC, though there is some archaeological evidence of a much older development. The potato, the tomato, the pepper, squash, several varieties of bean, and several other plants were also developed in the New World, as was quite extensive terracing of steep hillsides in much of Andean South America. Agriculture was also independently developed on the island of New Guinea.
The reasons for the development of farming may have included climate change, but possibly there were also social reasons (e.g., accumulation of food surplus for competitive gift-giving as in the Pacific Northwest potlatch culture). Most certainly, there was a gradual transition from hunter-gatherer to agricultural economies after a lengthy period during which some crops were deliberately planted and other foods were gathered in the wild. Although localised climate change is the favoured explanation for the origins of agriculture in the Levant, the fact that farming was 'invented' at least three times elsewhere, and possibly more, suggests that social reasons may have been instrumental.

Sumerian Harvester's sickle, 3000 BCE. Baked clay. Field Museum.
Full dependency on domestic crops and animals did not occur until the Bronze Age, by which time wild resources contributed a nutritionally insignificant component to the usual diet. If the operative definition of agriculture includes large scale intensive cultivation of land, mono-cropping, organized irrigation, and use of a specialized labour force, the title "inventors of agriculture" would fall to the Sumerians, starting ca. 5,500 BC. Intensive farming allows a much greater density of population than can be supported by hunting and gathering, and allows for the accumulation of excess product for off-season use, or to sell/barter. The ability of farmers to feed large numbers of people whose activities have nothing to do with material production was the crucial factor in the rise of standing armies. Sumerian agriculture supported a substantial territorial expansion, together with much internecine conflict between cities, making them the first empire builders. Not long after, the Egyptians, powered by farming in the fertile Nile valley, achieved a population density from which enough warriors could be drawn for a territorial expansion more than tripling the Sumerian empire in area.[citation needed]
Sumerian agriculture
In Sumer, barley was the main crop, but wheat, flax, dates, apples, plums, and grapes were grown as well. Mesopotamia was blessed with flooding from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers but floods came in late spring or early summer from snow melting from the Turkish mountains. With Salt deposits under the soil, all of this made Mesopotamia very hard to farm.[7] The earliest known sheep and goats were also domesticated and were in a much larger quantity than cattle. Sheep were mainly kept for meat and milk, and butter and cheese were made from the latter. Ur, a large town that covered about 50 acres (20 hectares), had 10,000 animals kept in sheepfolds and stables and 3,000 slaughtered every year. The city's population of 6,000 included a labour force of 2,500 cultivated 3,000 acres (12 km²) of land. The labour force contained storehouse recorders, work foremen, overseers, and harvest supervisors to supplement labourers. Agricultural produce was given to temple personnel, important people in the community, and small farmers.
The land was plowed by teams of oxen pulling light unwheeled plows and grain was harvested with sickles in the spring. Wagons had solid wheels covered by leather tires kept in position by copper nails and were drawn by oxen and the Syrian onager (now extinct). Animals were harnessed by collars, yokes, and headstalls. They were controlled by reins, and a ring through the nose or upper lip and a strap under the jaw. As many as four animals could pull a wagon at one time. Though some hypothesize that Domestication of the horse occurred as early as 4000 BC in the Ukraine, the horse was definitely in use by the Sumerians around 2000 BC.
Chinese agriculture
The unique tradition of Chinese agriculture has been traced to the pre-historic Xianrendong Relics and Diaotonghuan Relics (c. 12 0000 BC-7500 BC). [citation needed] Chinese historical and governmental records of the Warring States (481 BC-221 BC), Qin Dynasty (221 BC-207 BC), and Han Dynasty (202 BC-220 AD) eras allude to the use of complex agricultural practices, such as a nationwide granary system and widespread use of sericulture. However, the oldest extant Chinese book on agriculture is the Chimin Yaoshu of 535 AD, written by Jia Sixia.[8] Although much of the literature of the time was elaborate, flowery, and allusive, Jia's writing style was very straightforward and lucid, a literary approach to agriculture that later Chinese agronomists after Jia would follow, such as Wang Zhen and his groundbreaking Nong Shu of 1313 AD.[9] Jia's book was also incredibly long, with over one hundred thousand written Chinese characters, and quoted 160 other Chinese books that were written previously (but no longer survive).[9] The contents of Jia's 6th century book include sections on land preparation, seeding, cultivation, orchard management, forestry, and animal husbandry.[10] The book also includes peripherally related content covering trade and culinary uses for crops.[10]
For agricultural purposes, the Chinese had innovated the hydraulic-powered trip hammer by the 1st century BC.[11] Although it found other purposes, its main function to pound, decorticate, and polish grain that otherwise would have been done manually. The Chinese also innovated the square-pallet chain pump by the 1st century AD, powered by a waterwheel or an oxen pulling a on a system of mechanical wheels.[12] Although the chain pump found use in public works of providing water for urban and palatial pipe systems,[13] it was used largely to lift water from a lower to higher elevation in filling irrigation canals and channels for farmland.[14]
Indian agriculture
Evidence of the presence of wheat and some legumes in the 6th millennium BCE have been found in the Indus Valley. Oranges were cultivated in the same millennium. The crops grown in the valley around 4000 BCE were typically wheat, peas, sesame seed, barley, dates and mangoes. By 3500 BCE cotton growing and cotton textiles were quite advanced in the valley. By 3000 BCE farming of rice had started. Other monsoon crops of importance of the time was cane sugar. By 2500 BCE, rice was an important component of the staple diet in Mohenjodaro near the Arabian Sea.
The Indus Plain had rich alluvial deposits which came down the Indus River in annual floods. This helped sustain farming that formed basis of the Indus Valley Civilization at Harappa. The people built dams and drainage systems for the crops.
By 2000 BCE tea, bananas and apples were being cultivated in India. There was coconut trade with East Africa in 200 BCE. By 500 CE, eggplants were being cultivated.
Roman agriculture
Roman agriculture built off techniques pioneered by the Sumerians, with a specific emphasis on the cultivation of crops for trade and export. Romans laid the groundwork for the manorial economic system, involving serfdom, which flourished in the Middle Ages.
Mesoamerican agriculture
In Mesoamerica, the Aztecs were some of the most innovative farmers of the ancient world and farming provided the entire basis of their economy. The land around Lake Texcoco was fertile but not large enough to produce the amount of food needed for the population of their expanding empire. The Aztecs developed irrigation systems, formed terraced hillsides, and fertilized their soil. However, their greatest agricultural technique was the chinampa or artificial islands also known as "floating gardens". These were used to make the swampy areas around the lake suitable for farming. To make chinampas, canals were dug through the marshy islands and shores, then mud was heaped on huge mats made of woven reeds. The mats were anchored by tying them to posts driven into the lake bed and then planting trees at their corners that took root and secured the artificial islands permanently. The Aztecs grew corn, squash, vegetables, and flowers on chinampas. Alvaro loves Mayra.
Andean agriculture
The Andean civilizations were predominantly agricultural societies; the Incas took advantage of the ground, conquering the adversities like the Andean area and the inclemencies of the weather. The adaptation of agricultural technologies that already were used previously, allowed the Incas to organize the production a diversity of products of the coast, mountain and jungle, so them could be able to redistribute to villages that did not have access to other regions. The technological achievements reached to agricultural level, had not been possible without the workforce that was at the disposal of the Sapa Inca, as well as the road system that was allowing to store adequately the harvested resources and to distribute them for all the territory.
Muslim Agricultural Revolution

A valve-operated reciprocating suction piston pump water-raising machine with a crankshaft-connecting rod mechanism invented by al-Jazari.
From the 8th century, the medieval Islamic world witnessed a fundamental transformation in agriculture known as the "Muslim Agricultural Revolution", "Arab Agricultural Revolution", or "Green Revolution".[15] Due to the global economy established by Muslim traders across the Old World during the "Afro-Asiatic age of discovery" or "Pax Islamica", this enabled the diffusion of many crops, plants and farming techniques between different parts of the Islamic world, as well as the adaptation of crops, plants and techniques from beyond the Islamic world, distributed throughout Islamic lands which normally would not be able to grow these crops.[16] Some have referred to the diffusion of numerous crops during this period as the "Globalisation of Crops",[17] which, along with an increased mechanization of agriculture, led to major changes in economy, population distribution, vegetation cover,[18] agricultural production and income, population levels, urban growth, the distribution of the labour force, linked industries, cooking and diet, clothing, and numerous other aspects of life in the Islamic world.[16]
Serfdom became widespread in eastern Europe in the Middle Ages. The Middle Ages owe much of its development to advances made in Islamic areas, which flourished culturally and materially while Europe and other Roman and Byzantine administered lands entered an extended period of social and economic stagnation. As early as the ninth century, an essentially modern agricultural system became central to economic life and organization in the Arab caliphates, replacing the largely export driven Roman model. The great cities of the Near East, North Africa and Moorish Spain were supported by elaborate agricultural systems which included extensive irrigation based on knowledge of hydraulic and hydrostatic principles, some of which were continued from Roman times. In later centuries, Persian Muslims began to function as a conduit, transmitting cultural elements, including advanced agricultural techniques, into Turkic lands and western India. The Muslims introduced what was to become an agricultural revolution based on four key areas:
• Development of a sophisticated system of irrigation using machines such as norias, water mills, water raising machines, dams and reservoirs. With such technology they managed to greatly expand the exploitable land area.
• The adoption of a scientific approach[19] to farming enabled them to improve farming techniques derived from the collection and collation of relevant information throughout the whole of the known world.[19] Farming manuals were produced in every corner of the Muslim world detailing where, when and how to plant and grow various crops. Advanced scientific techniques allowed leaders like Ibn al-Baytar to introduce new crops and breeds and strains of livestock into areas where they were previously unknown.
• Incentives based on a new approach to land ownership and labourers' rights, combining the recognition of private ownership and the rewarding of cultivators with a harvest share commensurate with their efforts. Their counterparts in Europe struggled under a feudal system in which they were almost slaves (serfs) with little hope of improving their lot by hard work.
• The introduction of new crops transforming private farming into a new global industry exported everywhere,[16] including Europe, where farming was mostly restricted to wheat strains obtained much earlier via central Asia. Spain received what she in turn transmitted to the rest of Europe; many agricultural and fruit-growing processes, together with many new plants, fruit and vegetables. These new crops included sugar cane, rice, citrus fruit, apricots, cotton, artichokes, aubergines, and saffron. Others, previously known, were further developed. Muslims also brought to that country lemons, oranges, cotton, almonds, figs and sub-tropical crops such as bananas and sugar cane. Several were later exported from Spanish coastal areas to the Spanish colonies in the New World. Also transmitted via Muslim influence, a silk industry flourished, flax was cultivated and linen exported, and esparto grass, which grew wild in the more arid parts, was collected and turned into various articles.
Renaissance agriculture
The invention of a three field system of crop rotation during the Middle Ages, and the importation of the Chinese-invented moldboard plow[citation needed], vastly improved agricultural efficiency.
After 1492 the world's agricultural patterns were shuffled in the widespread exchange of plants and animals known as the Columbian Exchange. Crops and animals that were previously only known in the Old World were now transplanted to the New and vice versa. Perhaps most notably, the tomato became a favorite in European cuisine, and maize and potatoes were widely adopted. Other transplanted crops include pineapple, cocoa, and tobacco. In the other direction, several wheat strains quickly took to western hemisphere soils and became a dietary staple even for native North, Central and South Americans.
Agriculture was a key element in the Atlantic slave trade, Triangular trade, and the expansion by European powers into the Americas. In the expanding Plantation economy, large plantations producing crops including sugar, cotton, and indigo, were heavily dependent upon slave labor.
British Agricultural Revolution
Between the 16th century and the mid-19th century, Great Britain saw a massive increase in agricultural productivity and net output. New agricultural practices like enclosure, mechanization, four-field crop rotation and selective breeding enabled an unprecedented population growth, freeing up a significant percentage of the workforce, and thereby helped drive the Industrial Revolution.
By the early 1800s, agricultural practices, particularly careful selection of hardy strains and cultivars, had so improved that yield per land unit was many times that seen in the Middle Ages and before.
The 18th and 19th century also saw the development of glasshouses, or greenhouses, initially for the protection and cultivation of exotic plants imported to Europe and North America from the tropics.
Experiments on Plant Hybridization in the late 1800s yielded advances in the understanding of plant genetics, and subsequently, the development of hybrid crops.
Increasing dependence upon monoculture crops lead to famines and food shortages, most notably the Irish Potato Famine (1845–1849).
Storage silos and grain elevators appeared in the 19th centuries.
Recent history
New technologies
A tractor ploughing an alfalfa field
With the rapid rise of mechanization in the late 19th and 20th centuries, particularly in the form of the tractor, farming tasks could be done with a speed and on a scale previously impossible. These advances, joined to science-driven innovations in methods and resources, have led to efficiencies enabling certain modern farms in the United States, Argentina, Israel, Germany and a few other nations to output volumes of high quality produce per land unit at what may be the practical limit.
The development of rail and highway networks and the increasing use of container shipping and refrigeration in developed nations have also been essential to the growth of mechanized agriculture, allowing for the economical long distance shipping of produce.
While chemical fertilizer and pesticide have existed since the 19th century, their use grew significantly in the early twentieth century. In the 1960s, the Green Revolution applied western advances in fertilizer and pesticide use to farms worldwide, with varying success.
Other applications of scientific research since 1950 in agriculture include gene manipulation, and Hydroponics.
New criticisms
Though the intensive farming practices pioneered and extended in recent history generally led to increased outputs, they have also led to the destruction of farmland, most notably in the dust bowl area of the United States following World War I.
As global population increases, agriculture continues to replace natural ecosystems with monoculture crops.
In the past few decades, western consumers have become increasingly aware of, and in some cases critical of, widely used intensive agriculture practices, contributing to a rise in popularity of organic farming, the growth of the Slow Food movement, and an ongoing discussion surrounding the potential for sustainable agriculture.

Tuesday, November 6, 2007

Land reforms in Andhra Pradesh

Land reforms in Andhra Pradesh



C.H. Hanumantha Rao






--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Of the 104 recommendations made by the Land Committee headed by Koneru Ranga Rao, the government has accepted 90. Quite a few of these will have far-reaching consequences if implemented effectively.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Land for the landless — for cultivation as well as housing — is again high on the political agenda of Andhra Pradesh. The Rajasekhara Reddy government, soon after coming to power in 2004, constituted a Land Committee under the chairmanship of Koneru Ranga Rao, a Minister, “to assess the overall implementation of land distribution programmes of the government and suggest measures for more effective implementation.” Out of the 104 recommendations m ade by the Committee, the government has accepted 90. Quite a few of these will have far-reaching consequences if implemented effectively.

The current land movement arose and gathered momentum basically on the demand for house sites for the landless poor in the urban and semi-urban areas. This was not a major issue before the Committee. Ironically, the rising demand for urban land is traceable, in a significant measure, to the massive programme for irrigation development called ‘Jalayagnam,’ which is expected to ease pressure on land by raising agricultural productivity.

Much before the water started flowing into the fields, apparently, a good part of the money injected into the system for irrigation projects experienced a reverse flow into the urban land market through the contractors and real estate dealers, raising the demand for land. Also, there has been a massive allotment of land in the outskirts of Hyderabad and around other towns for the development projects.

The tremendous rise in the demand for urban land led to the skyrocketing of its prices, making land out of reach for the urban poor and the middle classes. Many of the poor farmers in the outskirts of the city suddenly found themselves ‘dispossessed’ through the allurement of money which turned out to be a pittance when compared to the prices at which their lands were ultimately sold by the dealers. This generated a great sense of insecurity among the poor — those losing land as well as those in need of land for housing — in and around the urban areas.

Admittedly, the Andhra Pradesh government has been in the forefront of building houses for the poor. But this can not alleviate the misery of the poor if there is a policy failure to contain the prices of urban land. Had the State government acted in time to acquire a sizeable chunk of land for expanding the on-going programme of constructing houses for the poor as well as for direct allotment of house sites to them, the situation would not have turned so adverse.

The Left parties clearly saw the rapidly emerging scarcity of urban land and its adverse consequences for the poor. Already, their movement for house sites for the poor appears to have had a sobering impact on land prices as it has sent the right signals to the land market. The welfare impact of containing land prices would indeed be enormous for the poor and the less affluent in the urban areas. Moreover, with growing urbanisation and migration of the rural poor to the urban areas, the need for house sites for the poor will increase. While ‘land to the tiller’ is still a live issue, ‘land to the dweller’ is going to assume increasing importance, especially in urban areas.

The significance of the Land Committee Report should be seen in the light of the growing scarcity of land and the rising land value. The Committee’s recommendations are, on the whole, quite moderate and not ‘radical.’ They basically centre round the more effective implementation of quite a few of the existing laws. If they sound ‘radical’ on occasions, especially on tribal land issues, it is because the Committee was constrained to recommend strict implementation of some of the existing laws dating back to 1917.

The three major concerns addressed by the Committee are: augmenting the ‘surplus’ land over the existing ceiling on land holdings as well as from government sources for distribution to the landless poor; encouraging investments by tenants for raising productivity and incomes; and restoring to the tribals lands appropriated by non-tribals.

A major recommendation of the Committee for the restoration of the ‘assigned’ land to the original assignees or, where it is not possible, its resumption by the government for making fresh assignment to the landless poor, has received wide support. However the government while accepting this, rejected the related recommendation to include the sarpanch and president and secretary of the Village Organisations of poor women in the Assignment Committee. Such an involvement is necessary for releasing a good chunk of land for the poor, on this account, without making the implementation process harsh and cumbersome, particularly because a piece of land would have changed a number of hands over the decades, the present occupants themselves being poor in many cases.

The government has accepted the recommendations on ceiling surplus land and tenancy — the two major concerns in non-tribal areas. It has agreed to “reopen cases of Land Ceilings, wherever the cases have been decided basing on fraud and misrepresentation of facts”. The number of such cases and the extent of ‘surplus’ land likely to be available are not known. But the indications are that, if effectively implemented, this measure could well unearth a sizeable area. Of much greater potential, perhaps, is the acceptance of another recommendation by the government to reassess the ‘surplus’ land consequent on the construction of irrigation projects, which have resulted in a significant increase in irrigated area over the last few decades.

In regard to the distribution of government as well as ceiling surplus land, the government has not accepted the Committee’s recommendation that “the maximum extent of land which may be allotted to a single individual be limited to 1 acre of wet land or 2 acres of dry land,” as against the existing provision of 2.5 acres of wet land and 5 acres of dry land. This recommendation appears reasonable considering the significant rise in productivity and value of land as well as in the number of landless poor in need of land.

The Committee has noted that the provisions in the existing Tenancy Acts “have given rise to informal tenancy — almost 100 per cent of tenancy that exists is informal,” and 55-60 per cent of the lands surveyed in the Delta region are under lease. Therefore, taking a realistic view, the Committee recommended that “a loan eligibility card should be issued to the tenants to enable them to access institutional loans so as to garner better gains from cultivation of lands, and the landlords on the other hand are not paranoid about losing their lands if the tenancy is recorded”. Since the government has accepted this recommendation, one can expect a rise in investment, productivity and incomes of the tenants.


Land alienation in tribal areas


Land alienation in tribal areas is remarkably high in Andhra Pradesh. According to the Committee, in tribal areas “non-tribal population holds as much as 48 per cent of the lands. Every year, more and more lands are passing into the hands of non-tribals and if it is not checked with a strong executive action, very soon the tribals may not have lands at all”.

The Committee has made a series of recommendations for restoring land to the tribals and for checking further alienation of their land. The government has accepted important recommendations such as reopening and re-examining of orders in favour of non-tribals, and review of a large number of cases of illegal occupation by non-tribals in some districts. However, a pre-requisite for effective implementation, according to the Committee, is the improvement in tribal land administration by putting in place field machinery with adequate staff, especially in Agency areas, and effective monitoring and review.

But, mere administrative capability is not sufficient unless the requisite political will is forthcoming. This is amply demonstrated by the massive failures in the implementation of Land Ceiling and Tenancy Acts in the non-tribal areas where administrative capability is not a bottleneck. The pulls and pressures from the vested interests can render even the most progressive land laws infructuous. This experience has prompted the Left parties to demand the constitution of an independent commission for implementing these recommendations.

But the government has not agreed to this demand presumably in the belief that in a democratic polity with an elected government, a parallel authority on land issues may not be workable. Instead, it has appointed a Commissioner in the revenue department for implementing the recommendations. Clearly, however, there is need for transparency and public accountability on this issue of vital importance.

The least that the government could still do, to ensure effective implementation, is to constitute a high level committee, consisting of important stakeholders, to continuously monitor the implementation with powers to receive representations and bring up specific cases. This would be quite in line with the recommendation made by the Land Committee to institute such a mechanism for tribal areas — already accepted by the government — in addition to the measures being taken for awareness-building among the affected people.

Monday, November 5, 2007

CHINA & THE 123 AGREEMENT: An Update

CHINA & THE 123 AGREEMENT: An Update

By B. Raman

Between July, 2005, when India and the US agreed in principle on civilian nuclear co-operation, and June, 2006, Beijing's reaction was unmistakably unenthusiastic. It sought to justify its lack of enthusiasm on the ground that such a special waiver to India, when it has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and not given up its military nuclear ambitions, could weaken the global non-proliferation architecture.

2. While Chinese Government spokespersons avoided outspoken comments on the India-US deal while making obvious their lack of enthusiasm for it, the government-controlled media in China observed no such restraint. For example, the "People's Daily" wrote on November 4, 2005: "This would be a hard blow on America's leading role in the global proliferation prevention system as well as the system itself. This will bring about a series of negative impacts. Now that the United States buys another country in with nuclear technologies in defiance of international treaty, other nuclear suppliers also have their own partners of interest as well as good reasons to copy what the United States did. A domino effect of nuclear proliferation, once turned into reality, will definitely lead to global nuclear proliferation and competition. Always calling itself a 'guard' for nuclear proliferation prevention, the US often condemns other countries for irresponsible transfers but this time, it hesitates not a bit in revising laws, taking the lead in 'making an exception' (in the case of India).Such an act of the United States once again proves that America is not at all a 'guard' of NPT and the treaty, however, is no more than a disguise serving the US interest. The most immediate reason for the foundation of NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) was India's first nuclear test in 1974, after which the United States instantly cut off its nuclear cooperation with India and established the NSG in 1975 to restrict selling sensitive nuclear technologies and raw materials to non-NPT countries. Over the past 30 years, the United States has always been trying to prevent India from access to nuclear technologies. Today, however, the United States wants a change."

3. The editorial came in the wake of a meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) on October 20, 2005, at which a US representative briefed the NSG members on the Indo-US deal and spoke of the US intention to move for the lifting of the NSG restrictions against India after the passage of the enabling legislation by the US Congress and the finalisation of a formal bilateral agreement (the 123 Agreement now signed) by India and the US.

4.. The lack of enthusiasm for the Indo-US nuclear deal was again evident at the time of the visit of President George Bush to India in the first week of March, 2006. In the daily media briefing of the Chinese Foreign Office at Beijing on March 2, 2006, its spokesperson Qin Gang said: "India should abandon nuclear weapons and strengthen atomic safeguards. India should sign the NPT and also dismantle its nuclear weapons. As a signatory country, China hopes non-signatory countries will join it as soon as possible as non-nuclear weapon states, thereby contributing to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime. China hopes that concerned countries developing cooperation in peaceful nuclear uses will pay attention to these efforts. The cooperation should conform with the rules of international non-proliferation mechanisms."

5. This negative attitude was in a great measure caused by the Chinese suspicion that the Indo-US nuclear deal was the US' quid pro quo for an Indian willingness to co-operate with the US in countering the growing Chinese power in the Asian region. This suspicion was strengthened when our Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, decided not to attend the summit meeting of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) as an observer at Shanghai in June, 2006. The Indian explanation that since India was only an observer of the SCO and not a full-fledged member, its participation at the level of the head of Government was not warranted did not seem convincing to Beijing. The Prime Minister's decision not to go was interpreted as due to the US suspicion that one of the main objectives of the SCO was to counter the US presence and role in the Central Asian Republics. As a result, China's lack of enthusiasm for the Indo-US nuclear deal continued.

6. In the meanwhile, President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan initiated a campaign to counter the Indo-US deal at two levels. He did not oppose the deal. Nor did Pakistan energetically try to have the deal disapproved by the US Congress through Congressmen and Senators sympathetic to it. Instead, it sought to counter the deal by using the following arguments. First, it will be discriminatory to Pakistan if it was not made applicable to it too. Second, it will create a military nuclear asymmetry in the sub-continent by enabling India to divert its domestic stock of fuel for military purposes, while using the imported fuel for civilian purposes under international safeguards. Thus, it will have an adverse effect on Pakistan's national security.

7. The US rejected the Pakistani arguments by pointing out that Pakistan's economy was unlikely to grow as rapidly as the Indian economy in the short and medium terms and hence it should be possible to meet its energy requirements from conventional sources. The US also repeatedly made it clear that in view of the role of Dr. A. Q. Khan, the so-called father of Pakistan's atomic bomb, and some of his colleagues in clandestinely supplying nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya, Pakistan cannot be treated on par with India, which had an unimpeachable record of non-proliferation.

8. While sticking to his arguments, Musharraf requested the Chinese leaders during his State visit to China in February, 2006, for Chinese assistance in the construction of six more nuclear power stations, with a capacity of 600 or 900 MWS each. The Chinese reportedly agreed in principle to supply two stations of 300 MWs each to be followed later by four more. This subject again figured in the General's bilateral discussions with Mr.HU in the margins of the SCO summit in June, 2006, and in the subsequent discussions between the officials of the two countries, who met at Islamabad and Beijing for doing the preparatory work for Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Pakistan from November 23 to 26.

9. Gen. Musharraf and his officials were so confident that an agreement in principle for the construction of two new nuclear power stations (Chashma III and IV ) would be initialed during Mr. Hu's visit that they even set up a site selection task force.

10. Then for reasons, which were not clear, there were indications of changes in the Chinese attitude---less negative towards the Indo-US nuclear deal and increasingly guarded on the Pakistani request for new nuclear power stations. In the case of India, the changing Chinese attitude was reflected in the daily media briefing of the Foreign Office spokesperson and in a media interview given by the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi. In the case of Pakistan, the change was reflected in the daily media briefings of the spokespersons of the two Foreign Offices at Beijing and Islamabad.

11. In an interview to the Press Trust of India (PTI), which was circulated by the agency on November 20, 2006, before the arrival of Mr.Hu in New Delhi, Mr. Sun Yuxi, the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi, was reported to have stated as follows: ``Every country has the right to develop energy in any form, including nuclear form, to meet its development needs. The objectives of non-proliferation should also be maintained and strengthened." When it was pointed out by the agency that India had contended that it abided by all non-proliferation rules although it had not signed the NPT, he said: ``Anything which can strengthen non-proliferation efforts should be welcomed by the international community.'' He added that Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon had recently apprised him about the issue and told him that India was trying to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. “I (would) like to take his word... If India is making effort, if any effort (is being made) to strengthen non-proliferation, I agree,'' he said. The Chinese envoy, however, refused to comment on the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal on the ground that it was a bilateral issue between India and the US.

12. A few hours later, in response to a question on the subject, Jiang Yu, spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, said at Beijing: "China has sought more information and explanations from India to address the concerns of some countries on the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal. We hope that Indian side can attach importance to these opinions and provide more information and explanations. Chinese side has noted that during the deliberations in the NSG regarding US-India nuclear cooperation, some countries expressed concern and doubts. The Chinese side will continue to participate in these relevant discussions with an earnest and responsible attitude."

13. Almost coinciding with these explanations at New Delhi and Beijing, the spokespersons of the Foreign Ministries of Pakistan and China tried to discourage expectations in Pakistan that Gen. Musharraf and Mr.Hu would be initialling a memorandum of understanding on the Chinese supply of two more nuclear power stations. They described the reports in this regard, which had been appearing in the Pakistani media for weeks before Mr. Hu's visit, as speculative and not based on facts.

14. The Joint Declaration issued on November 21, 2006, at the end of the formal talks between Dr. Manmohan Singh and Mr.Hu said: "Energy security constitutes a vital and strategic issue for producing and consuming countries alike. It is consistent with the common interest of the two sides to establish an international energy order, which is fair, equitable, secure and stable, and to the benefit of the entire international community. Both sides shall also make joint efforts, bilaterally as well as in multilateral fora, to diversify the global energy mix and to increase the share in it of renewable energy sources. Global energy systems should take into account and meet the energy needs of both countries, as part and parcel of a stable, predictable, secure and clean energy future. In this context, international civilian nuclear cooperation should be advanced through innovative and forward-looking approaches, while safeguarding the effectiveness of international non-proliferation principles. Both countries are committed to non-proliferation objectives and agree to expand their dialogue on the related issues, in bilateral and international fora."

15. The reference to promotion of international civilian nuclear co-operation through "innovative and forward-looking approaches" was interpreted, with some validity, as confirming the evolution of the Chinese view on the Indo-US deal from negative to hopefully positive. As a result, there was a greater confidence in New Delhi that China might not oppose the removal of restrictions applicable to India when the matter formally came up before the NSG at the initiative of the US. This guarded optimism was also evident from an interview given by Shri Pranab Mukherjee, the Indian Minister For External Affairs, to Shri Karan Thapar of the IBN-CNN TV channel on November 26. The relevant extract is annexed.

16. Dr. Manmohan Singh and Mr.Hu had formal talks hardly for a little more than an hour. The carefully-formulated position on the nuclear issue could not have been the outcome of such a brief meeting. The final version of the Joint Declaration was already ready before the two leaders formally met and approved it. It had been drafted by the officials of the two countries in their preparatory meetings in the weeks before Mr. Hu's arrival. The change in the Chinese position must have been the outcome of these discussions in the weeks before Mr. Hu's visit and not a sudden change on the eve of the summit or at the summit itself.

17. As against this, the change in the Chinese position with regard to Pakistan's request for six more nuclear power stations came about suddenly in the days (not weeks) before Mr. Hu's arrival in Islamabad. Well-informed Pakistani sources attributed the more guarded Chinese position to the bilateral discussions between President George Bush and Mr.Hu at Hanoi in the margins of the summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Organisation on November 18 and 19, 2006. The speculation was that during these bilateral discussions, Mr. Bush pointed out to Mr.Hu that the Chinese supply of new nuclear power stations to Pakistan could not be projected as a continuation of the Chinese assistance to Pakistan under a 1985 bilateral co-operation treaty under which CHASHMA I and CHASHMA II were given and hence would need the clearance of the NSG. According to this speculation, Mr. Bush was also reported to have referred to the Pakistani rejection of repeated requests from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to hand over Dr. A. Q. Khan for an independent interrogation and pointed out that the Chinese supply of the new power stations could encourage Pakistan's non-cooperation with the IAEA.

18. It was believed by these sources that Beijing, which has been projecting itself as a responsible and co-operative interlocutor of the US, Japan and South Korea on the question of North Korea's nuclear test and has won praise for its role in bringing North Korea back to the negotiating table, did not want this positive image to be dented by disregarding the reservations of Mr. Bush relating to the supply of new power stations to Pakistan. It, therefore, changed its stance at the last minute.

19. There was no substantive reference to the co-operation between China and Pakistan in the field of civilian nuclear energy during Mr. Hu's visit to Pakistan. The joint statement issued on November 25, 2006, by Gen. Musharraf and Mr.Hu said: “The two sides also agreed to strengthen cooperation in the energy sector, including fossil fuels, coal, hydro-power, nuclear power, renewable sources of energy as well as in the mining and resources sector.” Addressing a press conference after his talks with Gen. Musharraf, Mr.Hu said in reply to a question on nuclear co-operation: "Cooperation in the energy sector is an important component in the relationship between the two countries. We reached a common understanding on strengthening energy cooperation. We would continue this cooperation in future as well." While Mr.Hu himself did not refer to any future supply of new nuclear power stations, some Pakistani analysts interpreted Mr. Hu's remarks as indicating a willingness to supply more nuclear power stations.

20.Pakistani officials and analysts close to the Government tried to give the impression that the fact that no memorandum of understanding was signed did not mean that the Chinese were not going ahead with the project. But, the Chinese Foreign Office spokesperson was very clear on this point during a media briefing on November 20, 2006, at Beijing. He said: "As far as I know, there will be no new arrangement in this area."

21. Interestingly, in reply to a question on this subject, Mr. Sean McCormack, a spokesperson of the US State Department, said in Washington as follows on November 27,2006: "The US welcomes strong ties between China and Pakistan and urges China to play a constructive role in world affairs. We encourage development of bilateral relations between Pakistan and its neighbours. China and Pakistan have a long history of relations. As for any sort of nuclear angle on this, I’m not aware of anything new that was announced or is allowed for by these agreements other than what was already grandfathered in by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. So I don’t think there’s anything new on that front.”

22.What he apparently meant was that in addition to the Chashma I and Chashma II power stations given by China under an old agreement of 1985 for civilian nuclear co-operation between China and Pakistan, there would be nothing new for the present till approved by the NSG.
What was significant was that China paid attention to the US reservations on this subject instead of going ahead with its assistance as it did in the past in matters such as the supply of M-9 and M-11 missiles and nuclear equipment to Pakistan. This new attention to US reservations is what the Americans welcomed as China's constructive role.

23.There was no reference to China's possible assistance to Pakistan for the construction of Chashma IV and V for nearly seven months ---either from the Pakistani side or from the Chinese side. On July 18, 2007, there was a surprising reference to it in a Chinese statement on the Pakistani commando action in the Lal Masjid. This caused anger against the Chinese, who were suspected to have forced Musharraf to order the commando action after the kidnapping of six Chinese women by some students of the girls' madrasa attached to the Masjid. The "China Daily" reported as follows on July 18, 2007: "China did not push Pakistan for operations against the Red Mosque, Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Luo Zhaohui said. It is the consistent policy of China not to meddle in the domestic affairs of other countries, he told The News, a major Pakistani daily. Luo said he was considering an invitation to visit the mosque but it was made impossible due to the unstable security situation. "We enjoy very cordial relations with the ruling party here and likewise we maintain friendly ties with other segments of the society including the political parties of the opposition," he said. "I had no knowledge as to why Chinese nationals are being targeted and were the victims in five recent incidents", Luo said, referring to several Chinese who were killed in that country. He said if Chinese continued to be targeted, cooperation between the two countries could suffer. To protect the 3,000 Chinese working in Pakistan, China and Pakistan have decided to set up a Joint Task Force (JTF), the Ambassador revealed. China and Pakistan are still close friends and neighbors, Luo said. The Chinese Government is in discussions about proposed Chashma-III and IV for nuclear power projects. Chashma-II will be completed early next year, he said."

24.Apparently concerned over the anti-Chinese turn in some sections of public opinion in the tribal areas, the Chinese once again started talking of possible Chinese assistance for the construction of Chashma III and IV in order to reassure Pakistani public opinion that China would continue to be a steadfast friend of Pakistan. China's reversion to its pre-November,2006, positive stand on Chashma III and IV also came in the wake of reported Chinese concerns over the real purpose of the reported concert of democracies involving India, the US, Japan and Australia and moves for a joint naval exercise involving these four countries plus Singapore.

25.On August 2,2007,Pakistan's National Command Authority met under the chairmanship of President General Pervez Musharraf, to discuss, inter alia, India's 123 agreement with the US. A statement issued at the end of the meeting said:“The US-India nuclear agreement would have implications on strategic stability of the region as it would enable India to produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from un-safeguarded nuclear reactors.The objective of strategic stability in South Asia and the global non-proliferation regime would have been better served if the US had considered a package approach for Pakistan and India with a view to preventing a nuclear arms race in the region and promoting nuclear restraints.While continuing to act with responsibility in maintaining credible minimum deterrence and avoiding an arms race, Pakistan will neither be oblivious to its security requirements, nor to the needs of its economic development which demand growth in the energy sector.The meeting reviewed Pakistan’s objective and plans for civil nuclear power generation under IAEA safeguards, which is part of the overall energy strategy to meet the requirements of economic growth in the country. This objective will be pursued on priority basis especially in view of the increasing oil prices."

26. A Press Trust of India despatch from Beijing after the conclusion of the 123 agreement has cited a Chinese spokesperson as indicating that China would adopt a "creative" approach to the development. This recalls the use of the expression "innovative" at the time of Hu's visit to India.

27. When the issue of the NSG relaxing or lifting its present restrictions on India comes up before it formally in the wake of the 123 agreement, three Scenarios are possible:


SCENARIO I: China does not agree to it. This Scenario is unlikely as this could affect the forward momentum in Indo-Chinese relations.
SCENARIO II: China agrees to it without any conditions in the interest of its good relations with India without worrying about its impact on its relations with Pakistan. It seems to be an over-optimistic scenario for the present.
SCENARIO III: China agrees to it subject to the condition that there is a similar relaxation of the NSG guidelines in the case of Pakistan so that it could sell Chashmas III and IV to Pakistan.This Scenario was posed to Shri Pranab Mukherjee by Shri Karan Thapar. His answers were evasive, but one got the impression that India would not be unduly concerned over this so long as the restrictions on its international purchases are lifted.
28. In the eventuality of Scenario III materialising, there could be a delay in the implementation of the 123 agreement due to the following reasons:

The US might insist that before clearing the supply of Chashma III and IV to Pakistan, China and Pakistan should sign a formal agreement similar to the Indo-US deal under which Pakistan would separate its military and civilian infrastructure and sign a Pakistan-centric safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which would apply to its civilian infrastructure.
There could be Congressional opposition to the US agreeing to this till the Pakistan Government makes A.Q.Khan available for interrogation by IAEA experts.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai.He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
ANNEXURE
EXTRACTS FROM SHRI PRANAB MUKHERJEE'S INTERVIEW TO SHRI KARAN THAPAR

Karan Thapar: Hello and welcome to Devil’s Advocate. As attention starts to focus on India’s relationship with China and United States, those are the two key issues I shall raise today in an exclusive interview with External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee.

Mr Mukherjee, let’s start with the Chinese President’s visit to India, which has just been concluded. The joint declaration says, “International civilian nuclear cooperation should be advanced through innovative and forward-looking approaches while safeguarding the effectiveness of international non-proliferation principles.” Do you interpret that as an endorsement of the Indo-US nuclear deal?

Pranab Mukherjee: No. After all we are also for non-proliferation. At the same time, what is being done with India, especially with regard to the Indo-US nuclear deal, they are giving a special treatment to India because of India’s track record related to non-proliferation.

Karan Thapar: So, you’re saying that China has not endorsed it?

Pranab Mukherjee: No. China has endorsed it. I am just explaining the ‘innovative’ word.

Karan Thapar: So, when officials of your ministry have given an assessment to The Hindu, as they did on Friday, to say that China will not come in the way of any decisions of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to lift restrictions on international civilian nuclear cooperation with India,” you agree with that agreement?

Pranab Mukherjee: I hope so.

Karan Thapar: When you say hope so, is there some doubt? Is there some uncertainty?

Pranab Mukherjee: No. There is no uncertainty. I hope that they will not come in the way.

Karan Thapar: So you’re confident that China will not come in the way?

Pranab Mukherjee: Why are you playing with words? In diplomacy, we don't play with words. What we say is we wait till the official outcome comes.

Karan Thapar: But you are confident?

Pranab Mukherjee: I am confident.

Karan Thapar: There is a lot of speculation that China might end up offering a similar nuclear deal to Pakistan. So far in the newspapers, there is no mention of it. But if it were to have been offered quietly and not made public, would you be concerned?

Pranab Mukherjee: We shall have to recognise the fact that different countries have different relationships with different countries, keeping in view their own perspectives. Relationship of one country need not stand in the relationship of the other country. Therefore, we shall have to keep that fact always in view while assessing the relationship between two countries.

Karan Thapar: Very interesting. Most people will interpret that to mean that if China does give Pakistan a nuclear deal similar to the Indo-US nuclear deal, India will have no objection?

Pranab Mukherjee: It's not a question of my objection or non-objection. It's a question of what happens in the ground reality. Therefore, we shall have to keep in view… For instance, Pakistan is being supplied with sophisticated weapons by the USA over a long period.

US-INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL GENERATES VEHEMENT OPPOSITION IN INDIAN PARLIAMENT & PUBLIC DEBATE: An Analysis

US-INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL GENERATES VEHEMENT OPPOSITION IN INDIAN PARLIAMENT & PUBLIC DEBATE: An Analysis

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

The US-India Nuclear Deal Agreement unveiled by the Congress Government in India under suspicious circumstances after freezing the text and keeping it in wraps for some time has raised an unprecedented but expected storm in the Indian Parliament and in public debate.

In the Indian Parliament, the opposition to the US-India Nuclear Deal Agreement as finalized by the Government cuts across political parties lines and the Congress Party stands isolated. The Leftists as the main coalition supporter of the Congress Government have given an ultimatum that the Government should press the “pause button” and not proceed further on the Agreement and that the Agreement may need renegotiation. An explicit threat is implied that they could withdraw support to the Congress Government.

The Indian Prime Minister’s obdurate fixation to go ahead irrespective of the Leftists warning not only imperils the continuance in office of the Congress Government but also imperils the future of the US-India Nuclear Deal. A new political dispensation in India may not agree to go through with the Deal in the present form.

The issue that has presently acquired salience is not the Deal itself per-se, but the wider issue of the conduct of India’s foreign policy and the content of the US-India Strategic Partnership. The US-India Nuclear Deal as a purely “energy security initiative” should have been kept separate from the wider issues of US-India Strategic Partnership. What has happened is that concurrently with the US-India Nuclear Deal negotiations, the Indian Government allowed itself to be drawn into US – sponsored security initiatives like the US-Japan-India Trilateral and the US-Japan-Australia-India Quadrilateral. This rang alarm bells across India’s political spectrum.

Regular readers of papers by this author on the subject would recall that the Deal as originally conceived in July 2005 was welcomed by this author and others writing on this web-site. Readers would also recall that after the first six months itself, this author had begun injecting assessments and analyses that the future of the Deal was in doubt. In this connection besides other papers of this author, the following need particular highlighting with reference to what is happening today:

“US-India Nuclear Deal Reviewed "(SAAG Paper No. 1670 dated 10.01.2006)
“US-India Nuclear Deal Generates “Great Indian Divide” (SAAG Paper No. 1701 dated 14.02.2006)
“US Congress at Critical Crossroads with India: A Plain Speaking Analysis” (SAAG Paper No. 1766 dated 12.04.2006).
More than a year ago, not with any hindsight, but with prescient foresight, the above papers of the author had made the following observations:

“The dramatic change from high Indian expectations of the deal to a wide Indian divide now opposing the deal, in a matter of six months, needs serious analysis”.
“What can be stated straightaway is that the blame rests both on US Administration and the Indian political establishment in the manner both have managed the ensuing negotiation process.”
“The Indian Prime Minister and his establishment, generated by their lack of transparency and unwarranted security, that a “Strategic sell-out” was taking place”.
“An impression was taking shape in India that the Indian Prime Minister and a very strong Pro-American lobby in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) was riding rough shod over the contrary views in the Indian political, scientific and strategic community”.
But why should Indians blame the United States? The United States was pursuing its own national security interests and strategic agenda. It is the present Indian Government of the Congress Party that was responsible to the nation that Indian National Security interests were protected and the impression not given that India was allowing itself to be put in a “nuclear strait jacket” by the super-imposition of the Hyde Act on the US-India Nuclear Deal.

In the Indian Parliament today and in public debate it is not the United States that is being pilloried but the present Indian Government of the Congress Party and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

The reasons for the above and discussed further below are:

Indian Prime Minister’s Domestic Mishandling of the US-India Nuclear Deal
Indian Policy Establishment’s Dismissive Responses to Domestic Criticism of Nuclear Deal
India’s Foreign Policy Issues Need National Consensus
United States: Some Sobering Thoughts
Indian Prime Minister’s Domestic Mishandling of the US-India Nuclear Deal

The Indian Prime Minister for some uncanny reasons was not really forthcoming on the progress of negotiations of the Deal as they became more complex and vexing. The whole process was mishandled in the sense that on such a sensitive issue as “nuclear programs” which are India’s lexicons of power, the Indian Prime Minister should have widened the spread of consensual discussions with political parties, the scientific community and the strategic community. He did not do so.

The whole process was confined to the precincts of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) generating an environment where more details were available in Washington than in New Delhi. Differences and pressures had commenced in early 2006 itself on the separation plan and the issue of including FBR program in the civil list.

India at large was sensing something was amiss and this generated three significant events:

President Kalam’s statement that India should safeguard the FBR program
Chairman IAEC Dr. Kakodkar going public on the issue and his charge of US “shifting goal posts” on the Deal
Letter to Prime Minister by eight senior retired Indian diplomats which brought into public domain the lack of Prime Ministerial transparency on the Deal
In the preceding weeks to the current crisis, the pattern has remained the same, even after the text of the Deal has been unfrozen. New Delhi’s interpretations of the Text of the Deal have been selective and at variance with the interpretations being given in Washington. Obviously, the Indian and US perceptions and interpretations of the Text of the Deal varied significantly to generate contrary responses in both capitals.

The current crisis would not have taken place had the Indian Prime Minister and the Congress Government had taken the country into confidence right from the outset and not imparted an undue secrecy during the negotiations. It seems to have been forgotten that the Deal was between the United States and India and not between President Bush and Dr Manmohan Singh. and that therefore the widest possible political and scientific spectrum should have been involved by the Congress Government. in arriving at the Deal.

Indian Policy Establishment’s Dismissive Responses to Domestic Criticism of Nuclear Deal

The paper quoted above carried detailed excerpts of a very dismissive response by a junior PMO bureaucrat to Dr. Kakodkar going public on the “shifting of goal posts” by USA. This was unwarranted as the Indian public reposed greater trust in the Indian nuclear scientists who brought about independently India’s nuclear weapons program. The Prime Minister should have restrained the PMO bureaucracy from such dismissive responses as it is not the sole repository of India’s strategic wisdom and foresight.

Symptomatic of the above has been the uproar in Parliament today generated by statements by the Indian Ambassador in USA Ronen Sen alluding to the opponents of the Deal in India and the Parliament as responses made by “headless chickens” etc and other disparaging remarks.

The scribe who quoted Ambassador Sen has stood by his remarks and disputed the Ambassador’s contention that he was misquoted.

India can do without “committed diplomats and bureaucrats” delving into domains that do not fall within the purview of their official duties. It is not their duty to defend the Deal and they should have left it to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister to defend it.

India’s Foreign Policy Issues Need National Consensus

In the last two years this point has been consistently made in this author’s papers and this was in response to periodic statements from the present Government that the Cabinet has the sole power to enter into external agreements and that no constitutional provisions exist to do otherwise.

Technically this may be correct, but this assertion is politically untenable. With foreign policy issues increasingly figuring in domestic debates, no government and especially a coalition government can ignore the imperatives of a national debate and consensus on critical foreign policy and national security issues.

The last time a Congress Prime Minister personalized such issues it led to his fall from the iconic pedestal on which India had placed him besides the unwarranted military debacle of 1962.

In the current crisis, the Congress Government is still fighting shy of a debate in Parliament. If it is convinced that what it has agreed on the Deal is right, and that they have secured India’s national security interests, economic interests and energy interests then why is it fighting shy of a vote on Parliament on the issue under Rule 184.

The Congress Government and the Prime Minister should have the courage of conviction to face a Parliamentary vote. That is the right and appropriate democratic process.

United States: Some Sobering Thoughts

These last two years would have provided the United States some sobering thoughts on how to engage India and the contextual factors operative in any negotiations with India with any political dispensation in power.

The United States must not adopt with regard to India the negotiation approaches which it adopts with Pakistan.

It seemed that the United States took it for granted that as long as PM Manmohan Singh was in their pocket and his policy establishment was fully aboard the Deal was a ‘done thing’.

In India, public opinion counts and public opinion matters even more than in the United States. India unlike Pakistan is not a dictatorship where one man counts and one man takes the decisions.

In 2006 itself, the United States should have judged that a wide cross-section of India was not with PM Singh and the Congress Government on this Deal. They should have nuanced their approaches accordingly and gently advised the Indian interlocutors that the Indian Government should strive for a wider consensus embracing the entire political spectrum, the scientific community and the strategic community.

Concluding Observations

The US-India Nuclear Deal finalization should have been a landmark event and a watershed in US-India relations. Regrettably, the way it has been mismanaged by an obdurate Indian Prime Minister with total disregard to consensual national approaches has robbed it of its sheen.

There was no logical reason for the Indian Prime Minister to indulge in undue secrecy during the negotiations of the US-India Nuclear Deal. Some suggest that cloaking it with a veil of secrecy was an Indian suggestion.

The negativities that have been generated in the last two years in India’s official handling of the US-India Nuclear Deal and connected foreign policy issues may affect the future course of US-India Strategic Partnership, too.

India & Japan: Impact Of Relationship On China

India & Japan: Impact Of Relationship On China

by B. Raman

There is an economic and a strategic angle to India's expectations from the current visit of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan, who arrived in Delhi on August 21, to reciprocate the visit paid by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to Japan from December 13 to 16 last year.

2. The economic angle relates to India's expectations of a major role by Japanese investors in developing the infrastructure in India and by the Japanese Government in facilitating the Indian quest for nuclear energy by supporting the relaxation of the present restrictions on civilian nuclear trade with India when the matter comes up before the Nuclear Supplier's Group (NSG)----most probably before the end of the year.

3. Both these issues are of considerable importance to India. Despite the remarkable improvement in its economic performance during the last three years with an average GDP growth rate of seven per cent plus consistently, it will not be able to catch up with the Chinese economy in the near and medium terms unless and until it is able to improve its infrastructure, which is in a pretty bad shape, and ensure the availability of energy.

4. It has been estimated that the improvement of infrastructure will involve an investment of around US dollars 320 billion in the next five years. That kind of money can come only from Japan. The efforts of the Government of India have, therefore, been towards making Japanese investors get interested in the infrastructure improvement projects in a big way. The first positive results are already evident, thanks to the personal interest taken by Mr. Abe. Japan, which had helped India in the past in the construction of the Delhi Metro, is now the main foreign financial backer of the $90bn project to build a Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC). The work on this is expected to start next January and conclude by 2012. During the visit, the two countries are expected to sign an agreement for a dedicated rail freight corridor connecting Delhi, Mumbai (Bombay) and Kolkata (Calcutta), which will significantly reduce the time taken for transporting goods from one city to another.

5.Nearly 475 Japanese companies presently have a presence in India. Of these, nearly one-third reportedly came to India after Mr. Abe took over as the Prime Minister. This indicates the interest taken by his Government in strengthening the long-neglected economic relations with India. In their fascination for the Chinese market and the cheap labour market there, Japanese investors had paid little attention to India. This lack of interest in the Indian economy has now been sought to be corrected by Mr. Abe.

6. Despite this, the bilateral trade continues to be sluggish----- an average of US $ four billion per annum for some years now. As against this, India's bilateral trade with China has been steadily racing towards US $ 30 billion. However, this is largely due to large-scale Chinese imports of raw materials such as iron ore from India. The value of the export of Indian iron ore to China accounts for nearly 60 per cent of India's exports. The value of India's imports from China also includes the value of Japanese electronic goods manufactured by the branches of Japanese companies in China. Thus, while there has been a spectacular rise in India's trade with China, there are special reasons for it, which do not operate in the case of trade with Japan.

7. Even though Japan was strongly opposed to India's military nuclear tests of 1998, it has now got itself reconciled to them. No opposition from Japan is, therefore, expected to the lifting of restrictions on civilian nuclear commerce with India at the NSG meeting, when it takes place.

8.While China does not view with concern the developing economic relations between India and Japan, it has been viewing with increasing concern the growing strategic relations between the two countries in the form of joint exercises by the Coast Guards of the two countries, exchanges of visits by military officials etc. If these relations were growing purely in a bilateral framework, the Chinese concerns might not have been that high. The heightened Chinese concerns are due to the fact that the increasing strategic ties between India and Japan have been taking place in a larger framework involving India, Japan, the US and Australia.

9. This four-power framework started in a low profile in July,2005, after a visit paid by the Indian Prime Minister to Washington DC. The agreement in principle on bilater nuclear co-operation was reached during this visit. Though India and the US have projected this agreement as an act of purely economic significance to help the Indian economy to meet its growing energy demands, China suspects that there is an anti-China backdrop to it. The Chinese suspicion is that this agreement was the US quid pro quo to India agreeing to a quadrilateral strategic co-operation to contain the growing Chinese naval power in the Bay of Bengal/Indian Ocean region.

10. Though India has been denying any such anti-Chinese backdrop, Beijing is not convinced because many Western analysts have been projecting the Indo-US nuclear deal as a quid pro quo and not as a stand alone arrangement.

11. The Chinese prefer to take seriously such analyses coming out of Western scholars and not the assurances of benign intentions coming out of New Delhi. Dr. Manmohan Singh's visit to Japan in December , 2006, caused ill-concealed concern in China, which tended to see an American nudge behind the sustained attempts since 2005 to bring India and Japan closer together. The Chinese did not see it as a natural corollary of India's Look East Policy.Instead, they saw in it the thin edge of the wedge in what they apprehended as an American attempt to contain China.

12. Even before Dr. Singh had embarked on his visit to Japan, his interview to the Japanese daily "Yomiuri Shimbun" (December 5,2006) caught the attention of China's India-Japan watchers ---particularly for two reasons. The first was the subtle differentiation in Dr. Singh's
characterisation of India's relations with Japan on the one side and with China on the other. He characterised India and Japan as "the largest and the most developed democracies in Asia, which share a strong commitment to freedom, the rule of law and respect for human
rights." As against this, he characterised India and China as "the two largest developing countries" of Asia and added: " My own view is that the world is large enough to accommodate the development ambitions of both countries. And, therefore, there is immense scope for us to cooperate with one another."

13.. The second reason was what Dr. Singh had to say about Mr. Abe's reported proposal for a new four-way framework for strategic dialogue involving Japan, India, Australia and the US. He said: " Our bilateral relations (between India and Japan) are rooted in similar
perceptions about the evolving environment in our region..... I wish to use my forthcoming visit to Japan to gain a better understanding about Prime Minister Abe's idea of closer cooperation among major democracies in the region."

14. Many statements during the visit of Dr. Singh to Japan added to the concern of the Chinese. Examples:

"India and Japan are natural partners as the largest and most developed democracies of Asia, with a mutual stake in each other's progress and prosperity. Indeed, a strong, prosperous and dynamic India is in the interest of Japan, and likewise, a strong, prosperous
and dynamic Japan is in the interest of India. They have responsibility for, and are capable of, responding to global and regional challenges, and they must play an active role in the promotion of peace and stability in Asia and world at large. Recognising that Asia is
emerging as the leading growth centre of an increasingly interdependent global economy, the two countries are also keen to pursue a comprehensive economic partnership in the region and nurture sustainable economic growth, social peace and political tolerance in open and cooperative regional frameworks. Given their shared determination to raise bilateral relations to a higher level, the two leaders decide to establish a Strategic and Global Partnership between India and Japan. This will impart stronger political, economic and strategic dimensions to bilateral relations, serve long-term interests of both countries, enhance all-round cooperation and contribute to greater regional peace and stability. The Strategic and Global Partnership will involve closer political and diplomatic coordination on bilateral, regional, multilateral and global issues, comprehensive economic engagement, stronger defence relations, greater technological cooperation as well as working towards a quantum increase in cultural ties, educational linkages and people-to-people contacts. This partnership will enable both countries to harness the vast potential of bilateral relations, drawing upon complementarities and each other's intrinsic strengths, and also work together to address regional and global challenges." (From the joint statement issued at the end of the visit)

"Strong ties between India and Japan will be a major factor in building an open and inclusive Asia and in enhancing peace and stability in the region. Our partnership has the potential to create an arc of advantage and prosperity across Asia, laying the foundation for the creation of an Asian economic community." ( From Dr. Singh's address to the Japanese Parliament on December 14 ) .

" This will be the most important bilateral relationship (for Japan) in the world". (Mr. Abe while inaugurating the India-Japan Friendship Year--2007 on December 15)

15. The Chinese concerns have been further enhanced by the forthcoming joint naval exercise in the beginning of September in the Bay of Bengal involving the Navies of India, the US, Japan, Australia and Singapore. The officials of the participating countries have projected this exercise as having two objectives over which China should not be concerned. The first is humanitarian to faciliate joint operations for disaster relief in the case of naural disasters. The second is joint/co-ordinated operations against non-State actors such as pirates, maritime terrorists and maritime smugglers of weapons of mass destruction material. They have sought to remove any suspicion that this exercise is really directed against a State actor such as China. Despite this, the Chinese suspicion that this exercise is meant to contain the presence and role of its naval power in the region is strong.

16. It is the Chinese anger over the real purpose of this exercise, which should explain the seeming hardening of the Chinese attitude to the expected move in the NSG to remove the restrictions on nuclear trade with India. Shri D.S.Rajan, Director, Chennai Centre For China Studies, has drawn attention to this in his article at http://www.c3sindia.org/strategicissues/122/beijing-hardens-its-stand-on-the-india-us-civil-nuclear-cooperation-agreement/

17. This hardening does not necessarily mean that the Chinese will oppose any concessions to India at the NSG. The Chinese attitude will depend upon to what extent the US is prepared to exercise its powers of persuasion on the Chinese. China is still dependent on the US for access to the US market and for the continued flow of investments. Moreover, next year's Olympics is a highly prestigious event for Beijing. Its success as a spectacle and as an international sports event will depend on the US assistance in organising it and in ensuring its security. Any mishap could mean a loss of face for the Chinese leadership in the eyes of its own people and the international community. This gives a leverage to the US in seeing that the Chinese go along with the consensus in favour of India at the NSG.

INDIA AT SIXTY: STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS

INDIA AT SIXTY: STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS

by Dr Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

India completed sixty years of independence on August 15, 2007. India at sixty is in a buoyant mood today and more self-assured, fortified by its noticeable economic progress and sustained rates of high growth. This has prompted the global powers to take notice of India as an emerging power and accord more strategic attention as at some stage soon India’s emergent power could start affecting the Asian Power balance and so also the global power balance.

In this process, a significant factor that would come into play is India’s ability to assume ‘great power’ responsibilities and to exploit its power potential and military power to add muscle to its foreign policy objectives. Economic power by itself is only a ‘soft power’ and does not bring recognition as a ‘great power’ or a “Key Global Power”.

India may have arrived at the gates of being a Key Global Power or a great power but its entry into the “elite power club” necessarily depends on the ability and capabilities of India’s political elite to exhibit without any ambiguity that not only India has the attributes of power in abundance but more significantly India’s political elite will now have to have the “WILL TO USE INDIA’S NATIONAL and MILITARY POWER” in a pro-active and forceful manner to achieve India’s national security and foreign policy objectives.

Going by the historical record of the last sixty years, the above is the most worrisome factor that may impede India’s rise to global power status, namely, strategically inept political leadership apologetic about using power.

A pertinent point that requires mention at the introductory stage itself is that the present strategic attention being given to India is in recognition of its emerging power potential. It stands limited to India’s emergence as a “Key Global Player” and not a “Key Global Power”. The US President too has carefully made this distinction.

Also “strategic attention” is distinct from “strategic respect”. The global powers will accord India “strategic respect” only when India’s political leadership demonstrates that India has developed the “WILL THE USE POWER” and would do so unreservedly in the pursuit of its national interests and objectives.

In the last sixty years, India has been subjected to wars in every decade of its post-Independence existence and now witnesses a significant proliferation of proxy wars and terrorism of the Islamist Jihadi variety in all the nooks and corners of India besides other externally aided insurgencies. India’s flanking countries provide the wherewithal for this proxy war against India. India has been and now too being subjected to aggression because in the last sixty years., India’s political dispensations in power have exhibited the propensity to be pacifist or defensive in nature. India’s political leaders have shied away from the use of power despite its size and resources. The resultant effect was that India’s adversaries (despite their strategic asymmetry with India) perceived India as a “Soft State” incapable of strong military responses even when its national security interests were threatened and trampled upon both externally and internally.

India’s political leadership has failed to ignite a strategic mindset both within India’s polity and the nation as a whole. Strategic mindsets can be ignited only on the shoulders of Indian nationalism and patriotism. But then in the last sixty years the disparate Indian polity for narrow political gains from captive minority vote banks has de-valued the exalted concept of Indian nationalism. They seemed to forget that “National Cohesiveness” which is one of the attributes of a ‘great power’ can only come from inclusive policies rather than minority appeasement policies, politically excluding them form mainstream India.

With the aim of “Igniting a Strategic Mindset” in Indians this author wrote a book in 2003 “India’s Defence Policies and Strategic Thought: A Comparative Analysis”. India’s defense policies or lack of polices and strategic shortcomings were critically examined:

Later, in the context of contemporary political and regional developments affecting India’s national security it was considered appropriate to reproduce in abridged form the Concluding Chapter of the above book as it offered “Prescriptions” on issues relating to national security. Please refer to SAAG Paper No. 1118 dated 16-09-2004 “India’s National Security and Defence: Prescriptions”.

Many readers keep sending e-mails asking for further references to this author’s strategic writings. In response to such requests these are listed in Annexure.

In terms of “Strategic Reflections” on “ India at Sixty” this Author would like to offer the following reflections.

India’s Emergence as a Key Global Power: No Global Power Will Assist It.
India as a Key Global Power: The Imperatives of Strategic Autonomy
India’s Future Strategic Choice: “Economic Superpower” or “Key Global Power”
Global and Regional Power Comes With a “National Will to Use Power” and “Use it Hard”
Indian Prime Ministers “Strategic Culture” Deficit, Strategic Naivety and Vulnerability to External Pressures
India’s Strategic Vision: No official “National Strategy Document” Exists
India Needs a Legislated “National Security Act”
India’s Foreign Policy and National Security Issues Need to be Ratified by Parliament.
India’s Nuclear Doctrine Yet to be Finalized.
India’s Emergence as a Key Global Power: No Global Power Will Assist It

In the ongoing debate within the country, India’s more prominent and noted strategic analysts are pro-active in selling the line that India’s emergence as a Key Global Power can only be made possible by assistance from the United States and hence a more intense strategic partnership or commitment to United States global strategic policies is required.

This is factually incorrect as in contemporary world history no global power has ever assisted in the emergence of another global power to share the very limited global powers strategic space. The most instant example being the reluctance of the existing nuclear weapons powers led by the United States and Russia to admit India as a recognized Nuclear Weapons Power.

However, this author would concede one point on this score and that is India cannot emerge as a Key Global Power in confrontation or opposition to the United States. It can but the road will be very stretched out and ardous.

The United States has assisted Germany and Japan to emerge as global economic superpowers but stopped short of assisting them to emerge as key global military powers, which would permit them to emerge as contenders for global supremacy. Even Britain with strategic nuclear assets is a B-League player in the United States led global Western alliance along with Germany and Japan.

The above mentioned countries do not enjoy the national attributes of power in abundance as India does and therefore are content to be B-League global powers. Is India and especially “India Unbound” now willing to be a B-League global player?

India’s public aspirations today as popularly reflected are focused on India’s emergence as a Key Global Power in its own right with its strategic directions not subordinated to global strategies of other Key Global Powers whether it be the United States or Russia.

It is imperative that India’s policy establishment and its strategic community recognize this dictum because then only India’s future strategic directions and options would emerge clearly.

More addedly, the other truth that should dawn on India’s policy establishment is that India should not be content with just being a “Key Global Player” with a B-League status. India’s strategic ambitions should be to emerge as a “Key Global Power” in the “Top Quartet of Powers” and its national energies so harnessed.

If these two realities are not recognized then India stands the chance of being by-passed by the greatness attendant on a “Key Global Power”.

India as a Key Global Power: The Imperatives of Strategic Autonomy

“Strategic Autonomy” of India should not be mis-construed as “Non-alignment” in the pursuance of strategic and foreign policy choices. Autonomy here connotes that (1) India’s strategic and foreign policy directions are solely determined by India’s own national security interests (2) India’s policy establishment is not strait-jacketed in taking its cues in terms of responses to crisis situations from foreign capitals (3) India’s strategic decisions are so taken as those which enhance and reinforce her standing as a regional power and a Key Global Power (4) India’s strategic decisions are such that they reflect the dignity and majesty of a truly great power.

The above may sound as a tall order or flowery rhetoric. But it is not so when one studies the history of the emergence of great powers.

To illustrate from the current context as to what “strategic autonomy” entails, one needs to point out the on going controversy of the US-India Nuclear Deal or the 123 Agreement. By itself the US-India Nuclear Deal was strategically beneficial to both countries, but it has run into turbulent rough weather in India, because of a widespread perception in India that the Congress Government has allowed India’s “strategy autonomy” to be subjugated to US domestic laws through the US imposition of the Hyde Act straitjacket.

Similarly, the Congress Government overdrive for peace with Pakistan at any cost and that too with a military dictator intent on trampling the restoration of democracy in Pakistan is widely perceived in India as dancing to the tunes of an externally scripted agenda from Washington.

Further amplifying the above, India in the context of “strategic autonomous” nation would have entailed the Congress Government to maintain in July 2005 when the Nuclear Deal was signed that it would not accept at any stage the imposition of US domestic laws on the Deal.

Similarly, on relations with Pakistan and the peace process, the Congress Government should not have allowed the pace, nature and content of the process to be dictated by external actors. The Congress Government should have summarily dismissed those who have been maintaining that “India cannot emerge as a great power unless the Kashmir issue is settled and relations with Pakistan normalized”.

India has emerged as a global economic power despite Kashmir and despite Pakistan’s military regime’s peace-disruptive policies. It can emerge as Key Global Power also despite Kashmir and military rulers of Pakistan.

The above were only the major illustrations on how India’s “strategic autonomy” stood compromised.

Since it already stands maintained that neither the United States, nor Russia nor China can actively assist India’s emergence as a Key Global Power, there is no justification for India to lose its strategic autonomy to anyone of them.

Rising to the summits as mountaineers know means trudging a lonely furrow where the mountaineers own grit and determination comes into autonomous play. The same applies to nations aspiring to reach to the pinnacles of power.

India’s Future Strategic Choice: “Economic Superpower” or Key Global Power”

The keys to emerge as a “Key Global Power” lie in India’s strong economy, growing foreign exchange reserves and sustained rates of high economic growth well into the future. This is undeniable. But what also is undeniable is that India could end up as an “economic superpower” like Germany and Japan and yet miss the bus to emerge as a “Key Global Power” if it does not make the correct strategic choices.

China provides a good example of how both objectives of being an “economic superpower” and attaining a “Key Global Power” status have been pursued in parallel to China’s strategic advantage. India should do like wise.

Economic power, however colossal, is only a “soft power” strength. It lacks the coercive strength of “hard power” which is the sum total of a states military hard power and so also soft power. Economic power is persuasive power and lacks the dissuasion or compellance coercive power that hard power provides.

India in its ascendant trajectory towards “Key Global Power” status requires hard power to be respected if not feared.

Global Power Comes With a “National Will to Use Power” and “Use it Hard”

It stands pointed in this Author’s book referred above that historically India’s majority population was not devoid of martial traits or the will to use power. The disconnect with this reality and India’s present soft approaches to power arose from its independence struggle when pacifism and non-violence were given over-riding preference and priority. India’s post- Independence political leadership nurtured in this pacifism fought shy of using power even to protect India’s national security interests when trampled upon by nations severely asymmetric in size and strength.

The most recent example of India’s reluctance and the “Will to Use Power” is reflected in its counter-terrorism policies.

It is further reflected in India’s pathetic approaches to ensure political stability and order in South Asia where her national interests should reign supreme as a regional power.

A “National Will to Use Power” and “Use it Hard” has to emerge and be demonstrated by India’s political leadership from whichever political dispensation is in power, All of them have failed India on this count as the examples given below would illustrate.

India’s Prime Ministers’ “Strategic Culture” Deficit, Strategic Naivety and Vulnerability to External Pressures

The focus on strategic culture in India or lack of it emerged in the 1990’s when George Tanham in a study commissioned by the US Administration came up with conclusions as to how India and particularly its political leadership were deficit of strategic culture.

Thereafter academics in USA and UK especially have pored extensively on the geographical, historical and societal factors that impeded India in forging a distinctive strategic culture.

Many definitions of strategic culture exist as academics have sought to understand what shapes the political elites in Asian countries in their approaches to matters strategic. This paper is not intended to be a research paper and hence would attempt to highlight the various aspects in more layman terms.

In the Indian context, this Author would like to put understanding of India’s strategic culture in the following framework: (1) Indian political elites, its policy establishment and its strategic community’s comprehension of issues strategic and their intellect and capability to formulate effective national security strategies and defense policies (2) The capability of such elites to perceptively comprehend and respond to threats to India, anticipating emerging threats and even discerning “threats in the making” (3) The perceptive capabilities of such elites to read the minds of India’s adversaries, the strategic cultures of their opposing adversaries and providing an accurate or near accurate political component of India’s threat assessments to the Indian Armed Forces.

When the above parameters are applied to judge India’s Prime Ministers, they fail miserably both in reading their adversaries minds and their strategic cultures and as to how and what drives their moves against India at a given moment in time.

A recent illustration of this is the flawed approaches of India’s Congress Prime Minister are his dealings with Pakistan’s military dictator General Musharraf. The Indian Prime Minister went to the extent of publicly stating that he “could trust Musharraf” and that “he could do business with him.” This is a regrettable display of “strategic culture deficit”.

The strategic naivety of Indian Prime Ministers over the last 60 years can be discerned from the strategic blunders that they committed, namely (1) Nehru gifted away Tibet to China and stopped the Indian Army’s in its tracks near Uri when within a week or more, they would have captured the whole of Jammu & Kashmir (2) Nehru’s implicit trust of China over the Boundary Dispute leading to the 1962 debacle (3) Shastri’s agreeing at Tashkent to return the Haji Pir Bulge and Kargil Heights captured from Pakistan in 1965 (4) Indira Gandhi’s return of 90,000 Pakistani officers and Other Ranks of the Pakistani Army captured in Bangladesh without extracting a written pledge from Bhutto in the Simla Agreement on conversion of the LOC into an international boundary (5) Narasimha Rao’s scaling down of the Indian Army’s forward military presence in Arunachal Pradesh on economic grounds (6) Rajiv Gandhi’s ambiguous postures on India’s military intervention in Sri Lanka (7) Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s ordering a three-day lull at the height of Kargil operations when Indian Army was on a roll towards the Pakistani territory (8) Dr. Manmohan Singh’s virtual sell-out of the Siachen Region to Pakistan in 2006. He was stopped in the tracks by widespread public outrage.

In terms of Indian Prime Ministers vulnerabilities to external pressure the demonstrated record is equally poor. Brief illustrations of this can be mentioned as follows (1) Nehru’s Cease Fire in Kashmir in 1948 and referring the Kashmir issue to the United Nations under British pressure (2) Shastri’s caving in to Soviet pressures at Tashkent in 1965 to return captured territory to Pakistan after India’s military victories (3) Indira Gandhi’s halting the planned offensive against West Pakistan in December 1971 (after liberation of Bangladesh) under United States pressures (4) Vajpayee’s stopping Indian Army from crossing the LAC during the Kargil War and not carrying through to its logical end OP PRAKARM under US pressures. (5) Dr. Manmohan Singh's flawed peace approaches to Pakistan under US pressure which wanted to perpetuate the military dictator’s regime in Pakistan.

All of the foregoing presents a pitiable picture of Indian Prime Ministers. Their strategic failings arise from their not being equipped strategically to deal with matters of strategic importance for India’s national security. The same applies to their policy advisers.

A recent trend is the proliferation of armchair strategists who believe that their exposures to international relations and political science in universities or sponsored short stints in US think-tanks equip them to pontificate on matters strategic.

If India is ever held back from its destined run to emerge as a “Key Global Power”, the blame can squarely be laid on its Prime Ministers, the Indian policy establishment and the bureaucracy for their lack of strategic vision and grasp of international power politics.

India’s Strategic Vision: No Official “National Security Strategy” Document Exists

In the United States the strategic vision of the United States is encapsulated in an official White House Document known as the “National Security Strategy” Document. It is personally signed by the US President and lays down the “National Objectives” and the “National Security Strategy” to achieve the defined objectives.

This document is an important document for it provides the directives, the parameters and the national security priorities of the objectives in a declaratory and un-ambiguous manner. It provides the blueprint from where the entire United States defense planning takes off and gets further amplified through a number of other supporting defense planning documents. The whole process stands illustrated in this Author’s book referred above.

In India no such “National Security Strategy” Document exists even till today. The only conclusions that emerge can be surmised for this are as follows (1) India’s political leadership has yet to conceptualize a blueprint of India’s strategic future (2) India’s political leadership shirks from articulating a national security strategy for fear of being held accountable for wrong directions (the 1962 debacle) (3) India’s political leadership has no time for India’s strategic affairs busy as they are with political chicanery (4) Strategy articulation for counter-terrorism for example may entail hard decisions which could jeopardize political parties’ vote banks.

The end result is that in the absence of such political directives, the Indian Armed Forces have to prepare their operational plans, force-structures and strategic perspectives in the absence of the political component of the national threat assessment which should have been provided by the political leadership of the day.

India Needs a Legislated “National Security Act”

As early as 2000, this author had reviewed this imperative in SAAG Paper No. 123 dated 17.05.2000 entitled “India’s National Security Council – A Critical Review” and further reproduced as Appendix A in the Book referred.

A few excerpts from the “Concluding Observations” of this paper need repetition to add context to what is being advocated and these are:

India’s National Security Council (NSC) as currently structured and constituted reflects all the traditional shortcomings of the last 50 years (now 60 years) which have been repeated both in this paper and elsewhere ad-nauseum.”
“…highlight that ‘ad-holism’ and centralization of all security decision-making in the hands of civil bureaucrats and more specifically in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) ill-serve India’s national security decision making processes.”
“India’s NSC needs to be constituted and structured in a manner which facilitates serious deliberations of strategic threats and problems in an independent and objective manner on a whole time basis.”
“Lastly, the historical background of our national security processes in the last 50 years mandate that NSC should be legislatively institutionalized as a constitutional body so that there is a continuum in national security decisions.”
“National Security Directives should bear the signature of the incumbent Prime Minister so that accountability is assured.”
Regrettably, the National Security Council which was brought into existence by the BJP Government after half a century of opposition by vested interests stands withered and politically devalued under the present Congress Government. It exists in name and notional form only staffed by those who are close to the Government in power.

Nothing highlights the above more than the present Prime Minister constituting a number of Strategic Task Forces within the PMO to address subjects which should rightly have been addressed by the NSC.

The Indian Armed Forces hierarchy constitutionally tasked to defend India against external and internal security threats and maintain her sovereignty and integrity are singularly absent from the loop of India’s strategic decision making.

The net result in the last 60 years that not only India’s foreign policy stands personalized in the person of the Prime Minister (a Nehruvian legacy) but in the last few years India’s strategic decision making also stands personalized in the person of the Prime Minister and the bureaucrats of the Prime Minister’s Office.

India’s Foreign Policy and National Security Issues Need to be Ratified by Parliament

This author over the years has been advocating that major issues and agreements with foreign countries on foreign policy and national security issues should be reviewed and ratified by India’s Parliament.

This advocacy arises not only from the shortcomings pointed out in the preceding discussion but also India’s political history of the last 60 years. It has now come to a head and more focus in 2007 on the issue of the US-India Nuclear Deal.

The Congress Prime Minister and his policy establishment deliberately wrapped the negotiating process in a veil of secrecy and froze the text of the finalized Agreement for a week or two. It added more fuel to the fire when it started maintaining that as per the Constitution, the Government was not obliged to go back to the Parliament for ratification of external agreements arrived at by the Executive.

This is only correct in a narrow technical context. Recently three retired Supreme Court judges, and being constitutional experts, have highlighted certain clauses of India’s Constitution which oblige the Government of the day to get ratification from the Parliament.

Even if it were not so, the other argument that comes to the fore is in an era of coalition Governments cobbled together by pooling in numbers of disparate so called secularist parties with no foreign policy moorings or strategic perspectives, foreign policy and national security formulations or issues having a bearing on them, should be ratified by the Parliament.

India’s national security cannot be allowed to become the unguarded preserve of any particular political party which may be enjoying a single digit lead over the other leading political party minus the opportunistic components of the coalitions.

In the pursuit of India’s ambitions to achieve a “Key Global Power” status “National Cohesion” is an important attribute. This attributes’ reflection would come into focus when India’s foreign policy and national security and strategic formulations are arrived through a process of bi-partisan political support and consensus.

India’s Nuclear Security Doctrine Yet to Be Finalized

This has deliberately been listed as the last strategic reflection as it exemplifies the sum total of all the strategic failings of India’s political leadership examined above.

The ‘Draft Nuclear Doctrine’ was unveiled by the then BJP Government’s National Security Adviser, Brajesh Mishra on August 17, 1999, and was released for public debate. The aim of releasing it to public domain seemed to have been to generate more opinion on India’s Nuclear Doctrine before finalizing it.

The BJP Government was in power till April 2004 and thereafter the Congress Government has been in power. In a span of eight years, neither Government of different political dispensations has sought fit to finalize this document due to a strange mix of circumstances which can be said to reflect the shortcomings being repeated, namely (1) Finalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine would need some hard strategic decisions (2) Vulnerability to external pressures on the Government of the day on crucial aspects of India’s nuclear deterrence policies (3) Finalization of Doctrine conveniently tucked away in favor of more politically attractive domestic issues (4) Strategic issues not on the priority lists of political parties agenda.

India’s ascendancy towards “Key Global Power” status cannot progress if India’s political leadership continues to demonstrate the above shortcomings on strategic issues.

India as a “Key Global Power” has to have a “Credible Nuclear Deterrence Doctrine”. A finalized Nuclear Doctrine should reflect India’s firm resolve in the strategizing of her Nuclear Warfare strategy. India’s Nuclear Deterrence becomes “Credible” only when its adversaries primarily, and others too recognize in the Nuclear Doctrine formulations that India is firm in the use of its strategic nuclear assets when others cross the ‘red lines’ de-lineated by it in terms of her vital national security interests. India’s Nuclear Doctrine should be devoid of ambiguities and any apologetic formulations or statements.

It is rather strange that India’s community of noted strategic experts have not been vociferous in demanding the finalization of the Draft Nuclear Doctrine document which continues as a “Draft” for the last eight years. It seems that the ‘Draft’ has become a ‘Drift’.

The Nuclear Doctrine in a finalized form would be the blueprint on which India’s Armed Forces have to operationalize India’s responses to or for nuclear warfare, if an eventuality so arises. Based on it the entire “Command, Control and Communications” and Nuclear Targeting has to be planned. Can successive Indian Governments be allowed to get away with such political lethargy?

Concluding Observations

India’s political leadership should not be misled into the belief that the international fawning that is being bestowed on India is a recognition of India having acquired a “Key Global Power” status. The present international fawning on India strategically is only in recognition of its emerging power potential. It is limited only and limits India emergence to a “Key Global Player”. President Bush’s assertion some time back of US assistance was only to assist India to become a “Key Global Player”. That is a far cry from “Key Global Power”.

The above arises from two factors: (1) As mentioned earlier on in the paper, no global power will assist the emergence of another global power for strategic reasons, and (2) India’s political leadership in the last 60 years has not demonstrated the essential and vital ingredient of a Great Power or a Regional Power and that is the “WILL TO USE POWER” to secure its national security interests and to ensure that its strategic sensitivities are respected at least in its neighborhood.

The most striking strategic reflection that this Author wishes to make while reflecting on the strategic record of “India at Sixty” is that a complete structural transformation of India’s strategic set-up, its institutional mechanisms and strategy formulation processes is called for.

India’s political leadership in the last sixty years was content with grudging add-ons to the strategic set-up left behind by the British. It is ill-equipped and ill-structured to meet head on the challenging strategic environment of today.

Lastly, a more somber reflection needs to be added. Who will liberate the mindsets of India’s political leaders from their various inconsequential political “ISMS” namely secularism, minorityism, socialism and casteism and equip themselves with the strategic fibre, the strategic vision and the strategic “WILL TO USE POWER” to lead India to “KEY GLOBAL POWER” status?