Indias Foreign Policy : Emerging Trends in the New Century
Guest Column by R. Swaminathan
There are at least two methodologies to approach the broad theme of this subject. One would be the conventional method of taking stock of developments like India�s �Look East� policy, the emerging �strategic cooperation� between India and China, the developing �strategic partnership� between India and USA, the restructuring of Indo-Russian relations, Russian impatience with the perceived evolution of US-centric unipolar world order etc. and discuss how to proceed further. The other method, which I prefer to adopt in this paper, is to have an overall look at the current and emerging international situation and try to evolve some guidelines for an effective and successful foreign policy in the 21st century.
Certain Basic Formulations
Please let me start with a listing of what I consider to be some of the basic formulations that should guide the evolution of India�s foreign policy in the new century.
The other day, I read a �blog� on the internet in which a �Person of Indian Origin� spoke of India�s pretensions of becoming a superpower. My obvious initial reaction was one of outrage; but as I read the entire piece, I realized that the person was prejudiced against his home country and/or is very misinformed. I wished that he had used �ambition� or �aspiration� in place of �pretensions�. The facts, as I see them, are that India is already a significant power, which is speeding on its way to becoming a big power; and that this has been recognized by many countries. However, many academics and other intellectuals in our own country have not yet grown to accept this reality. Indian intellectuals and analysts (and seemingly many in our foreign policy establishment) have for so long been used to India being strong on rhetoric but an under-achiever, that it is not easy for many to see that the ugly duckling is growing into a beautiful swan. One of the reasons may be that India is trying to achieve and is achieving in a few years what many other significant powers could comfortably achieve in many decades or centuries � as the world gradually evolved from the Middle Ages to the modern era. In the process, many intermediate steps are being skipped (as has happened in many areas of our technological development) and the accelerated growth is not easy to cope with. The first requirement therefore is for such academics, intellectuals and foreign policy establishment to accept that India has grown out of her exploited under-dog status of nearly two centuries and to realize the potential of our current status as a significant power � economically as a matter of fact, militarily as a matter of relative strengths, and politically if we can learn to leverage them to our national advantage. Along with that, it has also to be recognized that India�s changed (and changing) status has also caused significant changes in the expectations of other countries about India�s involvement in world affairs. A change in our mind-set is therefore necessary.
A comparison could be made with China easing in comfortably into her emerging status as a significant (or even big) power. It is well to remember that China and India had both been significant powers centuries ago. However, China (which was not as colonized as India was) has had an easier task. Inspired by her perennial �Middle Kingdom� syndrome, China could get back into her big-power ways, overcoming the limitations imposed by a long period of foreign influence in her affairs. India, on the other hand, seems to have allowed foreign invasions and colonial rule to make her forget her glory days, except in speeches and school text books.
During the colonial era, India had no foreign policy of its own, as the policy was made in Whitehall to sub serve British interests. Even many years after independence, many intellectuals in think tanks and many in the foreign policy establishment have continued to let their thought processes be unduly influenced by western thought processes (with some, of course, tilting the other way). Jawahar Lal Nehru�s famous directive about the nomenclature of geographical regions was not followed up further and taken to its logical conclusion. It is time that we developed and nurtured our own (Indian) thinking about world affairs.
Economics has, over the past many decades, been gradually replacing territorial and imperial ambitions as the prime mover behind international relations. India has achieved a lot in the economic field since the policies of liberalization and globalization were brought into play. The aphorism that less government leads to good governance is being proved to the hilt. The innate genius of the Indian people has started blossoming and the Indian economy is generally thriving in international competition. People-to-people and business-to-business relations have taken their rightful places in economic relations between India and other countries. In the field of economics, the world is rapidly becoming multi-polar, with multiple foci of economic power. As observed by my good friend Balachandran (The Asian Age, 7 March 2007), globalization has resulted in the corporate sector playing important roles (earlier mostly played by governments) in areas such as heavy industries, communications, financial and commercial management etc. Although foreign policy is made by governments, commercial and social groups are pursuing their own foreign relations, which often outperform government initiatives. One could cite the various initiatives of FICCI, ASSOCHAM, CII, US-India Business Council, India-China Business Alliance etc. The role played by some of these and other non-governmental organizations during the negotiations on the US-India civilian nuclear agreement is still fresh in our memory. Multinational commercial entities also pursue their own foreign relations, (often blurring or ignoring international borders), which act as compelling ingredients in the evolution of the foreign or commercial policy of a country, e.g. the influence of Boeing on US-China policy.
We have to consider whether this route could not be adopted mutatis mutandis in the area of political relations also. It is possible that people to people relations and the media can act as pressure groups to evolve some kind of synthesis between differing security and political interests and priorities of India and other countries. Intellectuals, human rights workers, lawyers, press corps, artistes and film stars could easily set in motion a closer understanding between different countries to compel their governments to agree that cooperation on ecology and efforts to eradicate poverty and deprivation should receive higher priorities than narrow polemics. When the peoples of two countries develop a vested interest in good relations between their countries, the governments would have to follow suit. Though security services may have some reservations about this process, the benefits of regime neutralisation (as opposed to regime change) should help in overcoming those reservations.
As an example of how people-to-people cooperation could be used effectively to supplement and strengthen the efforts of governments, let us look at the example of Palk Bay, where the fishing communities on both sides had jointly exploited (with hardly any outside intervention) the marine resources for centuries. If the two governments would restore to those communities the right and responsibility to work out friendly, cooperative and sustainable fishing in these waters, the problem could probably be solved amicably. The two governments could encourage and facilitate whatever the fishermen are able to agree upon and reserve the waters of the Palk Bay for joint and co-operative fishing exclusively by artisan fishermen of the littoral fishing communities.
The reality that the era of superpowers (and of �gunboat diplomacy�) has ended has to be recognized. Even at the height (or the nadir) of the Cold war, the �authority� of the two superpowers was more perceived than real and they were never certain of unqualified support from their �allies� without resort to binding treaties and occasional threats or implementation of punitive action. Their writs ran more through fear of the opposite camp than by acceptance. The severe limitations of �superpower� authority have been exposed in Afghanistan, Iraq, DPRK, Iran etc In the present international situation, which has often been described as unipolar, with USA being the sole superpower, US foreign policy is probably more feared and loathed than admired or willingly accepted. Is it possible to cite instances where the US leadership has been accepted by willing consent, without financial and other incentives, without fear of sanctions and/or naked aggression? Russia and China have already started expressing their misgivings about US postures. The writ of the US Government does not always run in its own backyard of Latin America, as shown during the recent multi-nation tour of President Bush. The experience of USA should also signal that the use of military power is no longer a viable substitute for effective diplomacy and negotiation.
The terms of bipolar or unipolar international order seem to have lost their relevance. What we are likely to see as the current century progresses would be the emergence of multiple centers of political and economic power and influence, highlighting the need to achieve a stable equilibrium amongst them. The threat of economic losses and instability would become a strong incentive for all economically powerful countries to cooperate and work together.
Certain Guidelines
On the basis of the above formulations, it is possible to list some guidelines (not necessarily in the order of their importance) for making India�s foreign policy in the twenty first century. It may be argued that these are mere platitudes, but a careful and objective analysis will show their practical applications in specific cases. India has no doubt practiced one or more of these on different issues from time to time, but with our growing status as an emerging big power, these need to become permanent characteristics of our foreign policy.
* Overall national interest should always be the primary and supreme consideration. There should be no embarrassment in placing national interest at the top of our agenda.
* Our foreign and national security policies should be dovetailed, in private and in public.
* We should act as a responsible significant (or big) power, whose views and policies are of importance to many other countries. The luxury of making/ taking not-so-well-thought-out statements/actions relating to other countries is no longer available to India.
* There should be some continuity and predictability in our foreign policy. These would be hallmarks of a significant, mature and self-confident power. If we do not have a viable long-term strategy, foreign policy swings would become inevitable, resulting in a lack of credibility.
* As in the case of National Security Policy, there should be, as far as possible, a National Foreign Policy, and not merely that of the party (or parties) in power. All efforts need to be made to have a national political consensus on major foreign policy issues, so that the concerned countries are aware that they are dealing with a stable country and not merely with a transient government. The present UPA Government under Dr. Man Mohan Singh has undertaken many significant consultations on certain foreign policy issues. [In this context, a worthwhile effort would be to set up an independent think-tank, on the lines of the US Congressional Research Service, to study various issues and provide objective position papers to all Members of Parliament.]
* Domestic politics and partisan interests could be major inputs during the stage of consultations, but should not become reasons for casting doubts on the credibility of the foreign policy of the country. We have unfortunately been having too many such instances in recent years. An example of how the removal of domestic politics from the equation can benefit international relations is the 3 March 2007 agreement between the Directors General of India�s Border Security Force and Bangladesh Rifles.
* We should develop the art of looking at issues also from the perspective of the other country. [Intelligence and security analysts are taught and trained to get into the mind of the other person, to assess the possible plans, reactions and threats from such person.] This would help in avoiding over-sensitivity and any unjustified sense of mistrust. For instance, a relatively innocuous action taken by China in her own national interest could otherwise be misinterpreted by India as an unfriendly (or even a hostile) act.
* There should be more transparency in our policy-making process. We should consider making public disclosure, subject to security requirements, of our reasons � security, strategic, financial, and commercial - for making compromises or for taking specific actions, to enable others look at issues from our perspective and avoid misunderstandings. We should be unambiguous, in public or in private, in expressing our sensitivities on specific issues to the concerned countries. Such transparency may not always extend to diplomatic actions taken in specific cases. As the Prime Minister had stated in his letter of 14 March 2007 to L.K.Advani, �We do not believe in conducting diplomacy in public�.
* In a democracy, the government cannot be considered to be the depository of all wisdom on all issues. The policy-makers should be open to inputs also from outside the government, particularly from academia. India is already following this to some extent in the evolution of financial and economic policies.
* Guidelines are general in nature and cannot always be rigidly adhered to. A certain amount of customization would be necessary, relating to specific countries and specific situations.
* Without trying to reinvent the wheel, we could draw suitable lessons from the successes and failures in history. Just as we take vitamins and other dietary supplements to build up energy and muscles, it would not hurt if academics, intellectuals and the foreign policy establishment could adopt certain principles as below.
� National pride, short of chauvinism.
� A rosy vision of the future, short of fantasy.
� Boldness, short of mindless audacity.
� Self-confidence, short of arrogance.
� Logical thinking, short of paralysis by analysis.
� Firmness, tempered by compassion.
� Involvement with problems of smaller neighbours, short of unsolicited intervention.
Specialists in various disciplines are scheduled to address different segments of this seminar on subjects like India and the New Global Order, Globalisation and the Indian Economy, India and the Great Powers, India and the Shifting Security Scenario in South Asia and India and its Neighbourhood Diplomacy. I shall therefore offer (for the record) only some brief remarks on some of the emerging trends in India�s international relations.
Big Powers
When we consider relations with big powers, we have to take into account all countries and entities that would be economically powerful in the next few years. We have to factor in the reality that some of them would attempt to leverage economic power into political clout and attempt to influence other countries. The list of countries and entities that are likely to qualify in this league would include (in addition to India) Australia, Brazil, China, Germany, Japan, Russia, USA, ASEAN, OPEC and EU; and more may join the ranks as the century progresses. India has rapidly to grow up into dealing with these countries/entities on equal terms, understand and try to accommodate each one�s prime interests (subject to India�s own national interests) and avoid unnecessary confrontation on minor issues. It will be a not-too-easy balancing act, with high stakes involved.
The colonial legacy of being more understanding and accommodative of the concerns of western countries is still quite dominant in the thought-processes of many think-tanks and the foreign policy establishment, except when it is fashionable to be anti-west on specific issues. With our words and actions being studied more than before, India has to make a special effort to be visibly neutral � unless otherwise dictated by national interest.
Neighbourhood
India has seven neighbours with shared borders, i.e. Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Maldives and ASEAN should also be considered as neighbours, for the evolution of India�s foreign policy. One tends to forget that the nearest landfall in ASEAN is less than 100 kms from Indra Point.
China
China, apart from being a Big Power, is also a significant neighbour and merits special attention. The progress towards India-China strategic cooperation has not eliminated Chinese concern at the growing India-US strategic partnership. India�s foreign policy establishment seems to be fairly clear about the difference between �strategic cooperation� and �strategic partnership�. Strategic cooperation would imply an exchange and coordination of views by two countries on the common challenges posed in the political, security and economic spheres. Strategic partnership, on the other hand, would imply a relationship which would not only incorporate strategic cooperation but also an added emphasis on converting the strategic convergences between two nations into more meaningful defence and security cooperation, joint military training and exercises, defence production and hi-tech exchanges and shouldering of some common defence commitments.
China has displayed a remarkable consistency in its dealings in India�s neighbourhood. It is overtly friendly to Pakistan and Bangladesh, though both have been harbouring cross border terrorist organizations operating against India from within their territories. Further, when India supported the democratic movement in Myanmar, China showed pragmatism and supported the military junta. Air Chief Marshal S P Tyagi, Chief of Air Staff, had mentioned in November 2005 (B.C.Joshi Memorial Lecture at Pune University) that �China's strategic encirclement of India is already well under way. �. China is likely to view India as a regional economic threat and perhaps would be forced to attempt to stem its growth and influence in the region.� China has also started taking significant steps in Africa. Obviously, one of the worst nightmares of strategic thinkers would relate to India being encircled by hostile neighbours supported by China.
Even while progressing a close and comfortable relationship with China, India has to consider very carefully the implications to India�s security and economic interests of various Chinese actions. It may not be necessary to take reactive counter-measures at each and every stage, but our own policies and actions in various regions and on various issues have to be devised suitably to protect our overall national interests.
Pakistan and Bangladesh
Pakistan and Bangladesh pose special security and other problems, which stem largely from historical and geo-political reasons and are mostly caused or subscribed to by State actors. The ruling elites in both the countries seem to have adopted anti-India stance as a part of the basic foundation of their national identities and policies. India�s internal security, as well as regional security, is threatened due to their unwillingness or inability to prevent jihadi extremist groups from carrying out cross-border terrorist operations. The jihadi bases in the �ungoverned� areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and Pakistan�s perceived status as a close ally of USA in the �global war on terror� have created a piquant situation. India has shown a fair amount of sophistication and pragmatism in formulating and pursuing her foreign policy vis-�-vis Pakistan; but a similar approach is not apparent in relation to Bangladesh.
Smaller Neighbours
The previous National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government had made India virtually invisible in its neighbourhood, ceding influence to the USA and other western powers - due to certain over-emphasis on developing a strategic relationship with the US, its over-anxious solicitation of support for India's bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council and in unsuccessful efforts to bring pressure on Pakistan to stop its sponsorship of terrorism in Indian territory. The present UPA government has been quietly trying to reverse this trend, without openly protesting about the increased involvement of the west in India's neighbourhood, but steadily seeking to regain the influence which India had traditionally enjoyed in this region.
India�s difficulties in maintaining friendly and cordial relations with her smaller neighbours may be due to her inability to deal with them as equals. The smaller neighbours are naturally worried about the asymmetry in size, human and material resources and economic and military strength. India�s perceived willingness and tendency to assert its national interests (e.g. India�s role in the creation of Bangla Desh, Indian support to the Tamil movements in Sri Lanka); Indian encouragement and support to its political favourites in the countries of the region (e.g. India�s soft corner for the opposition Awami League in Bangla Desh and for the democratic forces in Nepal); and continuing differences relating to the utilization of water resources, are also matters of concern to them. The affected countries tend to guard themselves by avoiding the development of very close (and possibly dependent) economic and other linkages with India, by developing (balancing) economic and military linkages with China. These are amongst the factors that make it difficult to generate full confidence about equal relationships with the smaller neighbours. This often results in positions of near hostility, suspicion and distrust of India. The need of the hour is to avoid being perceived as the ubiquitous �Big Brother�, but function more as the benevolent and helpful karta of a traditional joint family.
India has shown considerable maturity and responsibility in dealing with Bhutan and Maldives. Where necessary (like eliminating ULFA bases in Bhutan), India has been firm; and, where possible, (like in the matter of revision of the Indo-Bhutan Treaty) India has been understanding and helpful. Despite being a Sunni Muslim country, the Maldives (under President Gayoom) has historically looked up to India as its well-wisher and benefactor. The confrontation between the government and the pro-democracy elements has the seeds of potential instability which could be exploited by jihadi elements based elsewhere. Though concerned about the absence of genuine democracy in the Maldives, India has reasons to be gratified over the Maldivian government�s success in keeping extremist influence away.
However, similar maturity, pro-active approach, pragmatism and helpful understanding have not been too evident in relation to Nepal, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. The developing situations in these three countries have the intrinsic capability to affect India�s security significantly. The growing involvement of the Maoists in the governance of Nepal has the potential of encouraging the activities of the Maoists in India�s �red corridor�. India's ability to restore peace in the North-East depends a lot on the co-operation of the Government of Myanmar and the latter�s success in establishing an effective administrative and military presence in its northern territories. The effects of the Sri Lankan situation on India�s security interests are well known and needs no repetition.
ASEAN
Most of ASEAN, as well as Japan and South Korea, are apprehensive of possible Chinese expansionism in South East Asia. The Chinese Defence Minister Cao Gangchuan, when he was the army chief earlier, had proposed Chinese force projection beyond the South China Sea. In the absence of any strategic competition within the region, with Japan having gone into a shell, and with the increased availability of additional resources due to the booming Chinese economy, China has continually been expanding her presence and influence in ASEAN. What China seems to be attempting is to get a practising hegemony over its own backyard and then make the leap to being a power to challenge the United States. India�s somewhat hesitant efforts to improve political, economic and military relations with the ASEAN countries require to be intensified without any further delay.
Conclusion
In the early years of India�s independence, when India was relatively weak economically and militarily, Jawahar Lal Nehru evolved a foreign policy that got a certain global stature, at the forefront of the non-aligned movement. It made a lot of sense for many newly-independent countries to avoid getting sucked into the Cold War confrontations, though John Foster Dulles termed it �immoral�. Now, with the growing status of India as an economic powerhouse and a regional military power, India needs to be �rediscovered� and the foreign policy redefined. Intellectuals and policy makers have to start thinking differently, to reflect the changing status of India in world affairs. There was a slogan many years ago, saying �Be Indian, Buy Indian�. We could profitably say now �Be Indian, Think Indian�.
Sunday, August 19, 2007
IRAN: UNITED STATES� STRATEGIC OPTIONS RE-EXAMINED
IRAN: UNITED STATES� STRATEGIC OPTIONS RE-EXAMINED
By Dr. Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations
More than quarter of a century has passed since Iran slipped out of the United States strategic and military grasp. It was and remains a strategic trauma for the United States as the loss of Iran from the American geo-strategic orbit in the Middle East knocked off the �main pillar� of United States strategic formulations in this vital oil-rich region.
The United States policy establishment had allowed itself to be led by a delusionary belief that its massive strategic and political investments in the person of the Shah of Iran and his military machine would ensure an unending insurance for US strategic interests in the Gulf region. Little did the United States realize that the people of Iran and their aspirations mattered more than a pro-US ruler or dictator at the helm. One is seeing a repeat of history in US policies centered on General Musharraf and the Pakistan Army.
In these twenty five years, Iran has been in the strategic cross-hairs of the United States constantly and more intensely in the last six years.
The strategic animosity of the United States became more pronounced in the last three years when concrete evidence surfaced that Pakistan had actively assisted Iran in its nuclear enrichment programs along with those of Libya and North Korea.
The current United States � Iran confrontation on the Iranian nuclear program provides a strange contrast in American approaches, namely: (1) Pakistan, the �original sinner� of WMD proliferation to the US so-called �axis of evil� countries has not only been called to account by the United States but stands exonerated by the US Administration (2) Iran stands intensely �demonized� by the United States on the nuclear account for reasons which are more geo-political than legal (3) In marked contrast Libya and more specifically North Korea were never demonized and no massing of US military power against them has been ever put in place.
This author has covered the US-Iran confrontation from 2003 onwards in nearly a dozen papers and examined every conceivable option of the United States against Iran from Limited War to all out war and selective strikes against Iran�s nuclear facilities along with Israel.
A full paper �United States Imperatives for Rapprochement With Iran: A Perspective Analysis (http://saag.org/papers14/paper1352.html) dated 28.04.2005 examined in detail the imperatives.
In the last four years, the United States � Iran confrontation has shown no promise of reconciliation or resolution, despite the significant geo-strategic and geo-political changes that have taken place. On the contrary, the United States-Iran confrontation has become more venomous from both sides.
The United States has let no opportunity to slip to declare that �all options are on the table� implying that the military option was certainly open. Iran concurrently has been equally in open defiance of the United States maintaining that it will not be cowed down by American threats that Iran should cease its nuclear enrichment program.
The Middle East today has enough number of military flashpoints, all in open explosion. Can the United States afford one more significantly potent flashpoint?
In this intractable tinder-box of US-Iran confrontation, the spark that can ignite this explosive mix would inevitably, if it comes around, would come from the United States. Iran dare not ignite the Middle East tinder-box by any direct military misadventure.
Both sides are however engaged today in proxy war against each other. Iran uses the Shia militias in Iraq and Lebanon to strategically discomfit USA. The United States uses Pakistani bases for clandestine operations against Iran by its Special Forces and Iranian dissidents.
In such a disturbing environment it becomes pertinent to re-examine United States strategic options against Iran. The following aspects will be examined in this paper:
* United States Strategic Options on Iran: A Comparative Analysis of the Contextual Determinants in 2003 and 2007
* United States Military Option Against Iran in 2007 Stands Severely Restricted
* Iranian Counter-Responses in 2007 Could be Expected to be More Sharper
* US-Iran Rapprochement: The Only Workable Option Available
United States Strategic Options on Iran: A Comparative Analysis of the Contextual Determinants in 2003 and 2007
A comparative analysis of the contextual determinants in 2003 and 2007 which come into play in deciding United States strategic options on Iran can be briefly said to have restricted United States options today.
In 2003, the contextual strategic determinants that were in play were: (1) The United States had Iran in a military cleft-stick with its military deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan (2) United States entire political spectrum and public opinion was strongly supportive of US Administration strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan; it perceived them as part of the �global war on terror� and WMD proliferation (3) Russia�s strategic resurgence though in the offing but had not become fully assertive (4) Islamic Jehadi terrorism had not manifested itself in Europe as exemplified by the suicide bombings in Madrid, London etc.
In 2007 the contextual determinants for USA stand out in marked disadvantageous contrast to 2003, namely: (1) The United states is in a strategic imbroglio in Iraq and Afghanistan; the US 2003 military cleft-stick stands seriously weakened (2) US political spectrum and public support on Iraq and Afghanistan has become critically divisive (3) Russia�s strategic resurgence is in full effect and the United States cannot discount Russia�s strategic stakes in Iran (4) European allies of USA after the major bombing incidents in UK are mindful, if not fearful, of Islamic backlashes, should they get drawn into US plans of the military option against Iran (5) Rise in oil revenues has facilitated Iran�s military modernization and buildup in these last four years (6) Iraq as the main base for potential US and/or joint military operations against Iran is in the throes of a civil war: the first signs of a concerted Shia-Sunni upsurge against US military occupation of Iraq have manifested themselves (7) Pakistan as the other base of US operations against Iran is in a politically explosive situation today.
The above determinants would come heavily into play in US decision making on Iran as it ponders its options.
United States Military Option Against Iran in 2007 Stands Severely Restricted
United States military options against Iran were analyzed by the author in his paper �Iran in United States Military Crosshairs: Brief Analysis of the End-Game� (http://www.saag.org/papers13/paper1298.html) dated 25.3.2005).
The major observations made in this paper were: (1) Iran�s demonization over nuclear weapons issue makes the average Iranian convinced that Iranian nuclear weapons are the only credible deterrent against US military threats (2) Iranian nuclear weapons program will enjoy support even if tomorrow a �democratic regime� emerges in Iran (3) The Brazilian and South African models cannot come into play in Iran as in the case of the former two countries there was no �demonization campaign� against them for dissuasion from nuclear weapons program (4) Iran poses a politico-strategic threat to USA in the Gulf Region and not a military threat in the foreseeable future; hence USA has to approach the Iran issue in a politico-strategic context, rather than in the military context.
The contextual determinants in 2007 rule out an all-out military intervention by USA against Iran and so also a Limited War. Even resorting to �selective military strikes� against Iran�s nuclear infrastructure carries with it the dangers of Iran�s counter-responses in the asymmetric dimensions.
Iranian Counter-Responses in 2007 Could be Expected to be More Sharper
Iran enjoys a wide range of counter-responses to United States military intervention in Iran in whatever form. It doesn�t necessarily follow that a United States �Limited War� against Iran would draw �Limited counter-responses� from Iran in the asymmetric dimension.
The full range of Iranian counter-responses stand spelt out in this author�s paper �United States Israel Plans for Pre-emptive Military Strikes on Iran�s Nuclear Sires: An Analytical Survey (http://www.saag.org/papers16/paper1554.html) dated 29.09.2005.
In 2007, all indicators point that Iranian counter-responses to any United States planned military intervention in Iraq could be sharper than what was pointed out in 2005 for the following reasons. (1) Iran has tasted the success of Shia militias against the United States in Iraq (2) Iran has evidenced the success of Iran-supported Hezbollah in Lebanon against Israel supported by USA (3) US and Western fears of fighting on two fronts against a Pan-Islamic threat: the main one in the Gulf and an equally potent one in the rear i.e. within their respective homelands arising from Muslim population in millions in USA, UK, France and Germany. These countries do not have the physical numbers to fight the war on two fronts and their technological warfare superiorities are not effective against asymmetric warfare threats.
And as pointed out earlier by this author, in Shia theology martyrdom in the cause of a religious war is exalted and extolled much more than in Sunni theology. The entire spectrum of Iranian counter-responses to US military intervention against Iran needs to be viewed in this light.
What needs to be noted is that so far the Hezbollah has restrained attacking US targets in the Middle East, in Europe and in USA. It does not want to play its hand prematurely against USA and reserve it for the ultimate showing.
Rather tenuous now, but could come into play is pan-Shia and pan-Islamic outrage and vengeance against US and Western targets all over the world, should US exercises its military options.
Should the US and the West succumb to such an implicit threat or blackmail? The answer lies in USA and West finding answers to a vexing question � do they have the means and resources to fight a war on two fronts? No clear answers are forth conning, but all indicators point that the West is ill-equipped in terms of resources to deal with the threat on two fronts.
US-Iran Rapprochement: The Only Workable Option Available
What is dawning more forcefully with each passing day is that the United States exercise of the military option against Iran would be inadvisable.
Both the United States and Iran have to come to a political solution on the Iranian enrichment program. The political solution can only emerge if the United States makes efforts and expresses readiness for a political rapprochement with Iran. For this existing mindsets in Washington need to change.
All related aspects of this rapprochement stand analyzed in this authors paper; �United States Imperatives for Rapprochement With Iran: A Perspective Analysis� (http://saag.org/papers14/paper1352.html) dated 28.04.2005.
The United States history is replete with precedents of rapprochement with its arch-enemies as evident from the China and Vietnam cases. In both these cases, China and Vietnam had engaged in vicious military conflict. Both of them fought the United States to a military stalemate, despite US military technological superiorities and airpower.
In contrast, Iran has no history of armed conflict with USA. At the root of the USA-Iran confrontation is the United States mindset that stands frozen in the events of the ouster of the Shah of Iran and the US diplomats hostage crisis that followed.
Surely the US mindset can change in respect of Iran as it changed in the case of China and Vietnam.
The recent release of 15 British Navy personnel captured by Iran is a pointer that Iran when treated with respect and without disdain is amenable to international processes.
Fortunately today even within USA there are now more voices favoring a rapprochement with Iran than when this author penned his paper.
It is the only honorable option for the United States to adopt. The political leadership has to rise above the policy advisory groups views on Iran as their �knowledge (on Iran) too often is derived from the prevailed demonology of detachment and indifference.�
Concluding Observations
The stark strategic reality in 2007 that faces the United States and Iran is that the United States military option is not exercisable today and could be counterproductive. Similarly, Iran must recognize that it cannot endure and afford an endless confrontation with the United States and the West.
Ironically, it was the United States which launched Iran under the Shah of Iran on a sizeable nuclear program. One could even surmise that had the Shah of Iran not been displaced, an Iranian nuclear weapon arsenal with United States permissiveness would have been a distinct eventual possibility.
It is imperative for the United States to explore all possible avenues for rapprochement with Iran and jointly arrive at parameters within which Iran�s aspirations for regional power status and some credible deterrence can be accommodated / adjusted in a manner which is not prejudicial to United States strategic interests in the Gulf Region.
Lastly, it needs to be said that resolution of Middle East crises cannot be achieved without co-opting Russia in the process. In the case of Iran, Russia does exercise a significant influence and the United States should attempt to bring this influence into play.
By Dr. Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations
More than quarter of a century has passed since Iran slipped out of the United States strategic and military grasp. It was and remains a strategic trauma for the United States as the loss of Iran from the American geo-strategic orbit in the Middle East knocked off the �main pillar� of United States strategic formulations in this vital oil-rich region.
The United States policy establishment had allowed itself to be led by a delusionary belief that its massive strategic and political investments in the person of the Shah of Iran and his military machine would ensure an unending insurance for US strategic interests in the Gulf region. Little did the United States realize that the people of Iran and their aspirations mattered more than a pro-US ruler or dictator at the helm. One is seeing a repeat of history in US policies centered on General Musharraf and the Pakistan Army.
In these twenty five years, Iran has been in the strategic cross-hairs of the United States constantly and more intensely in the last six years.
The strategic animosity of the United States became more pronounced in the last three years when concrete evidence surfaced that Pakistan had actively assisted Iran in its nuclear enrichment programs along with those of Libya and North Korea.
The current United States � Iran confrontation on the Iranian nuclear program provides a strange contrast in American approaches, namely: (1) Pakistan, the �original sinner� of WMD proliferation to the US so-called �axis of evil� countries has not only been called to account by the United States but stands exonerated by the US Administration (2) Iran stands intensely �demonized� by the United States on the nuclear account for reasons which are more geo-political than legal (3) In marked contrast Libya and more specifically North Korea were never demonized and no massing of US military power against them has been ever put in place.
This author has covered the US-Iran confrontation from 2003 onwards in nearly a dozen papers and examined every conceivable option of the United States against Iran from Limited War to all out war and selective strikes against Iran�s nuclear facilities along with Israel.
A full paper �United States Imperatives for Rapprochement With Iran: A Perspective Analysis (http://saag.org/papers14/paper1352.html) dated 28.04.2005 examined in detail the imperatives.
In the last four years, the United States � Iran confrontation has shown no promise of reconciliation or resolution, despite the significant geo-strategic and geo-political changes that have taken place. On the contrary, the United States-Iran confrontation has become more venomous from both sides.
The United States has let no opportunity to slip to declare that �all options are on the table� implying that the military option was certainly open. Iran concurrently has been equally in open defiance of the United States maintaining that it will not be cowed down by American threats that Iran should cease its nuclear enrichment program.
The Middle East today has enough number of military flashpoints, all in open explosion. Can the United States afford one more significantly potent flashpoint?
In this intractable tinder-box of US-Iran confrontation, the spark that can ignite this explosive mix would inevitably, if it comes around, would come from the United States. Iran dare not ignite the Middle East tinder-box by any direct military misadventure.
Both sides are however engaged today in proxy war against each other. Iran uses the Shia militias in Iraq and Lebanon to strategically discomfit USA. The United States uses Pakistani bases for clandestine operations against Iran by its Special Forces and Iranian dissidents.
In such a disturbing environment it becomes pertinent to re-examine United States strategic options against Iran. The following aspects will be examined in this paper:
* United States Strategic Options on Iran: A Comparative Analysis of the Contextual Determinants in 2003 and 2007
* United States Military Option Against Iran in 2007 Stands Severely Restricted
* Iranian Counter-Responses in 2007 Could be Expected to be More Sharper
* US-Iran Rapprochement: The Only Workable Option Available
United States Strategic Options on Iran: A Comparative Analysis of the Contextual Determinants in 2003 and 2007
A comparative analysis of the contextual determinants in 2003 and 2007 which come into play in deciding United States strategic options on Iran can be briefly said to have restricted United States options today.
In 2003, the contextual strategic determinants that were in play were: (1) The United States had Iran in a military cleft-stick with its military deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan (2) United States entire political spectrum and public opinion was strongly supportive of US Administration strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan; it perceived them as part of the �global war on terror� and WMD proliferation (3) Russia�s strategic resurgence though in the offing but had not become fully assertive (4) Islamic Jehadi terrorism had not manifested itself in Europe as exemplified by the suicide bombings in Madrid, London etc.
In 2007 the contextual determinants for USA stand out in marked disadvantageous contrast to 2003, namely: (1) The United states is in a strategic imbroglio in Iraq and Afghanistan; the US 2003 military cleft-stick stands seriously weakened (2) US political spectrum and public support on Iraq and Afghanistan has become critically divisive (3) Russia�s strategic resurgence is in full effect and the United States cannot discount Russia�s strategic stakes in Iran (4) European allies of USA after the major bombing incidents in UK are mindful, if not fearful, of Islamic backlashes, should they get drawn into US plans of the military option against Iran (5) Rise in oil revenues has facilitated Iran�s military modernization and buildup in these last four years (6) Iraq as the main base for potential US and/or joint military operations against Iran is in the throes of a civil war: the first signs of a concerted Shia-Sunni upsurge against US military occupation of Iraq have manifested themselves (7) Pakistan as the other base of US operations against Iran is in a politically explosive situation today.
The above determinants would come heavily into play in US decision making on Iran as it ponders its options.
United States Military Option Against Iran in 2007 Stands Severely Restricted
United States military options against Iran were analyzed by the author in his paper �Iran in United States Military Crosshairs: Brief Analysis of the End-Game� (http://www.saag.org/papers13/paper1298.html) dated 25.3.2005).
The major observations made in this paper were: (1) Iran�s demonization over nuclear weapons issue makes the average Iranian convinced that Iranian nuclear weapons are the only credible deterrent against US military threats (2) Iranian nuclear weapons program will enjoy support even if tomorrow a �democratic regime� emerges in Iran (3) The Brazilian and South African models cannot come into play in Iran as in the case of the former two countries there was no �demonization campaign� against them for dissuasion from nuclear weapons program (4) Iran poses a politico-strategic threat to USA in the Gulf Region and not a military threat in the foreseeable future; hence USA has to approach the Iran issue in a politico-strategic context, rather than in the military context.
The contextual determinants in 2007 rule out an all-out military intervention by USA against Iran and so also a Limited War. Even resorting to �selective military strikes� against Iran�s nuclear infrastructure carries with it the dangers of Iran�s counter-responses in the asymmetric dimensions.
Iranian Counter-Responses in 2007 Could be Expected to be More Sharper
Iran enjoys a wide range of counter-responses to United States military intervention in Iran in whatever form. It doesn�t necessarily follow that a United States �Limited War� against Iran would draw �Limited counter-responses� from Iran in the asymmetric dimension.
The full range of Iranian counter-responses stand spelt out in this author�s paper �United States Israel Plans for Pre-emptive Military Strikes on Iran�s Nuclear Sires: An Analytical Survey (http://www.saag.org/papers16/paper1554.html) dated 29.09.2005.
In 2007, all indicators point that Iranian counter-responses to any United States planned military intervention in Iraq could be sharper than what was pointed out in 2005 for the following reasons. (1) Iran has tasted the success of Shia militias against the United States in Iraq (2) Iran has evidenced the success of Iran-supported Hezbollah in Lebanon against Israel supported by USA (3) US and Western fears of fighting on two fronts against a Pan-Islamic threat: the main one in the Gulf and an equally potent one in the rear i.e. within their respective homelands arising from Muslim population in millions in USA, UK, France and Germany. These countries do not have the physical numbers to fight the war on two fronts and their technological warfare superiorities are not effective against asymmetric warfare threats.
And as pointed out earlier by this author, in Shia theology martyrdom in the cause of a religious war is exalted and extolled much more than in Sunni theology. The entire spectrum of Iranian counter-responses to US military intervention against Iran needs to be viewed in this light.
What needs to be noted is that so far the Hezbollah has restrained attacking US targets in the Middle East, in Europe and in USA. It does not want to play its hand prematurely against USA and reserve it for the ultimate showing.
Rather tenuous now, but could come into play is pan-Shia and pan-Islamic outrage and vengeance against US and Western targets all over the world, should US exercises its military options.
Should the US and the West succumb to such an implicit threat or blackmail? The answer lies in USA and West finding answers to a vexing question � do they have the means and resources to fight a war on two fronts? No clear answers are forth conning, but all indicators point that the West is ill-equipped in terms of resources to deal with the threat on two fronts.
US-Iran Rapprochement: The Only Workable Option Available
What is dawning more forcefully with each passing day is that the United States exercise of the military option against Iran would be inadvisable.
Both the United States and Iran have to come to a political solution on the Iranian enrichment program. The political solution can only emerge if the United States makes efforts and expresses readiness for a political rapprochement with Iran. For this existing mindsets in Washington need to change.
All related aspects of this rapprochement stand analyzed in this authors paper; �United States Imperatives for Rapprochement With Iran: A Perspective Analysis� (http://saag.org/papers14/paper1352.html) dated 28.04.2005.
The United States history is replete with precedents of rapprochement with its arch-enemies as evident from the China and Vietnam cases. In both these cases, China and Vietnam had engaged in vicious military conflict. Both of them fought the United States to a military stalemate, despite US military technological superiorities and airpower.
In contrast, Iran has no history of armed conflict with USA. At the root of the USA-Iran confrontation is the United States mindset that stands frozen in the events of the ouster of the Shah of Iran and the US diplomats hostage crisis that followed.
Surely the US mindset can change in respect of Iran as it changed in the case of China and Vietnam.
The recent release of 15 British Navy personnel captured by Iran is a pointer that Iran when treated with respect and without disdain is amenable to international processes.
Fortunately today even within USA there are now more voices favoring a rapprochement with Iran than when this author penned his paper.
It is the only honorable option for the United States to adopt. The political leadership has to rise above the policy advisory groups views on Iran as their �knowledge (on Iran) too often is derived from the prevailed demonology of detachment and indifference.�
Concluding Observations
The stark strategic reality in 2007 that faces the United States and Iran is that the United States military option is not exercisable today and could be counterproductive. Similarly, Iran must recognize that it cannot endure and afford an endless confrontation with the United States and the West.
Ironically, it was the United States which launched Iran under the Shah of Iran on a sizeable nuclear program. One could even surmise that had the Shah of Iran not been displaced, an Iranian nuclear weapon arsenal with United States permissiveness would have been a distinct eventual possibility.
It is imperative for the United States to explore all possible avenues for rapprochement with Iran and jointly arrive at parameters within which Iran�s aspirations for regional power status and some credible deterrence can be accommodated / adjusted in a manner which is not prejudicial to United States strategic interests in the Gulf Region.
Lastly, it needs to be said that resolution of Middle East crises cannot be achieved without co-opting Russia in the process. In the case of Iran, Russia does exercise a significant influence and the United States should attempt to bring this influence into play.
RAJU NARAYANASWAMY IAS
Dear friends,
Pls Read this article and think about RAJU NARAYANASWAMY IAS
First Rank in State in Secondary School Examination
First Rank in University in Plus Two
First Rank in IIT Entrance Examination
First Rank in All India IIT Computer Science
First Rank in IAS Entrance Examination
First Rank in IAS Training Institute
On passing out from IIT Chennai Mr. Narayanaswamy was offered scholarship by the prestigious Massachusetts Institute of Technology , USA . He who came from a middle class family believed that he had a moral obligation to give something in return for the lakhs of rupees the government spent on him as an IIT student. He had the intelligence and conviction to realize that this money came also from the poorest of the poor - who pay up the excise duty on textiles when they buy cloth, who pay up customs, excise and sales tax on diesel when they travel in a bus, and in numerous other ways indirectly pay the government. So he decided to join IAS hoping he could do something for the people of this country. How many young men have the will power to resist such an offer from USA ? Narayanaswamy did never look at IAS as a black money spinner as his later life bears testimony to this fact.
After a decade of meritorious service in IAS, today, Narayanaswamy is being forced out of the IAS profession. Do you know why?
A real estate agent wanted to fill up a paddy field which is banned under law. An application came up before Narayanaswamy who was sub collector the, for an exemption from this rule for this plot of land. Upon visiting the site he found that the complaint from 60 poor families that they will face water logging due to the waste water from a nearby Government Medical College if this paddy field was filled up was correct. Narayanswamy came under intense political pressure but he did what was right - refused permission for filling up the paddy field. That was his first confrontation with politicians.
Soon after his marriage his father-in-law closed down a public road to build compound wall for his plot of land. People approached Narayanaswamy with complaint.
When talking with his own father-in-law did not help, he removed the obstructing wall with police help. The result, his marriage broke up.
As district Collector he raided the house of a liquor baron who had defaulted Rupees 11 crores payment to government and carried out revenue recovery. A Minister directly telephoned him and ordered to return the forfeited articles to the house of the liquor baron. Narayanswamy politely replied that it is difficult. The minister replied that Narayanaswamy will suffer.
In his district it was a practice to collect crores of rupees for earthen bunds meant for poor farmers, but which were never constructed. A bill for rupees 8 crores came up before Narayanaswamy. He inspected the bund. He found it very weak and said that he will pass the bill after the rainy season to ensure that the bund served the purpose. As expected the earthen bund was too weak to stand the rain and it disappeared in the rain. But he created a lot of enemies for saving 8 crores public money. The net result of all such unholy activities was that he was asked to go on leave by the government. Later such an illustrious officer was posted as "State Co-Ordinator, Quality Improvement Programme for Schools". This is what the politician will do to a honest officer with backbone - post him in the most powerless position to teach him a lesson. Since he found that nothing can be achieved for the people if he continued with the State Service he opted for central service. But that too was denied on some technical ground.
What will you do when you have a brilliant computer career anywhere in the world you choose with the backing of several advanced technical papers too published in international journals to your credit?
When you are powerless to do anything for the people, why should you waste your life as the Co-Ordinator for a Schools Programme?
Mr. Narayanaswamy is on the verge of leaving IAS to go to Paris to take up a well paid United Nations assignment. The politicians can laugh thinking another obstacle has been removed. But it is the helpless people of this country who will lose - not Narayanaswamy. But you have the power to support capable and honest bureaucra ts like Narayaswamy, G.R.Khairnar and Alphons Kannamthanam who have suffered a lot under self seeking politicians who rule us. You have even the power to replace such politicians with these kind of people dedicated to the country. The question is will you do the little you can do NOW? At least a vote or word in support of such personalities?
Please pass on this mail to your friends
" There is a difference between an objective and actions. Unless you understand your objective, you will be wasting your time in actions. Know your objective first " - Swami Vivekananda
Pls Read this article and think about RAJU NARAYANASWAMY IAS
First Rank in State in Secondary School Examination
First Rank in University in Plus Two
First Rank in IIT Entrance Examination
First Rank in All India IIT Computer Science
First Rank in IAS Entrance Examination
First Rank in IAS Training Institute
On passing out from IIT Chennai Mr. Narayanaswamy was offered scholarship by the prestigious Massachusetts Institute of Technology , USA . He who came from a middle class family believed that he had a moral obligation to give something in return for the lakhs of rupees the government spent on him as an IIT student. He had the intelligence and conviction to realize that this money came also from the poorest of the poor - who pay up the excise duty on textiles when they buy cloth, who pay up customs, excise and sales tax on diesel when they travel in a bus, and in numerous other ways indirectly pay the government. So he decided to join IAS hoping he could do something for the people of this country. How many young men have the will power to resist such an offer from USA ? Narayanaswamy did never look at IAS as a black money spinner as his later life bears testimony to this fact.
After a decade of meritorious service in IAS, today, Narayanaswamy is being forced out of the IAS profession. Do you know why?
A real estate agent wanted to fill up a paddy field which is banned under law. An application came up before Narayanaswamy who was sub collector the, for an exemption from this rule for this plot of land. Upon visiting the site he found that the complaint from 60 poor families that they will face water logging due to the waste water from a nearby Government Medical College if this paddy field was filled up was correct. Narayanswamy came under intense political pressure but he did what was right - refused permission for filling up the paddy field. That was his first confrontation with politicians.
Soon after his marriage his father-in-law closed down a public road to build compound wall for his plot of land. People approached Narayanaswamy with complaint.
When talking with his own father-in-law did not help, he removed the obstructing wall with police help. The result, his marriage broke up.
As district Collector he raided the house of a liquor baron who had defaulted Rupees 11 crores payment to government and carried out revenue recovery. A Minister directly telephoned him and ordered to return the forfeited articles to the house of the liquor baron. Narayanswamy politely replied that it is difficult. The minister replied that Narayanaswamy will suffer.
In his district it was a practice to collect crores of rupees for earthen bunds meant for poor farmers, but which were never constructed. A bill for rupees 8 crores came up before Narayanaswamy. He inspected the bund. He found it very weak and said that he will pass the bill after the rainy season to ensure that the bund served the purpose. As expected the earthen bund was too weak to stand the rain and it disappeared in the rain. But he created a lot of enemies for saving 8 crores public money. The net result of all such unholy activities was that he was asked to go on leave by the government. Later such an illustrious officer was posted as "State Co-Ordinator, Quality Improvement Programme for Schools". This is what the politician will do to a honest officer with backbone - post him in the most powerless position to teach him a lesson. Since he found that nothing can be achieved for the people if he continued with the State Service he opted for central service. But that too was denied on some technical ground.
What will you do when you have a brilliant computer career anywhere in the world you choose with the backing of several advanced technical papers too published in international journals to your credit?
When you are powerless to do anything for the people, why should you waste your life as the Co-Ordinator for a Schools Programme?
Mr. Narayanaswamy is on the verge of leaving IAS to go to Paris to take up a well paid United Nations assignment. The politicians can laugh thinking another obstacle has been removed. But it is the helpless people of this country who will lose - not Narayanaswamy. But you have the power to support capable and honest bureaucra ts like Narayaswamy, G.R.Khairnar and Alphons Kannamthanam who have suffered a lot under self seeking politicians who rule us. You have even the power to replace such politicians with these kind of people dedicated to the country. The question is will you do the little you can do NOW? At least a vote or word in support of such personalities?
Please pass on this mail to your friends
" There is a difference between an objective and actions. Unless you understand your objective, you will be wasting your time in actions. Know your objective first " - Swami Vivekananda
INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS : CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS : CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
Guest Column by R. Swaminathan
(This paper was presented by R.Swaminathan, former Special Secretary, DG (Security), Government of India, at an interaction organised by the Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation on 28 April 2007)
I had earlier (on 14 October 2006) drawn attention to the differential priorities accorded by each country to India-China relations. India has always been according a very high priority to its relations with China. China, on the other hand, had been perceived to have accorded higher priorities to its relations with many other countries and regions. Of late, China would seem to be paying more attention to India. This is not as a favour to India but is a part of China�s pragmatism and primary attention to her own strategic interests. In a way, it is based on the recognition that India has really grown out of her exploited under-dog status of nearly two centuries and of the potential of her current status as a significant power � economically as a matter of fact, militarily as a matter of relative strengths, and politically if we can learn to leverage them to our national advantage. The current situation poses many challenges (like getting over past deficit of trust and opposition to �international communism�) as well as opportunities to India in the conduct of her relations with China in the coming years.
Certain Basic Realities
India and China together comprise 37.64% (India : 17.14 & China : 20.5) of the world�s population. However, their combined area is only 8.64% (India : 2.2 & China : 6.44) of the world�s land mass. At present, their combined GDP is 7.5% (India : 2.48 & China : 5.02) of the total GDP of the world; but they have two of the fastest growing economies in the world and their share of the world�s GDP may exceed 20% by 2025. Any congruence and co-operation between the policies of the two countries (however limited be the areas and scope) would make a formidable combination in world affairs.
It is an immutable fact that India and China are close neighbours, sharing a long land frontier. They have forever to live with this reality. They had both been significant powers centuries ago; and have again become significant powers, speeding on their way to becoming big powers. China (which was not as colonised as India), inspired by her perennial �Middle Kingdom� syndrome, is easily growing back into her big-power ways, overcoming the limitations imposed by a long period of foreign influence in her affairs. India, on the other hand, seems to have allowed foreign invasions and colonial rule to make her forget her glory days, except in speeches and school text books. A change in our mind-set would make it easier for India to deal with China (and many other countries and entities) on equal or near-equal terms.
In the 1950s, India and China were seen as crucibles in which different political and economic models for newly-independent and developing countries were being tested - democracy with a socialist leaning in India and classical Marxism in China. The current reality is that both countries have moved away from those doctrinaire approaches and are perhaps closer to market-driven policies than many �capitalist� countries.
It has to be recognised that the era of superpowers (and of �gunboat diplomacy�) has ended. Even at the height (or the nadir) of the Cold war, the �authority� of the two superpowers was essentially based on the fear of the opposite camp. The terms of bipolar or unipolar international order have lost their relevance. What we are likely to see as the current century progresses would be the emergence of multiple centers of political and economic power and influence, highlighting the need to achieve a stable equilibrium amongst them. The threats of economic losses and instability would become strong incentives for all economically powerful countries to cooperate and work together.
Political
The progress towards India-China �strategic cooperation� has not totally eliminated Chinese concern at the growing India-US �strategic partnership�. China�s remarkable consistency in her dealings in India�s neighborhood could easily and pardonably be seen as �China's strategic encirclement of India�, as described in November 2005 by retired Air Chief Marshal S P Tyagi, former Chief of Air Staff. Even while going ahead with developing a close and comfortable relationship with China, India has to consider very carefully the implications to India�s security and economic interests of various Chinese actions. While it may not be necessary to take reactive counter-measures at each and every stage, our own policies and actions in various regions and on various issues have to be devised suitably to protect our overall national interests.
Both India and China had made significant miscalculations in the period leading to the traumatic events of 1962. It would help if the policy-makers in both countries could develop the art of looking at issues also from the perspective of the other country. India could also consider unilaterally introducing more transparency in her policy-making process. She could, make public disclosure, subject to security requirements, of her reasons � security, strategic, financial, and commercial - for taking specific positions or actions. India should be unambiguous, in public or in private, in expressing her sensitivities on specific issues to China and other concerned countries. These measures would help in avoiding over-sensitivity and any unjustified sense of mistrust; and in preventing reactive counter-measures. In the present scenario, for instance, a relatively innocuous action taken by China in her own national interest could otherwise be misinterpreted by India as an unfriendly (or even a hostile) act; or vice versa.
India has had difficulties in maintaining friendly and cordial relations with her smaller neighbours, probably due to her not dealing with them as equals. Worried about the asymmetry in size, human and material resources as well as economic and military strength, and by India�s perceived willingness and tendency forcibly to assert her national interests, the smaller neighbours have tended to guard themselves by avoiding the development of very close (and possibly dependent) economic and other linkages with India; and by developing (balancing) economic and military linkages with China. This frequently results in positions of near hostility, suspicion and distrust. If India could avoid being perceived as the ubiquitous �Big Brother�, but function more as the benevolent and helpful karta of a traditional joint family, artificial �balancing� relations with China may become unnecessary.
Economic
Economics has, over the past many decades, been gradually replacing territorial and imperial ambitions as the prime mover behind international relations. India and China have achieved a lot in the economic field since the policies of liberalisation and globalisation were brought into play. The aphorism that less government leads to good governance is being proved in the economic field and the two economies are generally thriving in international competition. People-to-people and business-to-business relations have taken their rightful places in economic relations between the two countries. In the field of economics, the world is rapidly becoming multi-polar, with multiple foci of economic power.
Growing economic relations between India and China are of relatively recent origin, more or less coinciding with the onset of comfortable levels of economic growth in both the countries. India-China trade and economic cooperation is marked by strong political commitment of the leaderships of both countries in this regard. The structural framework for economic cooperation is being continuously strengthened and expanded.
The economies of India and China are somewhat parallel and competitive. However, there are many opportunities to make them also cooperative. It has been observed that China�s emergence as a significant link in the manufacturing chain of the world and India�s potential for the knowledge-based services and manufacturing are complementary strengths and could be further exploited for mutual benefit. The impact of an India-China business alliance could catapult their corporate sector to be among the best in the world. The new generation of joint India-China companies could change the competition landscape in global business. Combining China's infrastructural and logistical efficiency and massive economies of scale with India's world class innovative capability, management know-how, and corporate leadership could result in a business superpower of the 21st century. China�s growing economic might is being seen in India more as challenge than as a threat. More and more Indian companies are looking at China as a commercial opportunity and are entering China�s manufacturing, service and financial sectors.
As the two economies further expand, some competition will be inevitable. However, the competition should not be over-emphasized, as it will be a natural and healthy development. The Asia-Pacific region is large enough for them to develop together. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had observed (London, 10 Oct 2006) that "the world is large enough to accommodate the growth ambitions of India and China�.
India and China are competing for additional energy resources, for improving their energy security. India�s ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) and the China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) have often been rivals in the race for overseas oil resources; and the competition continues. However, if it is recognised that joint ventures have immense potential, the two government-owned firms could work together more often and closer than they have been doing till now.
India and China resumed official bilateral trade in 1978. The two countries signed a Most Favoured Nation Agreement in 1984 and bilateral trade has been steadily increasing, to reach USD 18 billion in 2005 and about USD 20 billion in 2006.
Military
India and China agreed, when Prime Minister Vajpayee visited China in June 2003, on the need to broaden and deepen defence exchanges between the two countries, which will help enhance and deepen the mutual understanding and trust between the two armed forces. A protocol on the Modalities for the Implementation of CBMs in the Military Field was signed during the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to India in April 2005. The two military establishments are slowly developing a professional relationship and this could lead to better and beneficial understanding of each other�s capabilities, intentions and concerns; resulting in a more stable military environment.
The Boundary Issue
I will accept the risk of being considered not being adequately patriotic or nationalistic and state (even if only for the purpose of an enlightened discussion) some personal views of mine on the India-China Boundary issue. So much information about the origins and �progress� of the dispute is available in the public domain that it is not necessary to discuss the basics in detail here.
It is an over-simplification to state that the issue is merely a legacy of the colonial era. It may be more objective to accept that vast tracts in the peripheral (and border) areas of both countries were factually �unadministered� for a long period, in the modern concept of administration. China�s claim to about 90,000 sq kms in Arunachal Pradesh (presently a part of India and under effective Indian administration) and India�s claim to about 43,180 sq kms in Jammu & Kashmir (including 5,180 sq kms illegally ceded by Pakistan), presently under China�s control, are based on �past sovereignty� and not on �past administrative control�. Except for a short duration during the hostilities in 1962, China had not had any meaningful administrative presence in Arunachal Pradesh in the modern era. Similarly, India became fully aware of the Chinese construction (over a period of nearly three years) of the strategic road between Kashi (Kashgar, in Sinkiang) and Kaerh (in Ali Administrative District in western Tibet), through Ladakh, only when a patrol party of the CRPF was �captured� by the Chinese while walking along the then unknown road. Thus was born the current concept of Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China.
An Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was signed during Prime Minister Narasimha Rao�s visit to China in September 1993. An India-China Expert Group of Diplomatic and Military Officers to assist (on the boundary question) the Joint Working Group was set up. This Agreement provided for both sides to respect the status quo on the border, clarify the LAC where there were doubts and undertake Confidence Building Measures (CBM). The thinning out of forces in areas close to the border (as part of the CBMs) and the commencement of a dialogue relating to the ultimate delineation and demarcation of the disputed segments of the Sino-Indian border reduced the apprehension of any unintended armed confrontation.
When Vajpayee (as Prime Minister) visited China in June 2003, the mechanism of Special Representatives was established to explore, from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship, the framework for a boundary settlement. The present UPA government has maintained and, to a certain extent, accelerated the pace. During the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to India (April 9-12, 2005), the two Special Representatives signed an Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question. The new guiding principles in effect ratified the status quo, by requiring the negotiators to respect historical evidence, practical difficulties, settled populations, national sentiments and each other's security concerns. Renouncing the use or threat of force, they called for "a package settlement" that "must be final, covering all sectors of the India-China boundary". The indications were that both countries realised more opportunities than threats in each other.
A total of ten rounds of discussions have so far been held (including the recent round during 21-23 April 2007) between the Special Representatives. Dai Bingguo, Vice Foreign Minister, has represented China in all the ten rounds. India has been represented by the incumbent National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister (Brajesh Misra, JN Dixit and MK Narayanan). After the conclusion of the tenth round, it was stated that the talks had been held in �open, friendly, cooperative and constructive atmosphere� aimed at reaching an �amicable and mutually beneficial� agreement. Narayanan described Dai as �a brilliant negotiator� and Dai reciprocated by saying that Narayanan was �a good negotiator�. One hardly needs a dictionary or a thesaurus to realise that the two Special Representatives, despite political directives and the best intentions to reach an agreement, have been unable to leave behind the issues of �past sovereignty� and claims and counter-claims. It is obviously not possible to settle the �international boundary� without settling these issues. In effect, the present framework of the talks militates against a solution, even half a century after the disagreements erupted in the open.
It is my personal opinion that there is an urgent need to take these talks to a new dimension. It might be useful if the Special Representatives could be authorised by their principals to look beyond the issue of sovereignty and quickly evolve a practical solution. They may then be able to place the settlement of the issue of sovereignty over the �disputed� areas on the back burner (perhaps for a very long time) and go ahead to work out an agreement on a practical �administrative boundary� between the two countries. The fact that this concept may not have been tried before in international relations, through a treaty or an agreement, should not prevent the Special Representatives to start thinking outside the box. The issue of Tawang could probably be addressed by agreeing to set up a Joint India-China Peace and Friendship Centre there, with tourists and pilgrims from both countries having free access, subject only to infrastructural limitations. The Government of India may, of course, have to discuss any such �radical� idea with all the major political parties and arrive at a national consensus � in order to present to China a unified national position.
Conclusion
The present international situation presents India and China with a lot of challenges and also opportunities. If the challenges are met and the opportunities fully utilised, the two countries together can soon become a very significant and stabilising influence in world affairs. The developed countries may then have to prepare for a different future, one where they must learn to share political and economic power as never before.
With bold and imaginative thinking in both countries, India and China can agree on a �working� arrangement despite their different views on the issue of sovereignty over disputed areas along their border. This may still not lead to a return to the �Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai� relationship, but would send a very strong signal to the world that the two countries are now ready to play their potential roles as partners in the effort to develop a stable and peaceful world order.
Guest Column by R. Swaminathan
(This paper was presented by R.Swaminathan, former Special Secretary, DG (Security), Government of India, at an interaction organised by the Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation on 28 April 2007)
I had earlier (on 14 October 2006) drawn attention to the differential priorities accorded by each country to India-China relations. India has always been according a very high priority to its relations with China. China, on the other hand, had been perceived to have accorded higher priorities to its relations with many other countries and regions. Of late, China would seem to be paying more attention to India. This is not as a favour to India but is a part of China�s pragmatism and primary attention to her own strategic interests. In a way, it is based on the recognition that India has really grown out of her exploited under-dog status of nearly two centuries and of the potential of her current status as a significant power � economically as a matter of fact, militarily as a matter of relative strengths, and politically if we can learn to leverage them to our national advantage. The current situation poses many challenges (like getting over past deficit of trust and opposition to �international communism�) as well as opportunities to India in the conduct of her relations with China in the coming years.
Certain Basic Realities
India and China together comprise 37.64% (India : 17.14 & China : 20.5) of the world�s population. However, their combined area is only 8.64% (India : 2.2 & China : 6.44) of the world�s land mass. At present, their combined GDP is 7.5% (India : 2.48 & China : 5.02) of the total GDP of the world; but they have two of the fastest growing economies in the world and their share of the world�s GDP may exceed 20% by 2025. Any congruence and co-operation between the policies of the two countries (however limited be the areas and scope) would make a formidable combination in world affairs.
It is an immutable fact that India and China are close neighbours, sharing a long land frontier. They have forever to live with this reality. They had both been significant powers centuries ago; and have again become significant powers, speeding on their way to becoming big powers. China (which was not as colonised as India), inspired by her perennial �Middle Kingdom� syndrome, is easily growing back into her big-power ways, overcoming the limitations imposed by a long period of foreign influence in her affairs. India, on the other hand, seems to have allowed foreign invasions and colonial rule to make her forget her glory days, except in speeches and school text books. A change in our mind-set would make it easier for India to deal with China (and many other countries and entities) on equal or near-equal terms.
In the 1950s, India and China were seen as crucibles in which different political and economic models for newly-independent and developing countries were being tested - democracy with a socialist leaning in India and classical Marxism in China. The current reality is that both countries have moved away from those doctrinaire approaches and are perhaps closer to market-driven policies than many �capitalist� countries.
It has to be recognised that the era of superpowers (and of �gunboat diplomacy�) has ended. Even at the height (or the nadir) of the Cold war, the �authority� of the two superpowers was essentially based on the fear of the opposite camp. The terms of bipolar or unipolar international order have lost their relevance. What we are likely to see as the current century progresses would be the emergence of multiple centers of political and economic power and influence, highlighting the need to achieve a stable equilibrium amongst them. The threats of economic losses and instability would become strong incentives for all economically powerful countries to cooperate and work together.
Political
The progress towards India-China �strategic cooperation� has not totally eliminated Chinese concern at the growing India-US �strategic partnership�. China�s remarkable consistency in her dealings in India�s neighborhood could easily and pardonably be seen as �China's strategic encirclement of India�, as described in November 2005 by retired Air Chief Marshal S P Tyagi, former Chief of Air Staff. Even while going ahead with developing a close and comfortable relationship with China, India has to consider very carefully the implications to India�s security and economic interests of various Chinese actions. While it may not be necessary to take reactive counter-measures at each and every stage, our own policies and actions in various regions and on various issues have to be devised suitably to protect our overall national interests.
Both India and China had made significant miscalculations in the period leading to the traumatic events of 1962. It would help if the policy-makers in both countries could develop the art of looking at issues also from the perspective of the other country. India could also consider unilaterally introducing more transparency in her policy-making process. She could, make public disclosure, subject to security requirements, of her reasons � security, strategic, financial, and commercial - for taking specific positions or actions. India should be unambiguous, in public or in private, in expressing her sensitivities on specific issues to China and other concerned countries. These measures would help in avoiding over-sensitivity and any unjustified sense of mistrust; and in preventing reactive counter-measures. In the present scenario, for instance, a relatively innocuous action taken by China in her own national interest could otherwise be misinterpreted by India as an unfriendly (or even a hostile) act; or vice versa.
India has had difficulties in maintaining friendly and cordial relations with her smaller neighbours, probably due to her not dealing with them as equals. Worried about the asymmetry in size, human and material resources as well as economic and military strength, and by India�s perceived willingness and tendency forcibly to assert her national interests, the smaller neighbours have tended to guard themselves by avoiding the development of very close (and possibly dependent) economic and other linkages with India; and by developing (balancing) economic and military linkages with China. This frequently results in positions of near hostility, suspicion and distrust. If India could avoid being perceived as the ubiquitous �Big Brother�, but function more as the benevolent and helpful karta of a traditional joint family, artificial �balancing� relations with China may become unnecessary.
Economic
Economics has, over the past many decades, been gradually replacing territorial and imperial ambitions as the prime mover behind international relations. India and China have achieved a lot in the economic field since the policies of liberalisation and globalisation were brought into play. The aphorism that less government leads to good governance is being proved in the economic field and the two economies are generally thriving in international competition. People-to-people and business-to-business relations have taken their rightful places in economic relations between the two countries. In the field of economics, the world is rapidly becoming multi-polar, with multiple foci of economic power.
Growing economic relations between India and China are of relatively recent origin, more or less coinciding with the onset of comfortable levels of economic growth in both the countries. India-China trade and economic cooperation is marked by strong political commitment of the leaderships of both countries in this regard. The structural framework for economic cooperation is being continuously strengthened and expanded.
The economies of India and China are somewhat parallel and competitive. However, there are many opportunities to make them also cooperative. It has been observed that China�s emergence as a significant link in the manufacturing chain of the world and India�s potential for the knowledge-based services and manufacturing are complementary strengths and could be further exploited for mutual benefit. The impact of an India-China business alliance could catapult their corporate sector to be among the best in the world. The new generation of joint India-China companies could change the competition landscape in global business. Combining China's infrastructural and logistical efficiency and massive economies of scale with India's world class innovative capability, management know-how, and corporate leadership could result in a business superpower of the 21st century. China�s growing economic might is being seen in India more as challenge than as a threat. More and more Indian companies are looking at China as a commercial opportunity and are entering China�s manufacturing, service and financial sectors.
As the two economies further expand, some competition will be inevitable. However, the competition should not be over-emphasized, as it will be a natural and healthy development. The Asia-Pacific region is large enough for them to develop together. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had observed (London, 10 Oct 2006) that "the world is large enough to accommodate the growth ambitions of India and China�.
India and China are competing for additional energy resources, for improving their energy security. India�s ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) and the China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) have often been rivals in the race for overseas oil resources; and the competition continues. However, if it is recognised that joint ventures have immense potential, the two government-owned firms could work together more often and closer than they have been doing till now.
India and China resumed official bilateral trade in 1978. The two countries signed a Most Favoured Nation Agreement in 1984 and bilateral trade has been steadily increasing, to reach USD 18 billion in 2005 and about USD 20 billion in 2006.
Military
India and China agreed, when Prime Minister Vajpayee visited China in June 2003, on the need to broaden and deepen defence exchanges between the two countries, which will help enhance and deepen the mutual understanding and trust between the two armed forces. A protocol on the Modalities for the Implementation of CBMs in the Military Field was signed during the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to India in April 2005. The two military establishments are slowly developing a professional relationship and this could lead to better and beneficial understanding of each other�s capabilities, intentions and concerns; resulting in a more stable military environment.
The Boundary Issue
I will accept the risk of being considered not being adequately patriotic or nationalistic and state (even if only for the purpose of an enlightened discussion) some personal views of mine on the India-China Boundary issue. So much information about the origins and �progress� of the dispute is available in the public domain that it is not necessary to discuss the basics in detail here.
It is an over-simplification to state that the issue is merely a legacy of the colonial era. It may be more objective to accept that vast tracts in the peripheral (and border) areas of both countries were factually �unadministered� for a long period, in the modern concept of administration. China�s claim to about 90,000 sq kms in Arunachal Pradesh (presently a part of India and under effective Indian administration) and India�s claim to about 43,180 sq kms in Jammu & Kashmir (including 5,180 sq kms illegally ceded by Pakistan), presently under China�s control, are based on �past sovereignty� and not on �past administrative control�. Except for a short duration during the hostilities in 1962, China had not had any meaningful administrative presence in Arunachal Pradesh in the modern era. Similarly, India became fully aware of the Chinese construction (over a period of nearly three years) of the strategic road between Kashi (Kashgar, in Sinkiang) and Kaerh (in Ali Administrative District in western Tibet), through Ladakh, only when a patrol party of the CRPF was �captured� by the Chinese while walking along the then unknown road. Thus was born the current concept of Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China.
An Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was signed during Prime Minister Narasimha Rao�s visit to China in September 1993. An India-China Expert Group of Diplomatic and Military Officers to assist (on the boundary question) the Joint Working Group was set up. This Agreement provided for both sides to respect the status quo on the border, clarify the LAC where there were doubts and undertake Confidence Building Measures (CBM). The thinning out of forces in areas close to the border (as part of the CBMs) and the commencement of a dialogue relating to the ultimate delineation and demarcation of the disputed segments of the Sino-Indian border reduced the apprehension of any unintended armed confrontation.
When Vajpayee (as Prime Minister) visited China in June 2003, the mechanism of Special Representatives was established to explore, from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship, the framework for a boundary settlement. The present UPA government has maintained and, to a certain extent, accelerated the pace. During the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to India (April 9-12, 2005), the two Special Representatives signed an Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question. The new guiding principles in effect ratified the status quo, by requiring the negotiators to respect historical evidence, practical difficulties, settled populations, national sentiments and each other's security concerns. Renouncing the use or threat of force, they called for "a package settlement" that "must be final, covering all sectors of the India-China boundary". The indications were that both countries realised more opportunities than threats in each other.
A total of ten rounds of discussions have so far been held (including the recent round during 21-23 April 2007) between the Special Representatives. Dai Bingguo, Vice Foreign Minister, has represented China in all the ten rounds. India has been represented by the incumbent National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister (Brajesh Misra, JN Dixit and MK Narayanan). After the conclusion of the tenth round, it was stated that the talks had been held in �open, friendly, cooperative and constructive atmosphere� aimed at reaching an �amicable and mutually beneficial� agreement. Narayanan described Dai as �a brilliant negotiator� and Dai reciprocated by saying that Narayanan was �a good negotiator�. One hardly needs a dictionary or a thesaurus to realise that the two Special Representatives, despite political directives and the best intentions to reach an agreement, have been unable to leave behind the issues of �past sovereignty� and claims and counter-claims. It is obviously not possible to settle the �international boundary� without settling these issues. In effect, the present framework of the talks militates against a solution, even half a century after the disagreements erupted in the open.
It is my personal opinion that there is an urgent need to take these talks to a new dimension. It might be useful if the Special Representatives could be authorised by their principals to look beyond the issue of sovereignty and quickly evolve a practical solution. They may then be able to place the settlement of the issue of sovereignty over the �disputed� areas on the back burner (perhaps for a very long time) and go ahead to work out an agreement on a practical �administrative boundary� between the two countries. The fact that this concept may not have been tried before in international relations, through a treaty or an agreement, should not prevent the Special Representatives to start thinking outside the box. The issue of Tawang could probably be addressed by agreeing to set up a Joint India-China Peace and Friendship Centre there, with tourists and pilgrims from both countries having free access, subject only to infrastructural limitations. The Government of India may, of course, have to discuss any such �radical� idea with all the major political parties and arrive at a national consensus � in order to present to China a unified national position.
Conclusion
The present international situation presents India and China with a lot of challenges and also opportunities. If the challenges are met and the opportunities fully utilised, the two countries together can soon become a very significant and stabilising influence in world affairs. The developed countries may then have to prepare for a different future, one where they must learn to share political and economic power as never before.
With bold and imaginative thinking in both countries, India and China can agree on a �working� arrangement despite their different views on the issue of sovereignty over disputed areas along their border. This may still not lead to a return to the �Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai� relationship, but would send a very strong signal to the world that the two countries are now ready to play their potential roles as partners in the effort to develop a stable and peaceful world order.
EAST ASIA�S STRATEGIC GEOMETRIES AND INDIA�S LIMITATIONS
EAST ASIA�S STRATEGIC GEOMETRIES AND INDIA�S LIMITATIONS
By Dr. Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations
The Cold War never ended in East Asia even with the dissolution of the Former Soviet Union at the commencement of the 1990s. The Cold War continued in East Asia; the only difference being that in the strategic and threat perceptions of the United States and its major alliance partner in East Asia, namely Japan, the Former Soviet Union stood replaced by China as the major threat.
In the first decade of the 21st century, the Cold War still persists in East Asia with the policy establishments and think tanks in the United States and Japan pre-occupied with serious deliberations on how to cope with a rising, powerful and assertive China.
The defining feature of East Asia�s strategic geometry has remained a constant with the exception of China. The United States has remained the predominant military power in East Asia since 1945 and may continue for another two decades. The United States crafted a web of bi-lateral security alliances in East Asia with countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Philippines as part of its security architecture in East Asia.
China as a weak economic and military power was during the Cold War in a military alliance with the Former Soviet Union. In the 1970s and first part of the 1980s it was induced by the United States to become an American �quasi-strategic ally� against the Soviet Union. During the continuing Cold War in East Asia underway, China as a rising power today is once again in a solid strategic partnership with a resurgent Russia. Both today seem to challenge the existing strategic status quo in East Asia.
Since East Asia�s strategic landscape in the 21st century will be essentially determined by the inter-se relationships of the United States and China, it would be pertinent to remember the �swing strategy� of both China and the United States in East Asia.
East Asia, till recently, essentially comprised of the Pacific littoral of mainland Asia and the island nations of Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. More strategically, and less economically and politically, the ASEAN countries were incorporated in the definition of East Asia. In April 2005, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers invited India, Australia and New Zealand to attend the First East Asia summit. East Asia in its extended definition now includes these three countries also.
East Asia today, presents a picture of churning �strategic geometries� where variable equations are being attempted to be crafted as part of the ongoing Cold War. The United States, Russia and China as the key players are busy with their �set-squares� trying to put their respective templates on the East Asian strategic chess-board.
Russia and China have come up with their Shanghai Cooperation Organization which encompasses a major portion of the Asian Pacific littoral and extends deeply into Central Asia and includes India, Pakistan and Iran as observer states which would turn into full membership.
At the other end of the strategic spectrum, to balance the above in East Asia, the United States is attempting to add additional strategic pillars to its existing security edifice of bilateral security alliances in East Asia. In the last year or so, an increasing resonance that has emerged from United States and Japanese policy establishment and think-tanks is the imperative of an �East Asian Trilateral (USA, Japan and India) an �East Asian Quadrilateral� (USA, Japan, India and Australia) and the �Axis of Democracies� with India, of course, prominently in the pack.
The Indian policy establishment may feel very flattered by all this strategic attention and strategic wooing, but the moot question is whether India has the strategic, military and political pre-requisites of power to become a major player in East Asia.
This author feels otherwise and would therefore like to analyze the subject under the following heads:
* India�s Ambiguity on East Asia�s Strategic Geometries
* India�s Strategic and Military Limitations in Playing a Major Strategic Role in East Asia
* India�s Political Limitations in Indulging in East Asia Strategic Geometries
India�s Ambiguity on East Asia�s Strategic Geometries
India has officially not recorded its formal views in declaratory terms on the East Asian strategic geometries as being propounded by the United States and Japan. It has however, though, responded positively to greater engagement and cooperation with USA, Japan and Australia. It has become fashionable for the Indian policy establishment to term every engagement with all and sundry nations as �strategic partnership� and this presumably also applies to its responses to the current inducements to be part of the proposed strategic geometries being propounded.
Hints on these strategic geometries in East Asia seem to have been thrown by at least one Senior Indian Cabinet Minister and some officials that India at some stage would have to participate in such strategic geometries.
India�s policy penchant for ambiguity in the strategic sphere is well known by now. In fact there exists a difference in perceptions and nuances of what India perceives as �strategic partnership� to what USA, Japan and Australia perceive. In relation to Japan this stands covered in this Authors paper �Japan-India Strategic Cooperation: Differing Nuances?� (http://www.saag.org/papers21/paper2099.html dated 18.01.2007)
India�s ambiguities on East Asia strategic geometries, in addition to the above, can be said to arise from the following factors. (1) India still not fully assured and not having implicit trust in a United States � India strategic partnership (2) India unwilling to be part of an East Asian strategy of containment of China (3) India�s political predilection to follow �soft power� approaches as opposed to �hard power� approaches (4) India�s Congress Government�s coalition compulsions, in that with the Leftist as the major coalition partner, they will not allow India to work against China�s strategic interests.
More importantly, East Asia today presents an extremely complex strategic landscape to India�s strategic analysts and others in the region and so also the constancy of United States strategic intentions in East Asia, in terms of emerging East Asia regionalism which seeks to exclude the United States.
Singapore�s Senior Minister, Mr. Goh Chok Tong had aptly reflected on the above at an Asia Security Conference in Bangkok in 2005, that the situation is �still plastic, in a malleable stage, its final form subject to political decisions and strategic choices.�
More importantly, Mr. Goh made the following observations on USA: �Will United States play the game? This unfortunately is not to be taken for granted. The United States attitude towards East Asia regionalism and regional diplomacy more generally has been ambivalent. I sense that some in Washington still ask whether the game is worth the candle.�
Further, assuming that there was no complexity in the East Asian strategic picture and that India had firm intentions to become a major strategic player in East Asia, would India today have the strategic, military and political prerequisites and capabilities to play that role? The answer is negative and hence an appraisal of the limitations that exist.
India�s Strategic and Military Limitations in Playing a Major Strategic Role in East Asia
India is geographically far away from the strategic center of gravity in East Asia. It shares a long land border with only one East Asian country, namely China. For playing any major strategic role in East Asia, India needs to have substantive �force projection� capabilities in terms of the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force. More significantly, India�s strategic assets should give her range coverage to the farthest confines of East Asia which means Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).
India�s present nuclear weapons and missile arsenal do not provide any credible power-punch to play an effective role in East Asia. India would reach that stage only when it catches up with China in these two fields.
The Indian Navy must not be induced to exaggerate its operational capabilities by the effective role it played in the South and South East Asian Tsunami disaster relief. The Indian Navy has yet to form a dedicated Indian Ocean Fleet for the Indian Ocean Region extending to South Africa and Australia. If India is to play an effective role in East Asia strategic geometries it would require yet another East Asia Fleet on station in the region. In sum, two additional Naval Fleets based on Aircraft Carrier Groups will be required. At the present rate of defense allocations to the Indian Navy it would take more than 20 years to acquire the requisite capabilities.
The Indian Air Force, due to India�s domestic political compulsions, stands handicapped for the last couple of years by a serious deficiency of 136 combat aircraft in its frontline squadrons. For any extended role in East Asia, the Indian Air Force would have to acquire strategic bombers and strategic surveillance aircraft additionally. Unless these acquisitions are put on a fast-track, it would take years to build up this capability.
In view of India�s glaring strategic and military limitations in relation to East Asia strategic geometries, one is tempted to ask the question as to what are the strategic roles the United States and Japan are seeking of India by involving it in their strategic �Trilaterals, �Quadrilaterals� and �Axis of Democracies�?
Is it only related to India�s extended geographical contiguity with China and India�s sizeable Indian Army being applied against China in some future contingency on behalf of the proposed strategic groupings?
India�s Political Limitations in Indulging in East Asia Strategic Geometries
India�s political limitations in national security management, higher direction of war and lack of political will to use power stands amply analyzed in this Author�s book. �India�s Defence Polices and Strategic Thought: A Comparative Analysis�. Nothing has changed since.
India�s political leadership across the political spectrum has shirked from exercising hard choices in relation to strategic and military choices. Indulging in East Asia strategic geometries would call for hard strategic choices. Other than rhetoric, no encouraging indicators exist that could induce confidence that India is ready to play the �balance of power� politics and is also ready to follow the �Realism� school of political theory in the exercise of its diplomacy and hard strategic choices.
By historical and political conditioning the present generation of India�s political leadership has not prepared and equipped itself by education, learning or inclination to grasp matters strategic and military.
Nothing is more strikingly painful in India�s measuring-up to be a global key player, if not a global power, is Indian political leadership�s lack of will to use power and the national power attributes. India�s lack of will to use its national power is painfully evident in South Asia, in its approaches to terrorism and the proxy war unleashed against it. India�s appeasement polices in facing them is reflective of its political leadership looking for escapist options when faced with hard decisions. If India has allowed its image in South Asia as a regional power to be eroded, how can it aspire to participate in East Asia�s strategic geometries?
Concluding Observations
India-at-large would have immense pride if its political leadership by enlarged and extended strategic engagement could place India as a major strategic player globally, which includes East Asia.
India is presently not strategically, militarily or politically equipped to play a major role in the strategic geometries of East Asia, and would be well advised to avoid a strategic over-reach till it builds up her strategic capabilities which can be respected in East Asia.
Presently, India can only end up as a Grade-B follower in East Asia strategic geometries. It cannot hope to be a major and equitable player of the strategic game on the East Asian strategic chessboard.
The present fawning on India of the United States and Japan to participate in East Asia strategic geometries, despite India�s strategic limitations, can only be read as use of India more for political and strategic signaling to the other side.
Finally, no strategic advantages accrue to India in the furtherance of India�s national security interests by partaking in East Asia strategic geometries.
By Dr. Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations
The Cold War never ended in East Asia even with the dissolution of the Former Soviet Union at the commencement of the 1990s. The Cold War continued in East Asia; the only difference being that in the strategic and threat perceptions of the United States and its major alliance partner in East Asia, namely Japan, the Former Soviet Union stood replaced by China as the major threat.
In the first decade of the 21st century, the Cold War still persists in East Asia with the policy establishments and think tanks in the United States and Japan pre-occupied with serious deliberations on how to cope with a rising, powerful and assertive China.
The defining feature of East Asia�s strategic geometry has remained a constant with the exception of China. The United States has remained the predominant military power in East Asia since 1945 and may continue for another two decades. The United States crafted a web of bi-lateral security alliances in East Asia with countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Philippines as part of its security architecture in East Asia.
China as a weak economic and military power was during the Cold War in a military alliance with the Former Soviet Union. In the 1970s and first part of the 1980s it was induced by the United States to become an American �quasi-strategic ally� against the Soviet Union. During the continuing Cold War in East Asia underway, China as a rising power today is once again in a solid strategic partnership with a resurgent Russia. Both today seem to challenge the existing strategic status quo in East Asia.
Since East Asia�s strategic landscape in the 21st century will be essentially determined by the inter-se relationships of the United States and China, it would be pertinent to remember the �swing strategy� of both China and the United States in East Asia.
East Asia, till recently, essentially comprised of the Pacific littoral of mainland Asia and the island nations of Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. More strategically, and less economically and politically, the ASEAN countries were incorporated in the definition of East Asia. In April 2005, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers invited India, Australia and New Zealand to attend the First East Asia summit. East Asia in its extended definition now includes these three countries also.
East Asia today, presents a picture of churning �strategic geometries� where variable equations are being attempted to be crafted as part of the ongoing Cold War. The United States, Russia and China as the key players are busy with their �set-squares� trying to put their respective templates on the East Asian strategic chess-board.
Russia and China have come up with their Shanghai Cooperation Organization which encompasses a major portion of the Asian Pacific littoral and extends deeply into Central Asia and includes India, Pakistan and Iran as observer states which would turn into full membership.
At the other end of the strategic spectrum, to balance the above in East Asia, the United States is attempting to add additional strategic pillars to its existing security edifice of bilateral security alliances in East Asia. In the last year or so, an increasing resonance that has emerged from United States and Japanese policy establishment and think-tanks is the imperative of an �East Asian Trilateral (USA, Japan and India) an �East Asian Quadrilateral� (USA, Japan, India and Australia) and the �Axis of Democracies� with India, of course, prominently in the pack.
The Indian policy establishment may feel very flattered by all this strategic attention and strategic wooing, but the moot question is whether India has the strategic, military and political pre-requisites of power to become a major player in East Asia.
This author feels otherwise and would therefore like to analyze the subject under the following heads:
* India�s Ambiguity on East Asia�s Strategic Geometries
* India�s Strategic and Military Limitations in Playing a Major Strategic Role in East Asia
* India�s Political Limitations in Indulging in East Asia Strategic Geometries
India�s Ambiguity on East Asia�s Strategic Geometries
India has officially not recorded its formal views in declaratory terms on the East Asian strategic geometries as being propounded by the United States and Japan. It has however, though, responded positively to greater engagement and cooperation with USA, Japan and Australia. It has become fashionable for the Indian policy establishment to term every engagement with all and sundry nations as �strategic partnership� and this presumably also applies to its responses to the current inducements to be part of the proposed strategic geometries being propounded.
Hints on these strategic geometries in East Asia seem to have been thrown by at least one Senior Indian Cabinet Minister and some officials that India at some stage would have to participate in such strategic geometries.
India�s policy penchant for ambiguity in the strategic sphere is well known by now. In fact there exists a difference in perceptions and nuances of what India perceives as �strategic partnership� to what USA, Japan and Australia perceive. In relation to Japan this stands covered in this Authors paper �Japan-India Strategic Cooperation: Differing Nuances?� (http://www.saag.org/papers21/paper2099.html dated 18.01.2007)
India�s ambiguities on East Asia strategic geometries, in addition to the above, can be said to arise from the following factors. (1) India still not fully assured and not having implicit trust in a United States � India strategic partnership (2) India unwilling to be part of an East Asian strategy of containment of China (3) India�s political predilection to follow �soft power� approaches as opposed to �hard power� approaches (4) India�s Congress Government�s coalition compulsions, in that with the Leftist as the major coalition partner, they will not allow India to work against China�s strategic interests.
More importantly, East Asia today presents an extremely complex strategic landscape to India�s strategic analysts and others in the region and so also the constancy of United States strategic intentions in East Asia, in terms of emerging East Asia regionalism which seeks to exclude the United States.
Singapore�s Senior Minister, Mr. Goh Chok Tong had aptly reflected on the above at an Asia Security Conference in Bangkok in 2005, that the situation is �still plastic, in a malleable stage, its final form subject to political decisions and strategic choices.�
More importantly, Mr. Goh made the following observations on USA: �Will United States play the game? This unfortunately is not to be taken for granted. The United States attitude towards East Asia regionalism and regional diplomacy more generally has been ambivalent. I sense that some in Washington still ask whether the game is worth the candle.�
Further, assuming that there was no complexity in the East Asian strategic picture and that India had firm intentions to become a major strategic player in East Asia, would India today have the strategic, military and political prerequisites and capabilities to play that role? The answer is negative and hence an appraisal of the limitations that exist.
India�s Strategic and Military Limitations in Playing a Major Strategic Role in East Asia
India is geographically far away from the strategic center of gravity in East Asia. It shares a long land border with only one East Asian country, namely China. For playing any major strategic role in East Asia, India needs to have substantive �force projection� capabilities in terms of the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force. More significantly, India�s strategic assets should give her range coverage to the farthest confines of East Asia which means Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).
India�s present nuclear weapons and missile arsenal do not provide any credible power-punch to play an effective role in East Asia. India would reach that stage only when it catches up with China in these two fields.
The Indian Navy must not be induced to exaggerate its operational capabilities by the effective role it played in the South and South East Asian Tsunami disaster relief. The Indian Navy has yet to form a dedicated Indian Ocean Fleet for the Indian Ocean Region extending to South Africa and Australia. If India is to play an effective role in East Asia strategic geometries it would require yet another East Asia Fleet on station in the region. In sum, two additional Naval Fleets based on Aircraft Carrier Groups will be required. At the present rate of defense allocations to the Indian Navy it would take more than 20 years to acquire the requisite capabilities.
The Indian Air Force, due to India�s domestic political compulsions, stands handicapped for the last couple of years by a serious deficiency of 136 combat aircraft in its frontline squadrons. For any extended role in East Asia, the Indian Air Force would have to acquire strategic bombers and strategic surveillance aircraft additionally. Unless these acquisitions are put on a fast-track, it would take years to build up this capability.
In view of India�s glaring strategic and military limitations in relation to East Asia strategic geometries, one is tempted to ask the question as to what are the strategic roles the United States and Japan are seeking of India by involving it in their strategic �Trilaterals, �Quadrilaterals� and �Axis of Democracies�?
Is it only related to India�s extended geographical contiguity with China and India�s sizeable Indian Army being applied against China in some future contingency on behalf of the proposed strategic groupings?
India�s Political Limitations in Indulging in East Asia Strategic Geometries
India�s political limitations in national security management, higher direction of war and lack of political will to use power stands amply analyzed in this Author�s book. �India�s Defence Polices and Strategic Thought: A Comparative Analysis�. Nothing has changed since.
India�s political leadership across the political spectrum has shirked from exercising hard choices in relation to strategic and military choices. Indulging in East Asia strategic geometries would call for hard strategic choices. Other than rhetoric, no encouraging indicators exist that could induce confidence that India is ready to play the �balance of power� politics and is also ready to follow the �Realism� school of political theory in the exercise of its diplomacy and hard strategic choices.
By historical and political conditioning the present generation of India�s political leadership has not prepared and equipped itself by education, learning or inclination to grasp matters strategic and military.
Nothing is more strikingly painful in India�s measuring-up to be a global key player, if not a global power, is Indian political leadership�s lack of will to use power and the national power attributes. India�s lack of will to use its national power is painfully evident in South Asia, in its approaches to terrorism and the proxy war unleashed against it. India�s appeasement polices in facing them is reflective of its political leadership looking for escapist options when faced with hard decisions. If India has allowed its image in South Asia as a regional power to be eroded, how can it aspire to participate in East Asia�s strategic geometries?
Concluding Observations
India-at-large would have immense pride if its political leadership by enlarged and extended strategic engagement could place India as a major strategic player globally, which includes East Asia.
India is presently not strategically, militarily or politically equipped to play a major role in the strategic geometries of East Asia, and would be well advised to avoid a strategic over-reach till it builds up her strategic capabilities which can be respected in East Asia.
Presently, India can only end up as a Grade-B follower in East Asia strategic geometries. It cannot hope to be a major and equitable player of the strategic game on the East Asian strategic chessboard.
The present fawning on India of the United States and Japan to participate in East Asia strategic geometries, despite India�s strategic limitations, can only be read as use of India more for political and strategic signaling to the other side.
Finally, no strategic advantages accrue to India in the furtherance of India�s national security interests by partaking in East Asia strategic geometries.
TAWANG: SOME INDIAN PLAIN-SPEAKING AT LAST
TAWANG: SOME INDIAN PLAIN-SPEAKING AT LAST
by B.Raman
For those who are knowledgeable about the goings-on in New Delhi, it has been known for some time that despite all the positive spins put out by the Government of India, the Sino-Indian border talks were making no progress due to Beijing's insistence that there could be no agreement on the border issue unless and until India agreed to transfer at least the Tawang Tract if not the whole of Arunachal Pradesh to China. The fact that China's unreasonable demand was in violation of the broad principles already agreed to by the leaders of the two countries did not inhibit China from pressing it. One of these principles is that any transfer of territory under the border agreement should not involve populated areas.
2. For the Chinese, mutually-agreed principles have only a tactical value. They do not hesitate to unilaterally discard any principle if it came in the way of what they perceive as their national interest. They look upon Tawang as important for their final pacification of Tibet and to prevent any unrest by the youth of Tibet after the exit of the present Dalai Lama, when they try to impose their nominee as his successor.
The strengthening of their Tibet-based military capabilities, including the development of their road and rail infrastructure right upto the borders with India and Nepal, is meant not only to pre-empt any possible destabilisation of Tibet after the Dalai Lama, but also to enable them to exercise the military option to acquire the Tawang Tract should that become necessary.
3. The decision announced by the Tibetan administration on June 19, 2007, to upgrade the 108-kilometre rough track that connects the foothills of Mount Everest on their side of the border with the base camp used by mountaineers climbing from the Tibetan side has been projected as meant to facilitate the Olympic Torch of next year's Olympic Games in Beijing to be taken to the top of the Everest. This upgradation, which has already started, is expected to be completed in four months at a cost of US $ 20 million. They have stated that this would also promote mountain tourism. They have totally ignored the concerns of environmentalists and nature lovers on the damage to nature and environment that could be caused by this project. They have also made light of the concerns of Indian analysts over the likely military potential of this upgradation.
4. Despite repeatedly professing friendship for India and expressing their interest in developing the multi-dimensional relationship without letting it be stunted by the deadlock in the border talks, the Chinese have been showing a lack of sensitivity to India's concerns over their continuing military-related relationship with Pakistan and Myanmar and over the new military dimension, which is being imparted to their relations with Sri Lanka. Very often, Chinese analysts project India's developing relations with the US, Japan and Australia and its increasing activism in the South-East Asian region as meant to contain China. It is not India that has been trying to contain China. It is Beijing that has been trying to contain India.
5. Its repeated claims to Arunachal Pradesh---- or at least the Tawang Tract--- are sought to be given an air of legitimacy on the ground that this area historically belonged to Tibet, which was part of China, and that the British managed to have it transferred to India through force and deceit. The Chinese attempts to get possession of the Tawang Tract---if not the whole of Arunachal Pradesh--- are sought to be justified on grounds of historic legitimacy.
6. The Chinese claims and policies with regard to Arunachal Pradesh remind one of the similar claims of Hitler's Nazi Germany to Austria and Al Qaeda's claims to what it projects as historic Muslim lands, that are now under the possession of non-Muslim powers. Al Qaeda looks upon the Xinjiang region of China as a historic Muslim land that has been occupied by the Hans through deceit and force. One of its objectives is to wage a jihad for the return of this "historic Muslim land" back to the control of the Ummah. The Chinese reject such claims of historic legitimacy when it comes to territory occupied by them, but have no qualms over aping the arguments of the Nazis and Al Qaeda when it comes to their acquiring possession of territory belonging to others if they consider such possession to be in their national interest.
7. It was the failure of Jawaharlal Nehru and V.K.Krishna Menon and those in India's Ministry of External Affairs who were their advisers to understand the Chinese mind-set, which led to the national humiliation in the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Repeated warnings from the Intelligence Bureau about the large-scale Chinese intrusions into the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh and their construction of a road there were not only ignored, but these disturbing developments were kept away from the knowledge of the public and the Parliament. They fondly believed that they would be able to make the Chinese see reason and withdraw from this region by observing a policy of silence and not articulating our concerns in public. Their fond hopes were belied.
8. It was not the Indian intelligence and security forces which were responsible for the 1962 debacle. It was the political leadership, which was living in an illusory world of its own creation. The debacle brought out our state of unpreparedness----particularly in the Arunachal Pradesh area. Very limited intelligence capability, no stay behind capapability to harass an illegal occupier of our territory, no dedicated para-military force suited for frontline duties on the Sino-Indian border in the Arunachal Pradesh sector, poor technical intelligence capability, no covert action capability, no worthwhile road infrastructure. It was a disturbing state of affairs.
9. One thought the political leadership had learnt the lessons. Action to remove some of these deficiencies was initiated with American and British help, but even then the development of the road infrastructure in the border areas was not given the urgent importance it deserved lest we provoke the Chinese and land ourselves in another military confrontation. A crash programme to train our intelligence officers in the Chinese language was undertaken. Our Techint capabilities were strengthened. An important outcome of the 1962 debacle was the creation of the Special Security Bureau (SSB) as a dedicated para-military force for front-line, covert action, trans-border intelligence collection and stay behind roles in the Arunachal Pradesh area.
10. As our capabilities were improving, our relations with China too started improving. The 1988 visit of Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, to China brought the bonhomie, which had disappeared since 1962, back to the bilateral relationship. We went back into our world of illusions thinking that China would not repeat 1962. The dedicated role of the SSB was sought to be diluted on the ground that in view of the improvement in our relations with China we no longer needed such a force.
11. In the 1990s, when Narasimha Rao was the Prime Minister, a determined effort was made by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to divest the SSB of its dedicated role in Arunachal Pradesh and to have it placed under the direct control of the MHA for use in mantaining law and order in other parts of the country and to perform security duties on the Nepal border. Narasimha Rao shot down the attempt of the MHA to have the role of the SSB changed. He felt that we should not have any illusions about any permanent change for the better in the designs of the Chinese in Arunachal Pradesh.
12. The Government headed by Shri A.B.Vajpayee initiated the process of dismantling the intelligence-cum-security set up created in Arunachal Pradesh in the wake of the 1962 debacle. The SSB was divested of its Tibet-specific role and converted almost into one more central police organisation and placed under the control of the MHA for being used on the Nepal border and other parts of India. Today, as the Chinese are becoming increasingly difficult on the Tawang issue, we do not have a dedicated and specially-trained para-military force for performing frontline duties on the border between Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet.
13. Till 1988, there used to be a close monitoring of the intelligence collection capabilities with regard to China. This has gradually gone into disuse after Rajiv Gandhi's euphoric visit to China in 1988. The Special Task Force for the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus set up by the Vajpayee Government in 2000 in the wake of the Kargil conflict of 1999 had largely Pakistan-centric terms of reference. It paid very inadequate attention to China. One does not know whether in the light of the increasing Chinese obstinacy on the Tawang issue, a review has been made of our intelligence and security-related capabilities with relation to China. If not, this must be given urgent priority.
14. While our Prime Minister has not openly articulated any sense of unease over the Chinese determination to get Tawang and over the strengthening of China's military-related capabilities in Tibet right up to its border with India, other senior Ministers such as Shri Pranab Mukherjee, Minister For External Affairs, and Shri A.K.Antony, the Defence Minister, have shown a refreshingly new readiness to call a spade a spade in public.
15. Talking to journalists at Shillong on June 16, 2007, Shri Mukherjee said that "he had made it clear to his new Chinese counterpart that any elected Government of India is not permitted by the provisions of the Constitution to part with any part of our land that sends representatives to the Indian Parliament."
16. He added: "The days of Hitler are over. After the Second World War, no country captures land of another country in the present global context. That is why there is a civilised mechanism of discussions and dialogue to sort out border disputes. We sit around the table and discuss disputes to resolve them."
17. The international community has recognised that the days of coveting the territory of another country in the name historic legitimacy are over, but unfortunately, not China and Al Qaeda.
18. Shri Antony told journalists at New Delhi on June 18, 2007:" China has been building infrastructure (near the Line of Actual Control). We are also building infrastructure. Nobody can prevent both sides. There is nothing wrong in that. They have the right to build infrastructure on their territory. We have the right to do that on ours. We are also trying to hasten the development of our infrastructure. They have their perception (about Arunachal Pradesh). On our part, we are very categorical that Arunachal Pradesh is part of India."
19. These are welcome signals to Beijing of our determination to defend Arunachal Pradesh, including Tawang. But signals without strength will serve little purpose. Strength can come only from concrete action on the ground to strengthen our intelligence and military-related capabilities in Arunachal Pradesh.
by B.Raman
For those who are knowledgeable about the goings-on in New Delhi, it has been known for some time that despite all the positive spins put out by the Government of India, the Sino-Indian border talks were making no progress due to Beijing's insistence that there could be no agreement on the border issue unless and until India agreed to transfer at least the Tawang Tract if not the whole of Arunachal Pradesh to China. The fact that China's unreasonable demand was in violation of the broad principles already agreed to by the leaders of the two countries did not inhibit China from pressing it. One of these principles is that any transfer of territory under the border agreement should not involve populated areas.
2. For the Chinese, mutually-agreed principles have only a tactical value. They do not hesitate to unilaterally discard any principle if it came in the way of what they perceive as their national interest. They look upon Tawang as important for their final pacification of Tibet and to prevent any unrest by the youth of Tibet after the exit of the present Dalai Lama, when they try to impose their nominee as his successor.
The strengthening of their Tibet-based military capabilities, including the development of their road and rail infrastructure right upto the borders with India and Nepal, is meant not only to pre-empt any possible destabilisation of Tibet after the Dalai Lama, but also to enable them to exercise the military option to acquire the Tawang Tract should that become necessary.
3. The decision announced by the Tibetan administration on June 19, 2007, to upgrade the 108-kilometre rough track that connects the foothills of Mount Everest on their side of the border with the base camp used by mountaineers climbing from the Tibetan side has been projected as meant to facilitate the Olympic Torch of next year's Olympic Games in Beijing to be taken to the top of the Everest. This upgradation, which has already started, is expected to be completed in four months at a cost of US $ 20 million. They have stated that this would also promote mountain tourism. They have totally ignored the concerns of environmentalists and nature lovers on the damage to nature and environment that could be caused by this project. They have also made light of the concerns of Indian analysts over the likely military potential of this upgradation.
4. Despite repeatedly professing friendship for India and expressing their interest in developing the multi-dimensional relationship without letting it be stunted by the deadlock in the border talks, the Chinese have been showing a lack of sensitivity to India's concerns over their continuing military-related relationship with Pakistan and Myanmar and over the new military dimension, which is being imparted to their relations with Sri Lanka. Very often, Chinese analysts project India's developing relations with the US, Japan and Australia and its increasing activism in the South-East Asian region as meant to contain China. It is not India that has been trying to contain China. It is Beijing that has been trying to contain India.
5. Its repeated claims to Arunachal Pradesh---- or at least the Tawang Tract--- are sought to be given an air of legitimacy on the ground that this area historically belonged to Tibet, which was part of China, and that the British managed to have it transferred to India through force and deceit. The Chinese attempts to get possession of the Tawang Tract---if not the whole of Arunachal Pradesh--- are sought to be justified on grounds of historic legitimacy.
6. The Chinese claims and policies with regard to Arunachal Pradesh remind one of the similar claims of Hitler's Nazi Germany to Austria and Al Qaeda's claims to what it projects as historic Muslim lands, that are now under the possession of non-Muslim powers. Al Qaeda looks upon the Xinjiang region of China as a historic Muslim land that has been occupied by the Hans through deceit and force. One of its objectives is to wage a jihad for the return of this "historic Muslim land" back to the control of the Ummah. The Chinese reject such claims of historic legitimacy when it comes to territory occupied by them, but have no qualms over aping the arguments of the Nazis and Al Qaeda when it comes to their acquiring possession of territory belonging to others if they consider such possession to be in their national interest.
7. It was the failure of Jawaharlal Nehru and V.K.Krishna Menon and those in India's Ministry of External Affairs who were their advisers to understand the Chinese mind-set, which led to the national humiliation in the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Repeated warnings from the Intelligence Bureau about the large-scale Chinese intrusions into the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh and their construction of a road there were not only ignored, but these disturbing developments were kept away from the knowledge of the public and the Parliament. They fondly believed that they would be able to make the Chinese see reason and withdraw from this region by observing a policy of silence and not articulating our concerns in public. Their fond hopes were belied.
8. It was not the Indian intelligence and security forces which were responsible for the 1962 debacle. It was the political leadership, which was living in an illusory world of its own creation. The debacle brought out our state of unpreparedness----particularly in the Arunachal Pradesh area. Very limited intelligence capability, no stay behind capapability to harass an illegal occupier of our territory, no dedicated para-military force suited for frontline duties on the Sino-Indian border in the Arunachal Pradesh sector, poor technical intelligence capability, no covert action capability, no worthwhile road infrastructure. It was a disturbing state of affairs.
9. One thought the political leadership had learnt the lessons. Action to remove some of these deficiencies was initiated with American and British help, but even then the development of the road infrastructure in the border areas was not given the urgent importance it deserved lest we provoke the Chinese and land ourselves in another military confrontation. A crash programme to train our intelligence officers in the Chinese language was undertaken. Our Techint capabilities were strengthened. An important outcome of the 1962 debacle was the creation of the Special Security Bureau (SSB) as a dedicated para-military force for front-line, covert action, trans-border intelligence collection and stay behind roles in the Arunachal Pradesh area.
10. As our capabilities were improving, our relations with China too started improving. The 1988 visit of Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, to China brought the bonhomie, which had disappeared since 1962, back to the bilateral relationship. We went back into our world of illusions thinking that China would not repeat 1962. The dedicated role of the SSB was sought to be diluted on the ground that in view of the improvement in our relations with China we no longer needed such a force.
11. In the 1990s, when Narasimha Rao was the Prime Minister, a determined effort was made by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to divest the SSB of its dedicated role in Arunachal Pradesh and to have it placed under the direct control of the MHA for use in mantaining law and order in other parts of the country and to perform security duties on the Nepal border. Narasimha Rao shot down the attempt of the MHA to have the role of the SSB changed. He felt that we should not have any illusions about any permanent change for the better in the designs of the Chinese in Arunachal Pradesh.
12. The Government headed by Shri A.B.Vajpayee initiated the process of dismantling the intelligence-cum-security set up created in Arunachal Pradesh in the wake of the 1962 debacle. The SSB was divested of its Tibet-specific role and converted almost into one more central police organisation and placed under the control of the MHA for being used on the Nepal border and other parts of India. Today, as the Chinese are becoming increasingly difficult on the Tawang issue, we do not have a dedicated and specially-trained para-military force for performing frontline duties on the border between Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet.
13. Till 1988, there used to be a close monitoring of the intelligence collection capabilities with regard to China. This has gradually gone into disuse after Rajiv Gandhi's euphoric visit to China in 1988. The Special Task Force for the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus set up by the Vajpayee Government in 2000 in the wake of the Kargil conflict of 1999 had largely Pakistan-centric terms of reference. It paid very inadequate attention to China. One does not know whether in the light of the increasing Chinese obstinacy on the Tawang issue, a review has been made of our intelligence and security-related capabilities with relation to China. If not, this must be given urgent priority.
14. While our Prime Minister has not openly articulated any sense of unease over the Chinese determination to get Tawang and over the strengthening of China's military-related capabilities in Tibet right up to its border with India, other senior Ministers such as Shri Pranab Mukherjee, Minister For External Affairs, and Shri A.K.Antony, the Defence Minister, have shown a refreshingly new readiness to call a spade a spade in public.
15. Talking to journalists at Shillong on June 16, 2007, Shri Mukherjee said that "he had made it clear to his new Chinese counterpart that any elected Government of India is not permitted by the provisions of the Constitution to part with any part of our land that sends representatives to the Indian Parliament."
16. He added: "The days of Hitler are over. After the Second World War, no country captures land of another country in the present global context. That is why there is a civilised mechanism of discussions and dialogue to sort out border disputes. We sit around the table and discuss disputes to resolve them."
17. The international community has recognised that the days of coveting the territory of another country in the name historic legitimacy are over, but unfortunately, not China and Al Qaeda.
18. Shri Antony told journalists at New Delhi on June 18, 2007:" China has been building infrastructure (near the Line of Actual Control). We are also building infrastructure. Nobody can prevent both sides. There is nothing wrong in that. They have the right to build infrastructure on their territory. We have the right to do that on ours. We are also trying to hasten the development of our infrastructure. They have their perception (about Arunachal Pradesh). On our part, we are very categorical that Arunachal Pradesh is part of India."
19. These are welcome signals to Beijing of our determination to defend Arunachal Pradesh, including Tawang. But signals without strength will serve little purpose. Strength can come only from concrete action on the ground to strengthen our intelligence and military-related capabilities in Arunachal Pradesh.
Indo-Bangladesh Relations
Indo-Bangladesh Relations:
by Dr. Anand Kumar
India which has been making effort to improve relationship with its neighbours in the spirit of SAARC, now wanted to bring a �positive uptrend� in its bilateral relationship with Bangladesh. This intention of India was shown during the last SAARC summit, when it unilaterally decided to give certain benefits to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) of the region. Bangladesh was one of the obvious beneficiaries of this decision. Otherwise also, India wanted to put its relationship with Bangladesh on a strong footing. This was not possible without dealing with some of the issues which have acted as major irritants in the bilateral relationships. To remove these irritants and to give a positive thrust to bilateral relations, Indian foreign secretary, Shiva Shankar Menon visited Bangladesh from June 24 to June 26, 2007. Another main objective of the visit was to gauge the change in political situation after the postponement of January 22 elections.
India and Bangladesh had agreed to hold secretary-level talks annually, but flagging Dhaka-New Delhi relations turned the meetings into a biennial affair, held alternately in Dhaka in 2003 and in New Delhi in 2005. However, Bangladesh Foreign Adviser Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury and Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee during their meeting in April on the sidelines of the SAARC summit in New Delhi promised regular secretary-level talks as part of a "new upward trajectory" in Dhaka-New Delhi relations. The recent meeting between Bangladesh Acting Foreign Secretary Touhid Hossain and Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon was result of this.
India has been very clear in its approach towards the military backed caretaker government of Bangladesh headed by Fakharuddin Ahmed. This government displayed friendly attitude towards India unlike some of the previous governments that tried to capitalize by creating anti-India feeling among the Bangladeshi people. In contrast, certain steps taken by the caretaker government have arrested the continuous decline in Indo-Bangladesh relations. Though this government has put democracy on hold, so far it has not tried to throttle it. In fact, the steps taken by it appear to be taken with the intention to strengthen democracy in Bangladesh by purging the system of some of the evil practices which mainstream political parties have adopted since the restoration of democracy in 1990.
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had promised during the 14th SAARC Summit that India would accommodate duty-free access of products of the LDCs in the SAARC region, including Bangladesh, by December 2007. India now wanted to put into practice this promise. Bangladesh has been claiming for a long time that its exports to India were suffering because of non-tariff and para-tariff barriers. To remove these alleged �non-tariff barriers� Dhaka and New Delhi signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to standardise their quality controls for certification, testing, measurement and quality assurance systems. Representatives from the Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI) and an Indian External Affairs Ministry official representing the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) signed the MoU. This step is likely to satisfy a long-pending demand of Bangladesh which thinks that it will help the country to expand its market in India.
Bangladesh has also demanded the removal of para-tariff barriers, which it claims raises the price of Bangladeshi exports in India due to Indian customs surcharges, additional charges, internal taxes and charges levied on imports, and decreased customs valuation. India has agreed to provide Bangladeshi goods with duty-free access to its market "in phases" by December 31. The next meeting of the Joint Working Group on Trade will attempt to sort out how to reduce the number of goods on India's "sensitive lists" protected from the duty-free arrangement. Both sides also discussed greater tariff cuts, coordinated development of land customs stations, establishing "border haats" and greater Indian investment into Bangladesh. The Bangladeshi side displayed a mature response to the cumulative trade gap of $7-8 billion with New Delhi. Bangladesh Acting Foreign Secretary Touhid Hossain said, "It will not happen overnight...I am sure we will reach a point where Bangladesh exports to India will increase." However, Bangladesh is drawing up its list of exportable items for the duty-free access. How far these steps will go to reduce the huge trade deficit Bangladesh has with India remains to be seen.
Sharing of Security Information
Both sides have also agreed to share security information regarding cross-border crimes and look to accelerate resolutions on border and water-resources sharing. The joint statement signed at the end of the meeting reads, "The two sides emphasised the need for enhanced security cooperation, particularly information sharing between the authorities concerned." The details of expanding security cooperation are likely to be discussed in the upcoming meeting of the home secretaries of the two countries. Of significance is the understanding forged to share intelligence information on cross border crimes. This could lead to enhanced security cooperation between the two countries. Highlighting the importance of sharing security information, Menon said, "I think our securities are linked. We have a common security interest. Criminals, insurgents, terrorists--if any of these elements seek sanctuary, then it doesn't help either India or Bangladesh. We are both determined to work against this."
Issue of Support to Terrorism
Use of Bangladeshi territory by the insurgents and terrorists has been a sore point in the bilateral relationship of India and Bangladesh. During the recent meeting India wanted the military-backed interim government to dismantle the Islamic religious schools near the common border, inside Bangladesh because these were allegedly providing training facilities to anti-Indian insurgents. Bangladesh once again denied the presence of such facilities, but nevertheless agreed to monitor closely the activities of the religious schools known as madrassas.
Border demarcation
Both the foreign secretaries also identified completion of boundary demarcation, exchange of enclaves and adverse possessions as priorities that require "early resolution". India and Bangladesh share the longest land-boundary with each other. Menon stated that India would like to solve these problems as quickly as possible. He said, "Nothing holds us apart (on the issue)...If it suits us both, if it suits the situation on the ground, we will implement it soon."
Sharing of Water Resources
Regarding sharing of water resources, the two sides decided to leave it up to the upcoming meeting of the water-resources secretaries at the Joint Committee of Experts (JCE) to sort out details on common river water sharing, minor irrigation and drinking water schemes, flood-mitigation cooperation, and dredging and river bank protection work. The two foreign secretaries hoped to hold a Joint Rivers Commission meeting at the earliest after the JCE meeting.
Emphasis on increased connectivity
The two sides also stressed the need for greater land and train links. India agreed to send a team in the first week of July to coordinate outstanding logistical issues to start the long-awaited Dhaka-Kolkata rail-link. Menon observed that "there is a tremendous positive response" from the two countries towards the restoration of missing links. The chief advisor of Bangladesh caretaker government was also of the view that passenger and goods train service between the two countries will help peoples of both the countries.
Meeting with Chief Advisor
Menon made a courtesy call on Chief Adviser (CA) Fakhruddin Ahmed at his office. The CA said Bangladesh expects increased cooperation from India on key issues, particularly in water sharing, which is a common concern for both the countries. He mentioned that the last SAARC Summit in New Delhi undertook four priority issues--water (including flood control), food, energy and environment--to deal with, as they are vital for sustainability of the peoples of the countries in this region. He expressed his gratitude towards the government and the people of India for providing $10million assistance for the victims of landslides in Chittagong. Ahmed felt that foreign secretary-level meeting should be held on a regular basis for the stocktaking of bilateral relations. On the issue of use of Bangladeshi territory by insurgents and terrorists he said, "Bangladesh, as a matter of principle, does not allow its territory to be used by any force inimical to the interest of India."
Meeting with Khaleda and Hasina
Menon also met former Prime ministers Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina separately who expressed their hope that India will take necessary steps to solve some prevailing issues between the two neighbouring countries to further boost up bilateral relationship. They expressed their hope to visiting Indian Foreign Secretary Shaivshankar Menon that the friendly ties between India and Bangladesh will be strengthened further through the meeting at the foreign secretary level.
Meeting separately, both the leaders elaborately discussed bilateral issues including the Ganges water-sharing accord, security, exchange of information, border terrorism, duty-free access of Bangladeshi goods to India, Chittagong Hill Tracts peace accord and reducing of imbalanced trade deficit. At the meeting, Hasina told Menon that India is a friendly country and the Awami League will extend its cooperation to help develop the bilateral relationship between the two countries. Focusing on different initiatives taken by her government with India, Khaleda expressed her hope that the foreign secretary level meeting between the two countries will continue in future and problems will be solved through meetings and bilateral relationship will be boosted up.
No decision by Bangladesh on Indian Capital Investment
A major disappointment of the visit was the failure of Bangladesh caretaker government to take any decision on the multi-billion dollar investment proposals from two Indian business giants, Mittal and Tata. The Bangladesh side indicated that the present caretaker government wants an elected government to make the decisions over these proposals. Dhaka�s vacillation over these proposals has reportedly not made India too happy.
Conclusion
It is true that some �positive uptrend� has been seen in Indo-Bangladesh relations. Both sides took advantage of improved political relations to discuss long-standing irritants such as demarcating 6.5km borderland, combating cross-border terrorism, greater access for Bangladeshi goods in India and improved road-rail connectivity. India has tried to deal with a major grievance of Bangladesh by allowing unilateral concessions. It plans to reduce duty level to zero and has removed the �non�tariff� barrier so far vociferously criticized by Bangladesh. Some of the major issues however still remain. There was hardly any progress over the issue of use of Bangladesh territory by the Indian insurgent groups. Bangladesh is still in denial mode. It has not taken any major action against them. The interim government has also not taken any decision towards the Indian capital investment in Bangladesh. Bangladesh must realize that it has a limited export basket. Even with the removal of non-tariff barriers and reduction of import duty to zero level, a huge trade gap will exist between India and Bangladesh. This will be so because Bangladesh does not have too many things to export. A change in this situation can be visualized only with the investment of Indian capital, which can expand the export basket of Bangladesh. It will also energize the economy of Bangladesh and improve intra-regional trade in south Asia. One hopes that progress on remaining issues are also made during the regime of present caretaker government, which in any case will be around till the end of 2008. The present caretaker wants an elected government to take decision on these issues. However, given the past track record of politicians of Bangladesh it appears difficult that any elected government in Bangladesh will have courage to act on these fronts. It appears, a beginning has to be made by the present dispensation, only then progress can be expected when elected governments takes charge.
by Dr. Anand Kumar
India which has been making effort to improve relationship with its neighbours in the spirit of SAARC, now wanted to bring a �positive uptrend� in its bilateral relationship with Bangladesh. This intention of India was shown during the last SAARC summit, when it unilaterally decided to give certain benefits to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) of the region. Bangladesh was one of the obvious beneficiaries of this decision. Otherwise also, India wanted to put its relationship with Bangladesh on a strong footing. This was not possible without dealing with some of the issues which have acted as major irritants in the bilateral relationships. To remove these irritants and to give a positive thrust to bilateral relations, Indian foreign secretary, Shiva Shankar Menon visited Bangladesh from June 24 to June 26, 2007. Another main objective of the visit was to gauge the change in political situation after the postponement of January 22 elections.
India and Bangladesh had agreed to hold secretary-level talks annually, but flagging Dhaka-New Delhi relations turned the meetings into a biennial affair, held alternately in Dhaka in 2003 and in New Delhi in 2005. However, Bangladesh Foreign Adviser Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury and Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee during their meeting in April on the sidelines of the SAARC summit in New Delhi promised regular secretary-level talks as part of a "new upward trajectory" in Dhaka-New Delhi relations. The recent meeting between Bangladesh Acting Foreign Secretary Touhid Hossain and Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon was result of this.
India has been very clear in its approach towards the military backed caretaker government of Bangladesh headed by Fakharuddin Ahmed. This government displayed friendly attitude towards India unlike some of the previous governments that tried to capitalize by creating anti-India feeling among the Bangladeshi people. In contrast, certain steps taken by the caretaker government have arrested the continuous decline in Indo-Bangladesh relations. Though this government has put democracy on hold, so far it has not tried to throttle it. In fact, the steps taken by it appear to be taken with the intention to strengthen democracy in Bangladesh by purging the system of some of the evil practices which mainstream political parties have adopted since the restoration of democracy in 1990.
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had promised during the 14th SAARC Summit that India would accommodate duty-free access of products of the LDCs in the SAARC region, including Bangladesh, by December 2007. India now wanted to put into practice this promise. Bangladesh has been claiming for a long time that its exports to India were suffering because of non-tariff and para-tariff barriers. To remove these alleged �non-tariff barriers� Dhaka and New Delhi signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to standardise their quality controls for certification, testing, measurement and quality assurance systems. Representatives from the Bangladesh Standards and Testing Institution (BSTI) and an Indian External Affairs Ministry official representing the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) signed the MoU. This step is likely to satisfy a long-pending demand of Bangladesh which thinks that it will help the country to expand its market in India.
Bangladesh has also demanded the removal of para-tariff barriers, which it claims raises the price of Bangladeshi exports in India due to Indian customs surcharges, additional charges, internal taxes and charges levied on imports, and decreased customs valuation. India has agreed to provide Bangladeshi goods with duty-free access to its market "in phases" by December 31. The next meeting of the Joint Working Group on Trade will attempt to sort out how to reduce the number of goods on India's "sensitive lists" protected from the duty-free arrangement. Both sides also discussed greater tariff cuts, coordinated development of land customs stations, establishing "border haats" and greater Indian investment into Bangladesh. The Bangladeshi side displayed a mature response to the cumulative trade gap of $7-8 billion with New Delhi. Bangladesh Acting Foreign Secretary Touhid Hossain said, "It will not happen overnight...I am sure we will reach a point where Bangladesh exports to India will increase." However, Bangladesh is drawing up its list of exportable items for the duty-free access. How far these steps will go to reduce the huge trade deficit Bangladesh has with India remains to be seen.
Sharing of Security Information
Both sides have also agreed to share security information regarding cross-border crimes and look to accelerate resolutions on border and water-resources sharing. The joint statement signed at the end of the meeting reads, "The two sides emphasised the need for enhanced security cooperation, particularly information sharing between the authorities concerned." The details of expanding security cooperation are likely to be discussed in the upcoming meeting of the home secretaries of the two countries. Of significance is the understanding forged to share intelligence information on cross border crimes. This could lead to enhanced security cooperation between the two countries. Highlighting the importance of sharing security information, Menon said, "I think our securities are linked. We have a common security interest. Criminals, insurgents, terrorists--if any of these elements seek sanctuary, then it doesn't help either India or Bangladesh. We are both determined to work against this."
Issue of Support to Terrorism
Use of Bangladeshi territory by the insurgents and terrorists has been a sore point in the bilateral relationship of India and Bangladesh. During the recent meeting India wanted the military-backed interim government to dismantle the Islamic religious schools near the common border, inside Bangladesh because these were allegedly providing training facilities to anti-Indian insurgents. Bangladesh once again denied the presence of such facilities, but nevertheless agreed to monitor closely the activities of the religious schools known as madrassas.
Border demarcation
Both the foreign secretaries also identified completion of boundary demarcation, exchange of enclaves and adverse possessions as priorities that require "early resolution". India and Bangladesh share the longest land-boundary with each other. Menon stated that India would like to solve these problems as quickly as possible. He said, "Nothing holds us apart (on the issue)...If it suits us both, if it suits the situation on the ground, we will implement it soon."
Sharing of Water Resources
Regarding sharing of water resources, the two sides decided to leave it up to the upcoming meeting of the water-resources secretaries at the Joint Committee of Experts (JCE) to sort out details on common river water sharing, minor irrigation and drinking water schemes, flood-mitigation cooperation, and dredging and river bank protection work. The two foreign secretaries hoped to hold a Joint Rivers Commission meeting at the earliest after the JCE meeting.
Emphasis on increased connectivity
The two sides also stressed the need for greater land and train links. India agreed to send a team in the first week of July to coordinate outstanding logistical issues to start the long-awaited Dhaka-Kolkata rail-link. Menon observed that "there is a tremendous positive response" from the two countries towards the restoration of missing links. The chief advisor of Bangladesh caretaker government was also of the view that passenger and goods train service between the two countries will help peoples of both the countries.
Meeting with Chief Advisor
Menon made a courtesy call on Chief Adviser (CA) Fakhruddin Ahmed at his office. The CA said Bangladesh expects increased cooperation from India on key issues, particularly in water sharing, which is a common concern for both the countries. He mentioned that the last SAARC Summit in New Delhi undertook four priority issues--water (including flood control), food, energy and environment--to deal with, as they are vital for sustainability of the peoples of the countries in this region. He expressed his gratitude towards the government and the people of India for providing $10million assistance for the victims of landslides in Chittagong. Ahmed felt that foreign secretary-level meeting should be held on a regular basis for the stocktaking of bilateral relations. On the issue of use of Bangladeshi territory by insurgents and terrorists he said, "Bangladesh, as a matter of principle, does not allow its territory to be used by any force inimical to the interest of India."
Meeting with Khaleda and Hasina
Menon also met former Prime ministers Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina separately who expressed their hope that India will take necessary steps to solve some prevailing issues between the two neighbouring countries to further boost up bilateral relationship. They expressed their hope to visiting Indian Foreign Secretary Shaivshankar Menon that the friendly ties between India and Bangladesh will be strengthened further through the meeting at the foreign secretary level.
Meeting separately, both the leaders elaborately discussed bilateral issues including the Ganges water-sharing accord, security, exchange of information, border terrorism, duty-free access of Bangladeshi goods to India, Chittagong Hill Tracts peace accord and reducing of imbalanced trade deficit. At the meeting, Hasina told Menon that India is a friendly country and the Awami League will extend its cooperation to help develop the bilateral relationship between the two countries. Focusing on different initiatives taken by her government with India, Khaleda expressed her hope that the foreign secretary level meeting between the two countries will continue in future and problems will be solved through meetings and bilateral relationship will be boosted up.
No decision by Bangladesh on Indian Capital Investment
A major disappointment of the visit was the failure of Bangladesh caretaker government to take any decision on the multi-billion dollar investment proposals from two Indian business giants, Mittal and Tata. The Bangladesh side indicated that the present caretaker government wants an elected government to make the decisions over these proposals. Dhaka�s vacillation over these proposals has reportedly not made India too happy.
Conclusion
It is true that some �positive uptrend� has been seen in Indo-Bangladesh relations. Both sides took advantage of improved political relations to discuss long-standing irritants such as demarcating 6.5km borderland, combating cross-border terrorism, greater access for Bangladeshi goods in India and improved road-rail connectivity. India has tried to deal with a major grievance of Bangladesh by allowing unilateral concessions. It plans to reduce duty level to zero and has removed the �non�tariff� barrier so far vociferously criticized by Bangladesh. Some of the major issues however still remain. There was hardly any progress over the issue of use of Bangladesh territory by the Indian insurgent groups. Bangladesh is still in denial mode. It has not taken any major action against them. The interim government has also not taken any decision towards the Indian capital investment in Bangladesh. Bangladesh must realize that it has a limited export basket. Even with the removal of non-tariff barriers and reduction of import duty to zero level, a huge trade gap will exist between India and Bangladesh. This will be so because Bangladesh does not have too many things to export. A change in this situation can be visualized only with the investment of Indian capital, which can expand the export basket of Bangladesh. It will also energize the economy of Bangladesh and improve intra-regional trade in south Asia. One hopes that progress on remaining issues are also made during the regime of present caretaker government, which in any case will be around till the end of 2008. The present caretaker wants an elected government to take decision on these issues. However, given the past track record of politicians of Bangladesh it appears difficult that any elected government in Bangladesh will have courage to act on these fronts. It appears, a beginning has to be made by the present dispensation, only then progress can be expected when elected governments takes charge.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)