INDIA-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: STRATEGIC REVERBERATIONS FROM RUSSIA AND CHINA CREATE IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA’S SECURITY

INDIA-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: STRATEGIC REVERBERATIONS FROM RUSSIA AND CHINA CREATE IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA’S SECURITY

by Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

In an earlier paper of this Author entitled “India-United States Strategic Partnership: The Reverberations From China And Russia” SAAG Paper No. 2320 dated 02.08.2007 attention was drawn to the fact that the India-US strategic partnership being sought to be evolved with more intensity by the present Indian Government is not without strategic costs for India from other major powers so impacted.

The major observations made in the earlier paper by the Author were as under:

India’s strategic and foreign policy establishment must recognize that India’s management of its strategic partnerships, both existing and evolving must be adroitly done
India’s strategic stances must not generate reverberations from other global power centers, until India reaches the culminating stage of emerging as an independent power center in the world.
Since a substantive India-US Strategic Partnership has the potential to alter the global strategic balance and so also the Asian strategic balance, the evolving Indo-US Strategic Partnership has been under intense scrutiny by China and Russia. In particular India’s participation in the “strategic geometries” sponsored in East Asia by the United States has raised strategic concerns in China and Russia and their reverberations have not been long in coming in a subtle manner.

In the Indian strategic calculus, China and Russia cannot be discounted for a number of good reasons. China figures in Indian threat perceptions in a major way because of past armed conflicts and the chronic unsettled boundary disputes. While India and China are today engaged in transforming their relationship from one of mutual suspicions to that of mutual trust, both countries cannot ignore their national security interests and strategic priorities.

In China’s threat perceptions, a substantive India-US Strategic Partnership carries with it the potential of initiatives for Indo-US containment of China and use of Tibet as a strategic pressure point.

Russia’s strategic sensitivities in relation to India’s future strategic moves need to be paid due respect as the Indo-Russian Strategic Partnership is a time tested one. Unlike the United States and China which have resorted to creation of “spoiler states” like Pakistan, to checkmate India, Russia has not resorted to such policies against India.

Strategic reverberations from Russia and China do create strategic implications for India and these are discussed at the end of the paper.

An Indian strategic tilt towards the United States would have been justifiable if the United States could address India’s threat perceptions from China and Pakistan. Politically the United States is not so inclined and is ever unlikely to underwrite India’s security against any such threats. With no such surety ever likely to emerge from the United States would it be prudent for India to endanger her security by a strategic tilt?

India’s security and foreign policy establishment needs to do some hard thinking on this account.

Strategic Reverberations from Russia: President Putin Misses Traditional Meetings with India’s External Affairs Minister and Indian Defence Minister During their Moscow Visits in October 2007

The Indian External Affairs Minister and the Indian Defense Minister paid visits to Moscow this month to attend the inter-governmental panel discussions held annually. In the case of the External Affairs Minister’s visit it was being projected that his Moscow visit was also undertaken as a preparatory visit for the Indian Prime Minister forthcoming visit to Moscow in November 2007.

The Indian External Affairs Minister was unable to meet the Russian Foreign Minister and the Russian President and both these were significant departures from past precedents. The reasons advanced by the Russians were that both were busy with discussions with the visiting US Secretary of State and the US Defense Secretary. Further that President Putin was leaving for Iran and was busy.

The Indian Defense Minister did sign some defense agreements during his Moscow visit and also had discussions on overdue defense deliveries from Russia. Again, departing from precedents the Russians could not arrange a call by the Indian Defense Minister on President Putin.

The strategic reverberations from Russia stand discussed in the Author’s earlier paper. But what has happened now is something serious. While both Russia and India can dismiss diplomatically that everything is normal and undue importance should not be accorded to the visiting Indian Ministers not being given audience by President Putin, one cannot also ignore that obviously something is amiss and the Russians are trying to signal some messages.

In his earlier paper this Author had reflected that more serious Russian strategic reverberations are likely to occur if the present Indian Government allots the $ 7 billion orders for combat planes for the Indian Air Force to the United States as a single vendor. It was further emphasized that this is a deal which can send out strong distorted strategic messages and the present Indian Government needs to tread seriously and with care when deciding on this deal.

Is it likely that the Russians have got a whiff from their Indian sources that the Indian Government is politically inclined to award the $ 7 billion contract for combat planes to the United States? Is the political could shouldering by President Putin of not meeting the Indian External Affairs Minister and the Indian Defense Minister during their Moscow visits this month is a manifestation of Russia’s strategic displeasure?

While the above may only be speculative analysis but the underpinning reality of it being a likelihood cannot also be dismissed.

In addition to the above, recent reverberations from Russia over India’s strategic tilt have manifested in Russia giving permission that China could use Russian aircraft engines for Chinese fighter aircraft being supplied to Pakistan. There are also reports to indicate that China is interceding with Russia on Pakistan’s behalf that Russia should open upto Pakistan which the Russians have so far avoided respecting India’s strategic sensitivities.

China’s Strategic Displeasure on India-United States Strategic Partnership Emergence Persist

In the Author’s last paper on this subject after listing at least eight different strategic displeasure reverberations on India’s strategic tilt towards USA under the present Government, two questions were asked and both answered.

The first question that this Author raised was whether India should really be concerned with China’s manifested strategic displeasures? It was opined that “Not really, one should think so, as India has the right to indulge in counter-strategic pressure points against China as China was doing so all along so far by using Pakistan against India.”

The second question raised in the paper was whether India should take note of it. It was opined that “very certainly and absolutely must do so. As India proceeds on its trajectory towards global power status, China must seriously and significantly figure in India’s strategic calculus, irrespective of what contours the US-India Strategic Partnership assumes”.

In addition to the reverberations listed earlier, some more which needs to be added to the list are: (1) Last round of boundary negotiations held recently could not make any progress; the stalemate persists (2) China’s lodging protests alleging that India had constructed military bunkers on the Chinese side of the border in Sikkim (3) Border incursions into Bhutan in a bid to pressurize the India-friendly Bhutanese Government and also to highlight India’s helplessness on the issue (4) Postponing of joint China-India military exercises.

Russia’s and China’s Reverberations: Implications for India’s Security

Some may like to be dismissive of the manifested strategic reverberations from Russia and China on the India-US Strategic Partnership emerging contours on the grounds that these are inconsequential. But what must not be forgotten in strategic analysis is that the “inconsequentials” are the first indicators of a “trend-in-the-making”.

What is at issue here is the “persistence” of both India on one hand to indulge in a monochromatic strategic partnership with USA and on the rebound the “persisttence” of Russia and China to raise the profile and stakes of their strategic reverberations against India.

In terms of strategic implications for India arising from the issues under discussion, the following factors need to be considered by India’s strategic and foreign policy establishment:

Just as India cannot become a global key player in confrontation with USA, so also India cannot become a global key player by impinging on the strategic sensitivities of Russia and China, especially those which intersect with USA.
As an emerging global power, India cannot be strategically type- casted as an alliance partner of one or the other powers. Strategically, India would have to be even-handed and maintain an autonomous strategic posture.
Russia enjoys strategic leverages over India in terms of India’s predominantly Russian-origin military inventories. This cannot be wished away overnight.
If India can participate in “strategic geometries” in East Asia along side USA it can also participate in the “strategic geometries” of “heartland Asia” alongside the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (SCO) A global power in the making should have that much of strategic autonomy. The absence of India’s present Prime Minister avoiding attendance of SCO summit meetings is noticeable. The Indian Prime Minister’s absence indicates a strategic tilt towards USA.
To emerge as a key global play India would have to first carve a niche in the Asian strategic pecking order and the Asian security calculus. This cannot emerge in opposition to the strategic interests and sensitivities of Russia and China.
Lastly, India’s security problems can be compounded should Russia and China, singly or in conjunction with each other attempt to counter India’s strategic tilt towards the United States.

The present Indian Government has already got a foretaste on the India-US Strategic Partnership on the strong political opposition to the Nuclear Deal. It can ill-afford more divisiveness within the country.

Concluding Observations

In conclusion, nothing more apt can be stated, than to re-emphasize what this author has highlighted in the ‘Introductory Observations’ namely:

India’s strategic and foreign policy establishment must recognize that India’s management of its strategic partnerships, both existing and evolving must be adroitly done
India’s strategic stances must not generate reverberations from other global power centers, until India reaches the culminating stage of emerging as an independent power center in the world.