India & Japan: Impact Of Relationship On China
by B. Raman
There is an economic and a strategic angle to India's expectations from the current visit of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan, who arrived in Delhi on August 21, to reciprocate the visit paid by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to Japan from December 13 to 16 last year.
2. The economic angle relates to India's expectations of a major role by Japanese investors in developing the infrastructure in India and by the Japanese Government in facilitating the Indian quest for nuclear energy by supporting the relaxation of the present restrictions on civilian nuclear trade with India when the matter comes up before the Nuclear Supplier's Group (NSG)----most probably before the end of the year.
3. Both these issues are of considerable importance to India. Despite the remarkable improvement in its economic performance during the last three years with an average GDP growth rate of seven per cent plus consistently, it will not be able to catch up with the Chinese economy in the near and medium terms unless and until it is able to improve its infrastructure, which is in a pretty bad shape, and ensure the availability of energy.
4. It has been estimated that the improvement of infrastructure will involve an investment of around US dollars 320 billion in the next five years. That kind of money can come only from Japan. The efforts of the Government of India have, therefore, been towards making Japanese investors get interested in the infrastructure improvement projects in a big way. The first positive results are already evident, thanks to the personal interest taken by Mr. Abe. Japan, which had helped India in the past in the construction of the Delhi Metro, is now the main foreign financial backer of the $90bn project to build a Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC). The work on this is expected to start next January and conclude by 2012. During the visit, the two countries are expected to sign an agreement for a dedicated rail freight corridor connecting Delhi, Mumbai (Bombay) and Kolkata (Calcutta), which will significantly reduce the time taken for transporting goods from one city to another.
5.Nearly 475 Japanese companies presently have a presence in India. Of these, nearly one-third reportedly came to India after Mr. Abe took over as the Prime Minister. This indicates the interest taken by his Government in strengthening the long-neglected economic relations with India. In their fascination for the Chinese market and the cheap labour market there, Japanese investors had paid little attention to India. This lack of interest in the Indian economy has now been sought to be corrected by Mr. Abe.
6. Despite this, the bilateral trade continues to be sluggish----- an average of US $ four billion per annum for some years now. As against this, India's bilateral trade with China has been steadily racing towards US $ 30 billion. However, this is largely due to large-scale Chinese imports of raw materials such as iron ore from India. The value of the export of Indian iron ore to China accounts for nearly 60 per cent of India's exports. The value of India's imports from China also includes the value of Japanese electronic goods manufactured by the branches of Japanese companies in China. Thus, while there has been a spectacular rise in India's trade with China, there are special reasons for it, which do not operate in the case of trade with Japan.
7. Even though Japan was strongly opposed to India's military nuclear tests of 1998, it has now got itself reconciled to them. No opposition from Japan is, therefore, expected to the lifting of restrictions on civilian nuclear commerce with India at the NSG meeting, when it takes place.
8.While China does not view with concern the developing economic relations between India and Japan, it has been viewing with increasing concern the growing strategic relations between the two countries in the form of joint exercises by the Coast Guards of the two countries, exchanges of visits by military officials etc. If these relations were growing purely in a bilateral framework, the Chinese concerns might not have been that high. The heightened Chinese concerns are due to the fact that the increasing strategic ties between India and Japan have been taking place in a larger framework involving India, Japan, the US and Australia.
9. This four-power framework started in a low profile in July,2005, after a visit paid by the Indian Prime Minister to Washington DC. The agreement in principle on bilater nuclear co-operation was reached during this visit. Though India and the US have projected this agreement as an act of purely economic significance to help the Indian economy to meet its growing energy demands, China suspects that there is an anti-China backdrop to it. The Chinese suspicion is that this agreement was the US quid pro quo to India agreeing to a quadrilateral strategic co-operation to contain the growing Chinese naval power in the Bay of Bengal/Indian Ocean region.
10. Though India has been denying any such anti-Chinese backdrop, Beijing is not convinced because many Western analysts have been projecting the Indo-US nuclear deal as a quid pro quo and not as a stand alone arrangement.
11. The Chinese prefer to take seriously such analyses coming out of Western scholars and not the assurances of benign intentions coming out of New Delhi. Dr. Manmohan Singh's visit to Japan in December , 2006, caused ill-concealed concern in China, which tended to see an American nudge behind the sustained attempts since 2005 to bring India and Japan closer together. The Chinese did not see it as a natural corollary of India's Look East Policy.Instead, they saw in it the thin edge of the wedge in what they apprehended as an American attempt to contain China.
12. Even before Dr. Singh had embarked on his visit to Japan, his interview to the Japanese daily "Yomiuri Shimbun" (December 5,2006) caught the attention of China's India-Japan watchers ---particularly for two reasons. The first was the subtle differentiation in Dr. Singh's
characterisation of India's relations with Japan on the one side and with China on the other. He characterised India and Japan as "the largest and the most developed democracies in Asia, which share a strong commitment to freedom, the rule of law and respect for human
rights." As against this, he characterised India and China as "the two largest developing countries" of Asia and added: " My own view is that the world is large enough to accommodate the development ambitions of both countries. And, therefore, there is immense scope for us to cooperate with one another."
13.. The second reason was what Dr. Singh had to say about Mr. Abe's reported proposal for a new four-way framework for strategic dialogue involving Japan, India, Australia and the US. He said: " Our bilateral relations (between India and Japan) are rooted in similar
perceptions about the evolving environment in our region..... I wish to use my forthcoming visit to Japan to gain a better understanding about Prime Minister Abe's idea of closer cooperation among major democracies in the region."
14. Many statements during the visit of Dr. Singh to Japan added to the concern of the Chinese. Examples:
"India and Japan are natural partners as the largest and most developed democracies of Asia, with a mutual stake in each other's progress and prosperity. Indeed, a strong, prosperous and dynamic India is in the interest of Japan, and likewise, a strong, prosperous
and dynamic Japan is in the interest of India. They have responsibility for, and are capable of, responding to global and regional challenges, and they must play an active role in the promotion of peace and stability in Asia and world at large. Recognising that Asia is
emerging as the leading growth centre of an increasingly interdependent global economy, the two countries are also keen to pursue a comprehensive economic partnership in the region and nurture sustainable economic growth, social peace and political tolerance in open and cooperative regional frameworks. Given their shared determination to raise bilateral relations to a higher level, the two leaders decide to establish a Strategic and Global Partnership between India and Japan. This will impart stronger political, economic and strategic dimensions to bilateral relations, serve long-term interests of both countries, enhance all-round cooperation and contribute to greater regional peace and stability. The Strategic and Global Partnership will involve closer political and diplomatic coordination on bilateral, regional, multilateral and global issues, comprehensive economic engagement, stronger defence relations, greater technological cooperation as well as working towards a quantum increase in cultural ties, educational linkages and people-to-people contacts. This partnership will enable both countries to harness the vast potential of bilateral relations, drawing upon complementarities and each other's intrinsic strengths, and also work together to address regional and global challenges." (From the joint statement issued at the end of the visit)
"Strong ties between India and Japan will be a major factor in building an open and inclusive Asia and in enhancing peace and stability in the region. Our partnership has the potential to create an arc of advantage and prosperity across Asia, laying the foundation for the creation of an Asian economic community." ( From Dr. Singh's address to the Japanese Parliament on December 14 ) .
" This will be the most important bilateral relationship (for Japan) in the world". (Mr. Abe while inaugurating the India-Japan Friendship Year--2007 on December 15)
15. The Chinese concerns have been further enhanced by the forthcoming joint naval exercise in the beginning of September in the Bay of Bengal involving the Navies of India, the US, Japan, Australia and Singapore. The officials of the participating countries have projected this exercise as having two objectives over which China should not be concerned. The first is humanitarian to faciliate joint operations for disaster relief in the case of naural disasters. The second is joint/co-ordinated operations against non-State actors such as pirates, maritime terrorists and maritime smugglers of weapons of mass destruction material. They have sought to remove any suspicion that this exercise is really directed against a State actor such as China. Despite this, the Chinese suspicion that this exercise is meant to contain the presence and role of its naval power in the region is strong.
16. It is the Chinese anger over the real purpose of this exercise, which should explain the seeming hardening of the Chinese attitude to the expected move in the NSG to remove the restrictions on nuclear trade with India. Shri D.S.Rajan, Director, Chennai Centre For China Studies, has drawn attention to this in his article at http://www.c3sindia.org/strategicissues/122/beijing-hardens-its-stand-on-the-india-us-civil-nuclear-cooperation-agreement/
17. This hardening does not necessarily mean that the Chinese will oppose any concessions to India at the NSG. The Chinese attitude will depend upon to what extent the US is prepared to exercise its powers of persuasion on the Chinese. China is still dependent on the US for access to the US market and for the continued flow of investments. Moreover, next year's Olympics is a highly prestigious event for Beijing. Its success as a spectacle and as an international sports event will depend on the US assistance in organising it and in ensuring its security. Any mishap could mean a loss of face for the Chinese leadership in the eyes of its own people and the international community. This gives a leverage to the US in seeing that the Chinese go along with the consensus in favour of India at the NSG.
Monday, November 5, 2007
INDIA AT SIXTY: STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS
INDIA AT SIXTY: STRATEGIC REFLECTIONS
by Dr Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations
India completed sixty years of independence on August 15, 2007. India at sixty is in a buoyant mood today and more self-assured, fortified by its noticeable economic progress and sustained rates of high growth. This has prompted the global powers to take notice of India as an emerging power and accord more strategic attention as at some stage soon India’s emergent power could start affecting the Asian Power balance and so also the global power balance.
In this process, a significant factor that would come into play is India’s ability to assume ‘great power’ responsibilities and to exploit its power potential and military power to add muscle to its foreign policy objectives. Economic power by itself is only a ‘soft power’ and does not bring recognition as a ‘great power’ or a “Key Global Power”.
India may have arrived at the gates of being a Key Global Power or a great power but its entry into the “elite power club” necessarily depends on the ability and capabilities of India’s political elite to exhibit without any ambiguity that not only India has the attributes of power in abundance but more significantly India’s political elite will now have to have the “WILL TO USE INDIA’S NATIONAL and MILITARY POWER” in a pro-active and forceful manner to achieve India’s national security and foreign policy objectives.
Going by the historical record of the last sixty years, the above is the most worrisome factor that may impede India’s rise to global power status, namely, strategically inept political leadership apologetic about using power.
A pertinent point that requires mention at the introductory stage itself is that the present strategic attention being given to India is in recognition of its emerging power potential. It stands limited to India’s emergence as a “Key Global Player” and not a “Key Global Power”. The US President too has carefully made this distinction.
Also “strategic attention” is distinct from “strategic respect”. The global powers will accord India “strategic respect” only when India’s political leadership demonstrates that India has developed the “WILL THE USE POWER” and would do so unreservedly in the pursuit of its national interests and objectives.
In the last sixty years, India has been subjected to wars in every decade of its post-Independence existence and now witnesses a significant proliferation of proxy wars and terrorism of the Islamist Jihadi variety in all the nooks and corners of India besides other externally aided insurgencies. India’s flanking countries provide the wherewithal for this proxy war against India. India has been and now too being subjected to aggression because in the last sixty years., India’s political dispensations in power have exhibited the propensity to be pacifist or defensive in nature. India’s political leaders have shied away from the use of power despite its size and resources. The resultant effect was that India’s adversaries (despite their strategic asymmetry with India) perceived India as a “Soft State” incapable of strong military responses even when its national security interests were threatened and trampled upon both externally and internally.
India’s political leadership has failed to ignite a strategic mindset both within India’s polity and the nation as a whole. Strategic mindsets can be ignited only on the shoulders of Indian nationalism and patriotism. But then in the last sixty years the disparate Indian polity for narrow political gains from captive minority vote banks has de-valued the exalted concept of Indian nationalism. They seemed to forget that “National Cohesiveness” which is one of the attributes of a ‘great power’ can only come from inclusive policies rather than minority appeasement policies, politically excluding them form mainstream India.
With the aim of “Igniting a Strategic Mindset” in Indians this author wrote a book in 2003 “India’s Defence Policies and Strategic Thought: A Comparative Analysis”. India’s defense policies or lack of polices and strategic shortcomings were critically examined:
Later, in the context of contemporary political and regional developments affecting India’s national security it was considered appropriate to reproduce in abridged form the Concluding Chapter of the above book as it offered “Prescriptions” on issues relating to national security. Please refer to SAAG Paper No. 1118 dated 16-09-2004 “India’s National Security and Defence: Prescriptions”.
Many readers keep sending e-mails asking for further references to this author’s strategic writings. In response to such requests these are listed in Annexure.
In terms of “Strategic Reflections” on “ India at Sixty” this Author would like to offer the following reflections.
India’s Emergence as a Key Global Power: No Global Power Will Assist It.
India as a Key Global Power: The Imperatives of Strategic Autonomy
India’s Future Strategic Choice: “Economic Superpower” or “Key Global Power”
Global and Regional Power Comes With a “National Will to Use Power” and “Use it Hard”
Indian Prime Ministers “Strategic Culture” Deficit, Strategic Naivety and Vulnerability to External Pressures
India’s Strategic Vision: No official “National Strategy Document” Exists
India Needs a Legislated “National Security Act”
India’s Foreign Policy and National Security Issues Need to be Ratified by Parliament.
India’s Nuclear Doctrine Yet to be Finalized.
India’s Emergence as a Key Global Power: No Global Power Will Assist It
In the ongoing debate within the country, India’s more prominent and noted strategic analysts are pro-active in selling the line that India’s emergence as a Key Global Power can only be made possible by assistance from the United States and hence a more intense strategic partnership or commitment to United States global strategic policies is required.
This is factually incorrect as in contemporary world history no global power has ever assisted in the emergence of another global power to share the very limited global powers strategic space. The most instant example being the reluctance of the existing nuclear weapons powers led by the United States and Russia to admit India as a recognized Nuclear Weapons Power.
However, this author would concede one point on this score and that is India cannot emerge as a Key Global Power in confrontation or opposition to the United States. It can but the road will be very stretched out and ardous.
The United States has assisted Germany and Japan to emerge as global economic superpowers but stopped short of assisting them to emerge as key global military powers, which would permit them to emerge as contenders for global supremacy. Even Britain with strategic nuclear assets is a B-League player in the United States led global Western alliance along with Germany and Japan.
The above mentioned countries do not enjoy the national attributes of power in abundance as India does and therefore are content to be B-League global powers. Is India and especially “India Unbound” now willing to be a B-League global player?
India’s public aspirations today as popularly reflected are focused on India’s emergence as a Key Global Power in its own right with its strategic directions not subordinated to global strategies of other Key Global Powers whether it be the United States or Russia.
It is imperative that India’s policy establishment and its strategic community recognize this dictum because then only India’s future strategic directions and options would emerge clearly.
More addedly, the other truth that should dawn on India’s policy establishment is that India should not be content with just being a “Key Global Player” with a B-League status. India’s strategic ambitions should be to emerge as a “Key Global Power” in the “Top Quartet of Powers” and its national energies so harnessed.
If these two realities are not recognized then India stands the chance of being by-passed by the greatness attendant on a “Key Global Power”.
India as a Key Global Power: The Imperatives of Strategic Autonomy
“Strategic Autonomy” of India should not be mis-construed as “Non-alignment” in the pursuance of strategic and foreign policy choices. Autonomy here connotes that (1) India’s strategic and foreign policy directions are solely determined by India’s own national security interests (2) India’s policy establishment is not strait-jacketed in taking its cues in terms of responses to crisis situations from foreign capitals (3) India’s strategic decisions are so taken as those which enhance and reinforce her standing as a regional power and a Key Global Power (4) India’s strategic decisions are such that they reflect the dignity and majesty of a truly great power.
The above may sound as a tall order or flowery rhetoric. But it is not so when one studies the history of the emergence of great powers.
To illustrate from the current context as to what “strategic autonomy” entails, one needs to point out the on going controversy of the US-India Nuclear Deal or the 123 Agreement. By itself the US-India Nuclear Deal was strategically beneficial to both countries, but it has run into turbulent rough weather in India, because of a widespread perception in India that the Congress Government has allowed India’s “strategy autonomy” to be subjugated to US domestic laws through the US imposition of the Hyde Act straitjacket.
Similarly, the Congress Government overdrive for peace with Pakistan at any cost and that too with a military dictator intent on trampling the restoration of democracy in Pakistan is widely perceived in India as dancing to the tunes of an externally scripted agenda from Washington.
Further amplifying the above, India in the context of “strategic autonomous” nation would have entailed the Congress Government to maintain in July 2005 when the Nuclear Deal was signed that it would not accept at any stage the imposition of US domestic laws on the Deal.
Similarly, on relations with Pakistan and the peace process, the Congress Government should not have allowed the pace, nature and content of the process to be dictated by external actors. The Congress Government should have summarily dismissed those who have been maintaining that “India cannot emerge as a great power unless the Kashmir issue is settled and relations with Pakistan normalized”.
India has emerged as a global economic power despite Kashmir and despite Pakistan’s military regime’s peace-disruptive policies. It can emerge as Key Global Power also despite Kashmir and military rulers of Pakistan.
The above were only the major illustrations on how India’s “strategic autonomy” stood compromised.
Since it already stands maintained that neither the United States, nor Russia nor China can actively assist India’s emergence as a Key Global Power, there is no justification for India to lose its strategic autonomy to anyone of them.
Rising to the summits as mountaineers know means trudging a lonely furrow where the mountaineers own grit and determination comes into autonomous play. The same applies to nations aspiring to reach to the pinnacles of power.
India’s Future Strategic Choice: “Economic Superpower” or Key Global Power”
The keys to emerge as a “Key Global Power” lie in India’s strong economy, growing foreign exchange reserves and sustained rates of high economic growth well into the future. This is undeniable. But what also is undeniable is that India could end up as an “economic superpower” like Germany and Japan and yet miss the bus to emerge as a “Key Global Power” if it does not make the correct strategic choices.
China provides a good example of how both objectives of being an “economic superpower” and attaining a “Key Global Power” status have been pursued in parallel to China’s strategic advantage. India should do like wise.
Economic power, however colossal, is only a “soft power” strength. It lacks the coercive strength of “hard power” which is the sum total of a states military hard power and so also soft power. Economic power is persuasive power and lacks the dissuasion or compellance coercive power that hard power provides.
India in its ascendant trajectory towards “Key Global Power” status requires hard power to be respected if not feared.
Global Power Comes With a “National Will to Use Power” and “Use it Hard”
It stands pointed in this Author’s book referred above that historically India’s majority population was not devoid of martial traits or the will to use power. The disconnect with this reality and India’s present soft approaches to power arose from its independence struggle when pacifism and non-violence were given over-riding preference and priority. India’s post- Independence political leadership nurtured in this pacifism fought shy of using power even to protect India’s national security interests when trampled upon by nations severely asymmetric in size and strength.
The most recent example of India’s reluctance and the “Will to Use Power” is reflected in its counter-terrorism policies.
It is further reflected in India’s pathetic approaches to ensure political stability and order in South Asia where her national interests should reign supreme as a regional power.
A “National Will to Use Power” and “Use it Hard” has to emerge and be demonstrated by India’s political leadership from whichever political dispensation is in power, All of them have failed India on this count as the examples given below would illustrate.
India’s Prime Ministers’ “Strategic Culture” Deficit, Strategic Naivety and Vulnerability to External Pressures
The focus on strategic culture in India or lack of it emerged in the 1990’s when George Tanham in a study commissioned by the US Administration came up with conclusions as to how India and particularly its political leadership were deficit of strategic culture.
Thereafter academics in USA and UK especially have pored extensively on the geographical, historical and societal factors that impeded India in forging a distinctive strategic culture.
Many definitions of strategic culture exist as academics have sought to understand what shapes the political elites in Asian countries in their approaches to matters strategic. This paper is not intended to be a research paper and hence would attempt to highlight the various aspects in more layman terms.
In the Indian context, this Author would like to put understanding of India’s strategic culture in the following framework: (1) Indian political elites, its policy establishment and its strategic community’s comprehension of issues strategic and their intellect and capability to formulate effective national security strategies and defense policies (2) The capability of such elites to perceptively comprehend and respond to threats to India, anticipating emerging threats and even discerning “threats in the making” (3) The perceptive capabilities of such elites to read the minds of India’s adversaries, the strategic cultures of their opposing adversaries and providing an accurate or near accurate political component of India’s threat assessments to the Indian Armed Forces.
When the above parameters are applied to judge India’s Prime Ministers, they fail miserably both in reading their adversaries minds and their strategic cultures and as to how and what drives their moves against India at a given moment in time.
A recent illustration of this is the flawed approaches of India’s Congress Prime Minister are his dealings with Pakistan’s military dictator General Musharraf. The Indian Prime Minister went to the extent of publicly stating that he “could trust Musharraf” and that “he could do business with him.” This is a regrettable display of “strategic culture deficit”.
The strategic naivety of Indian Prime Ministers over the last 60 years can be discerned from the strategic blunders that they committed, namely (1) Nehru gifted away Tibet to China and stopped the Indian Army’s in its tracks near Uri when within a week or more, they would have captured the whole of Jammu & Kashmir (2) Nehru’s implicit trust of China over the Boundary Dispute leading to the 1962 debacle (3) Shastri’s agreeing at Tashkent to return the Haji Pir Bulge and Kargil Heights captured from Pakistan in 1965 (4) Indira Gandhi’s return of 90,000 Pakistani officers and Other Ranks of the Pakistani Army captured in Bangladesh without extracting a written pledge from Bhutto in the Simla Agreement on conversion of the LOC into an international boundary (5) Narasimha Rao’s scaling down of the Indian Army’s forward military presence in Arunachal Pradesh on economic grounds (6) Rajiv Gandhi’s ambiguous postures on India’s military intervention in Sri Lanka (7) Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s ordering a three-day lull at the height of Kargil operations when Indian Army was on a roll towards the Pakistani territory (8) Dr. Manmohan Singh’s virtual sell-out of the Siachen Region to Pakistan in 2006. He was stopped in the tracks by widespread public outrage.
In terms of Indian Prime Ministers vulnerabilities to external pressure the demonstrated record is equally poor. Brief illustrations of this can be mentioned as follows (1) Nehru’s Cease Fire in Kashmir in 1948 and referring the Kashmir issue to the United Nations under British pressure (2) Shastri’s caving in to Soviet pressures at Tashkent in 1965 to return captured territory to Pakistan after India’s military victories (3) Indira Gandhi’s halting the planned offensive against West Pakistan in December 1971 (after liberation of Bangladesh) under United States pressures (4) Vajpayee’s stopping Indian Army from crossing the LAC during the Kargil War and not carrying through to its logical end OP PRAKARM under US pressures. (5) Dr. Manmohan Singh's flawed peace approaches to Pakistan under US pressure which wanted to perpetuate the military dictator’s regime in Pakistan.
All of the foregoing presents a pitiable picture of Indian Prime Ministers. Their strategic failings arise from their not being equipped strategically to deal with matters of strategic importance for India’s national security. The same applies to their policy advisers.
A recent trend is the proliferation of armchair strategists who believe that their exposures to international relations and political science in universities or sponsored short stints in US think-tanks equip them to pontificate on matters strategic.
If India is ever held back from its destined run to emerge as a “Key Global Power”, the blame can squarely be laid on its Prime Ministers, the Indian policy establishment and the bureaucracy for their lack of strategic vision and grasp of international power politics.
India’s Strategic Vision: No Official “National Security Strategy” Document Exists
In the United States the strategic vision of the United States is encapsulated in an official White House Document known as the “National Security Strategy” Document. It is personally signed by the US President and lays down the “National Objectives” and the “National Security Strategy” to achieve the defined objectives.
This document is an important document for it provides the directives, the parameters and the national security priorities of the objectives in a declaratory and un-ambiguous manner. It provides the blueprint from where the entire United States defense planning takes off and gets further amplified through a number of other supporting defense planning documents. The whole process stands illustrated in this Author’s book referred above.
In India no such “National Security Strategy” Document exists even till today. The only conclusions that emerge can be surmised for this are as follows (1) India’s political leadership has yet to conceptualize a blueprint of India’s strategic future (2) India’s political leadership shirks from articulating a national security strategy for fear of being held accountable for wrong directions (the 1962 debacle) (3) India’s political leadership has no time for India’s strategic affairs busy as they are with political chicanery (4) Strategy articulation for counter-terrorism for example may entail hard decisions which could jeopardize political parties’ vote banks.
The end result is that in the absence of such political directives, the Indian Armed Forces have to prepare their operational plans, force-structures and strategic perspectives in the absence of the political component of the national threat assessment which should have been provided by the political leadership of the day.
India Needs a Legislated “National Security Act”
As early as 2000, this author had reviewed this imperative in SAAG Paper No. 123 dated 17.05.2000 entitled “India’s National Security Council – A Critical Review” and further reproduced as Appendix A in the Book referred.
A few excerpts from the “Concluding Observations” of this paper need repetition to add context to what is being advocated and these are:
India’s National Security Council (NSC) as currently structured and constituted reflects all the traditional shortcomings of the last 50 years (now 60 years) which have been repeated both in this paper and elsewhere ad-nauseum.”
“…highlight that ‘ad-holism’ and centralization of all security decision-making in the hands of civil bureaucrats and more specifically in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) ill-serve India’s national security decision making processes.”
“India’s NSC needs to be constituted and structured in a manner which facilitates serious deliberations of strategic threats and problems in an independent and objective manner on a whole time basis.”
“Lastly, the historical background of our national security processes in the last 50 years mandate that NSC should be legislatively institutionalized as a constitutional body so that there is a continuum in national security decisions.”
“National Security Directives should bear the signature of the incumbent Prime Minister so that accountability is assured.”
Regrettably, the National Security Council which was brought into existence by the BJP Government after half a century of opposition by vested interests stands withered and politically devalued under the present Congress Government. It exists in name and notional form only staffed by those who are close to the Government in power.
Nothing highlights the above more than the present Prime Minister constituting a number of Strategic Task Forces within the PMO to address subjects which should rightly have been addressed by the NSC.
The Indian Armed Forces hierarchy constitutionally tasked to defend India against external and internal security threats and maintain her sovereignty and integrity are singularly absent from the loop of India’s strategic decision making.
The net result in the last 60 years that not only India’s foreign policy stands personalized in the person of the Prime Minister (a Nehruvian legacy) but in the last few years India’s strategic decision making also stands personalized in the person of the Prime Minister and the bureaucrats of the Prime Minister’s Office.
India’s Foreign Policy and National Security Issues Need to be Ratified by Parliament
This author over the years has been advocating that major issues and agreements with foreign countries on foreign policy and national security issues should be reviewed and ratified by India’s Parliament.
This advocacy arises not only from the shortcomings pointed out in the preceding discussion but also India’s political history of the last 60 years. It has now come to a head and more focus in 2007 on the issue of the US-India Nuclear Deal.
The Congress Prime Minister and his policy establishment deliberately wrapped the negotiating process in a veil of secrecy and froze the text of the finalized Agreement for a week or two. It added more fuel to the fire when it started maintaining that as per the Constitution, the Government was not obliged to go back to the Parliament for ratification of external agreements arrived at by the Executive.
This is only correct in a narrow technical context. Recently three retired Supreme Court judges, and being constitutional experts, have highlighted certain clauses of India’s Constitution which oblige the Government of the day to get ratification from the Parliament.
Even if it were not so, the other argument that comes to the fore is in an era of coalition Governments cobbled together by pooling in numbers of disparate so called secularist parties with no foreign policy moorings or strategic perspectives, foreign policy and national security formulations or issues having a bearing on them, should be ratified by the Parliament.
India’s national security cannot be allowed to become the unguarded preserve of any particular political party which may be enjoying a single digit lead over the other leading political party minus the opportunistic components of the coalitions.
In the pursuit of India’s ambitions to achieve a “Key Global Power” status “National Cohesion” is an important attribute. This attributes’ reflection would come into focus when India’s foreign policy and national security and strategic formulations are arrived through a process of bi-partisan political support and consensus.
India’s Nuclear Security Doctrine Yet to Be Finalized
This has deliberately been listed as the last strategic reflection as it exemplifies the sum total of all the strategic failings of India’s political leadership examined above.
The ‘Draft Nuclear Doctrine’ was unveiled by the then BJP Government’s National Security Adviser, Brajesh Mishra on August 17, 1999, and was released for public debate. The aim of releasing it to public domain seemed to have been to generate more opinion on India’s Nuclear Doctrine before finalizing it.
The BJP Government was in power till April 2004 and thereafter the Congress Government has been in power. In a span of eight years, neither Government of different political dispensations has sought fit to finalize this document due to a strange mix of circumstances which can be said to reflect the shortcomings being repeated, namely (1) Finalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine would need some hard strategic decisions (2) Vulnerability to external pressures on the Government of the day on crucial aspects of India’s nuclear deterrence policies (3) Finalization of Doctrine conveniently tucked away in favor of more politically attractive domestic issues (4) Strategic issues not on the priority lists of political parties agenda.
India’s ascendancy towards “Key Global Power” status cannot progress if India’s political leadership continues to demonstrate the above shortcomings on strategic issues.
India as a “Key Global Power” has to have a “Credible Nuclear Deterrence Doctrine”. A finalized Nuclear Doctrine should reflect India’s firm resolve in the strategizing of her Nuclear Warfare strategy. India’s Nuclear Deterrence becomes “Credible” only when its adversaries primarily, and others too recognize in the Nuclear Doctrine formulations that India is firm in the use of its strategic nuclear assets when others cross the ‘red lines’ de-lineated by it in terms of her vital national security interests. India’s Nuclear Doctrine should be devoid of ambiguities and any apologetic formulations or statements.
It is rather strange that India’s community of noted strategic experts have not been vociferous in demanding the finalization of the Draft Nuclear Doctrine document which continues as a “Draft” for the last eight years. It seems that the ‘Draft’ has become a ‘Drift’.
The Nuclear Doctrine in a finalized form would be the blueprint on which India’s Armed Forces have to operationalize India’s responses to or for nuclear warfare, if an eventuality so arises. Based on it the entire “Command, Control and Communications” and Nuclear Targeting has to be planned. Can successive Indian Governments be allowed to get away with such political lethargy?
Concluding Observations
India’s political leadership should not be misled into the belief that the international fawning that is being bestowed on India is a recognition of India having acquired a “Key Global Power” status. The present international fawning on India strategically is only in recognition of its emerging power potential. It is limited only and limits India emergence to a “Key Global Player”. President Bush’s assertion some time back of US assistance was only to assist India to become a “Key Global Player”. That is a far cry from “Key Global Power”.
The above arises from two factors: (1) As mentioned earlier on in the paper, no global power will assist the emergence of another global power for strategic reasons, and (2) India’s political leadership in the last 60 years has not demonstrated the essential and vital ingredient of a Great Power or a Regional Power and that is the “WILL TO USE POWER” to secure its national security interests and to ensure that its strategic sensitivities are respected at least in its neighborhood.
The most striking strategic reflection that this Author wishes to make while reflecting on the strategic record of “India at Sixty” is that a complete structural transformation of India’s strategic set-up, its institutional mechanisms and strategy formulation processes is called for.
India’s political leadership in the last sixty years was content with grudging add-ons to the strategic set-up left behind by the British. It is ill-equipped and ill-structured to meet head on the challenging strategic environment of today.
Lastly, a more somber reflection needs to be added. Who will liberate the mindsets of India’s political leaders from their various inconsequential political “ISMS” namely secularism, minorityism, socialism and casteism and equip themselves with the strategic fibre, the strategic vision and the strategic “WILL TO USE POWER” to lead India to “KEY GLOBAL POWER” status?
by Dr Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations
India completed sixty years of independence on August 15, 2007. India at sixty is in a buoyant mood today and more self-assured, fortified by its noticeable economic progress and sustained rates of high growth. This has prompted the global powers to take notice of India as an emerging power and accord more strategic attention as at some stage soon India’s emergent power could start affecting the Asian Power balance and so also the global power balance.
In this process, a significant factor that would come into play is India’s ability to assume ‘great power’ responsibilities and to exploit its power potential and military power to add muscle to its foreign policy objectives. Economic power by itself is only a ‘soft power’ and does not bring recognition as a ‘great power’ or a “Key Global Power”.
India may have arrived at the gates of being a Key Global Power or a great power but its entry into the “elite power club” necessarily depends on the ability and capabilities of India’s political elite to exhibit without any ambiguity that not only India has the attributes of power in abundance but more significantly India’s political elite will now have to have the “WILL TO USE INDIA’S NATIONAL and MILITARY POWER” in a pro-active and forceful manner to achieve India’s national security and foreign policy objectives.
Going by the historical record of the last sixty years, the above is the most worrisome factor that may impede India’s rise to global power status, namely, strategically inept political leadership apologetic about using power.
A pertinent point that requires mention at the introductory stage itself is that the present strategic attention being given to India is in recognition of its emerging power potential. It stands limited to India’s emergence as a “Key Global Player” and not a “Key Global Power”. The US President too has carefully made this distinction.
Also “strategic attention” is distinct from “strategic respect”. The global powers will accord India “strategic respect” only when India’s political leadership demonstrates that India has developed the “WILL THE USE POWER” and would do so unreservedly in the pursuit of its national interests and objectives.
In the last sixty years, India has been subjected to wars in every decade of its post-Independence existence and now witnesses a significant proliferation of proxy wars and terrorism of the Islamist Jihadi variety in all the nooks and corners of India besides other externally aided insurgencies. India’s flanking countries provide the wherewithal for this proxy war against India. India has been and now too being subjected to aggression because in the last sixty years., India’s political dispensations in power have exhibited the propensity to be pacifist or defensive in nature. India’s political leaders have shied away from the use of power despite its size and resources. The resultant effect was that India’s adversaries (despite their strategic asymmetry with India) perceived India as a “Soft State” incapable of strong military responses even when its national security interests were threatened and trampled upon both externally and internally.
India’s political leadership has failed to ignite a strategic mindset both within India’s polity and the nation as a whole. Strategic mindsets can be ignited only on the shoulders of Indian nationalism and patriotism. But then in the last sixty years the disparate Indian polity for narrow political gains from captive minority vote banks has de-valued the exalted concept of Indian nationalism. They seemed to forget that “National Cohesiveness” which is one of the attributes of a ‘great power’ can only come from inclusive policies rather than minority appeasement policies, politically excluding them form mainstream India.
With the aim of “Igniting a Strategic Mindset” in Indians this author wrote a book in 2003 “India’s Defence Policies and Strategic Thought: A Comparative Analysis”. India’s defense policies or lack of polices and strategic shortcomings were critically examined:
Later, in the context of contemporary political and regional developments affecting India’s national security it was considered appropriate to reproduce in abridged form the Concluding Chapter of the above book as it offered “Prescriptions” on issues relating to national security. Please refer to SAAG Paper No. 1118 dated 16-09-2004 “India’s National Security and Defence: Prescriptions”.
Many readers keep sending e-mails asking for further references to this author’s strategic writings. In response to such requests these are listed in Annexure.
In terms of “Strategic Reflections” on “ India at Sixty” this Author would like to offer the following reflections.
India’s Emergence as a Key Global Power: No Global Power Will Assist It.
India as a Key Global Power: The Imperatives of Strategic Autonomy
India’s Future Strategic Choice: “Economic Superpower” or “Key Global Power”
Global and Regional Power Comes With a “National Will to Use Power” and “Use it Hard”
Indian Prime Ministers “Strategic Culture” Deficit, Strategic Naivety and Vulnerability to External Pressures
India’s Strategic Vision: No official “National Strategy Document” Exists
India Needs a Legislated “National Security Act”
India’s Foreign Policy and National Security Issues Need to be Ratified by Parliament.
India’s Nuclear Doctrine Yet to be Finalized.
India’s Emergence as a Key Global Power: No Global Power Will Assist It
In the ongoing debate within the country, India’s more prominent and noted strategic analysts are pro-active in selling the line that India’s emergence as a Key Global Power can only be made possible by assistance from the United States and hence a more intense strategic partnership or commitment to United States global strategic policies is required.
This is factually incorrect as in contemporary world history no global power has ever assisted in the emergence of another global power to share the very limited global powers strategic space. The most instant example being the reluctance of the existing nuclear weapons powers led by the United States and Russia to admit India as a recognized Nuclear Weapons Power.
However, this author would concede one point on this score and that is India cannot emerge as a Key Global Power in confrontation or opposition to the United States. It can but the road will be very stretched out and ardous.
The United States has assisted Germany and Japan to emerge as global economic superpowers but stopped short of assisting them to emerge as key global military powers, which would permit them to emerge as contenders for global supremacy. Even Britain with strategic nuclear assets is a B-League player in the United States led global Western alliance along with Germany and Japan.
The above mentioned countries do not enjoy the national attributes of power in abundance as India does and therefore are content to be B-League global powers. Is India and especially “India Unbound” now willing to be a B-League global player?
India’s public aspirations today as popularly reflected are focused on India’s emergence as a Key Global Power in its own right with its strategic directions not subordinated to global strategies of other Key Global Powers whether it be the United States or Russia.
It is imperative that India’s policy establishment and its strategic community recognize this dictum because then only India’s future strategic directions and options would emerge clearly.
More addedly, the other truth that should dawn on India’s policy establishment is that India should not be content with just being a “Key Global Player” with a B-League status. India’s strategic ambitions should be to emerge as a “Key Global Power” in the “Top Quartet of Powers” and its national energies so harnessed.
If these two realities are not recognized then India stands the chance of being by-passed by the greatness attendant on a “Key Global Power”.
India as a Key Global Power: The Imperatives of Strategic Autonomy
“Strategic Autonomy” of India should not be mis-construed as “Non-alignment” in the pursuance of strategic and foreign policy choices. Autonomy here connotes that (1) India’s strategic and foreign policy directions are solely determined by India’s own national security interests (2) India’s policy establishment is not strait-jacketed in taking its cues in terms of responses to crisis situations from foreign capitals (3) India’s strategic decisions are so taken as those which enhance and reinforce her standing as a regional power and a Key Global Power (4) India’s strategic decisions are such that they reflect the dignity and majesty of a truly great power.
The above may sound as a tall order or flowery rhetoric. But it is not so when one studies the history of the emergence of great powers.
To illustrate from the current context as to what “strategic autonomy” entails, one needs to point out the on going controversy of the US-India Nuclear Deal or the 123 Agreement. By itself the US-India Nuclear Deal was strategically beneficial to both countries, but it has run into turbulent rough weather in India, because of a widespread perception in India that the Congress Government has allowed India’s “strategy autonomy” to be subjugated to US domestic laws through the US imposition of the Hyde Act straitjacket.
Similarly, the Congress Government overdrive for peace with Pakistan at any cost and that too with a military dictator intent on trampling the restoration of democracy in Pakistan is widely perceived in India as dancing to the tunes of an externally scripted agenda from Washington.
Further amplifying the above, India in the context of “strategic autonomous” nation would have entailed the Congress Government to maintain in July 2005 when the Nuclear Deal was signed that it would not accept at any stage the imposition of US domestic laws on the Deal.
Similarly, on relations with Pakistan and the peace process, the Congress Government should not have allowed the pace, nature and content of the process to be dictated by external actors. The Congress Government should have summarily dismissed those who have been maintaining that “India cannot emerge as a great power unless the Kashmir issue is settled and relations with Pakistan normalized”.
India has emerged as a global economic power despite Kashmir and despite Pakistan’s military regime’s peace-disruptive policies. It can emerge as Key Global Power also despite Kashmir and military rulers of Pakistan.
The above were only the major illustrations on how India’s “strategic autonomy” stood compromised.
Since it already stands maintained that neither the United States, nor Russia nor China can actively assist India’s emergence as a Key Global Power, there is no justification for India to lose its strategic autonomy to anyone of them.
Rising to the summits as mountaineers know means trudging a lonely furrow where the mountaineers own grit and determination comes into autonomous play. The same applies to nations aspiring to reach to the pinnacles of power.
India’s Future Strategic Choice: “Economic Superpower” or Key Global Power”
The keys to emerge as a “Key Global Power” lie in India’s strong economy, growing foreign exchange reserves and sustained rates of high economic growth well into the future. This is undeniable. But what also is undeniable is that India could end up as an “economic superpower” like Germany and Japan and yet miss the bus to emerge as a “Key Global Power” if it does not make the correct strategic choices.
China provides a good example of how both objectives of being an “economic superpower” and attaining a “Key Global Power” status have been pursued in parallel to China’s strategic advantage. India should do like wise.
Economic power, however colossal, is only a “soft power” strength. It lacks the coercive strength of “hard power” which is the sum total of a states military hard power and so also soft power. Economic power is persuasive power and lacks the dissuasion or compellance coercive power that hard power provides.
India in its ascendant trajectory towards “Key Global Power” status requires hard power to be respected if not feared.
Global Power Comes With a “National Will to Use Power” and “Use it Hard”
It stands pointed in this Author’s book referred above that historically India’s majority population was not devoid of martial traits or the will to use power. The disconnect with this reality and India’s present soft approaches to power arose from its independence struggle when pacifism and non-violence were given over-riding preference and priority. India’s post- Independence political leadership nurtured in this pacifism fought shy of using power even to protect India’s national security interests when trampled upon by nations severely asymmetric in size and strength.
The most recent example of India’s reluctance and the “Will to Use Power” is reflected in its counter-terrorism policies.
It is further reflected in India’s pathetic approaches to ensure political stability and order in South Asia where her national interests should reign supreme as a regional power.
A “National Will to Use Power” and “Use it Hard” has to emerge and be demonstrated by India’s political leadership from whichever political dispensation is in power, All of them have failed India on this count as the examples given below would illustrate.
India’s Prime Ministers’ “Strategic Culture” Deficit, Strategic Naivety and Vulnerability to External Pressures
The focus on strategic culture in India or lack of it emerged in the 1990’s when George Tanham in a study commissioned by the US Administration came up with conclusions as to how India and particularly its political leadership were deficit of strategic culture.
Thereafter academics in USA and UK especially have pored extensively on the geographical, historical and societal factors that impeded India in forging a distinctive strategic culture.
Many definitions of strategic culture exist as academics have sought to understand what shapes the political elites in Asian countries in their approaches to matters strategic. This paper is not intended to be a research paper and hence would attempt to highlight the various aspects in more layman terms.
In the Indian context, this Author would like to put understanding of India’s strategic culture in the following framework: (1) Indian political elites, its policy establishment and its strategic community’s comprehension of issues strategic and their intellect and capability to formulate effective national security strategies and defense policies (2) The capability of such elites to perceptively comprehend and respond to threats to India, anticipating emerging threats and even discerning “threats in the making” (3) The perceptive capabilities of such elites to read the minds of India’s adversaries, the strategic cultures of their opposing adversaries and providing an accurate or near accurate political component of India’s threat assessments to the Indian Armed Forces.
When the above parameters are applied to judge India’s Prime Ministers, they fail miserably both in reading their adversaries minds and their strategic cultures and as to how and what drives their moves against India at a given moment in time.
A recent illustration of this is the flawed approaches of India’s Congress Prime Minister are his dealings with Pakistan’s military dictator General Musharraf. The Indian Prime Minister went to the extent of publicly stating that he “could trust Musharraf” and that “he could do business with him.” This is a regrettable display of “strategic culture deficit”.
The strategic naivety of Indian Prime Ministers over the last 60 years can be discerned from the strategic blunders that they committed, namely (1) Nehru gifted away Tibet to China and stopped the Indian Army’s in its tracks near Uri when within a week or more, they would have captured the whole of Jammu & Kashmir (2) Nehru’s implicit trust of China over the Boundary Dispute leading to the 1962 debacle (3) Shastri’s agreeing at Tashkent to return the Haji Pir Bulge and Kargil Heights captured from Pakistan in 1965 (4) Indira Gandhi’s return of 90,000 Pakistani officers and Other Ranks of the Pakistani Army captured in Bangladesh without extracting a written pledge from Bhutto in the Simla Agreement on conversion of the LOC into an international boundary (5) Narasimha Rao’s scaling down of the Indian Army’s forward military presence in Arunachal Pradesh on economic grounds (6) Rajiv Gandhi’s ambiguous postures on India’s military intervention in Sri Lanka (7) Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s ordering a three-day lull at the height of Kargil operations when Indian Army was on a roll towards the Pakistani territory (8) Dr. Manmohan Singh’s virtual sell-out of the Siachen Region to Pakistan in 2006. He was stopped in the tracks by widespread public outrage.
In terms of Indian Prime Ministers vulnerabilities to external pressure the demonstrated record is equally poor. Brief illustrations of this can be mentioned as follows (1) Nehru’s Cease Fire in Kashmir in 1948 and referring the Kashmir issue to the United Nations under British pressure (2) Shastri’s caving in to Soviet pressures at Tashkent in 1965 to return captured territory to Pakistan after India’s military victories (3) Indira Gandhi’s halting the planned offensive against West Pakistan in December 1971 (after liberation of Bangladesh) under United States pressures (4) Vajpayee’s stopping Indian Army from crossing the LAC during the Kargil War and not carrying through to its logical end OP PRAKARM under US pressures. (5) Dr. Manmohan Singh's flawed peace approaches to Pakistan under US pressure which wanted to perpetuate the military dictator’s regime in Pakistan.
All of the foregoing presents a pitiable picture of Indian Prime Ministers. Their strategic failings arise from their not being equipped strategically to deal with matters of strategic importance for India’s national security. The same applies to their policy advisers.
A recent trend is the proliferation of armchair strategists who believe that their exposures to international relations and political science in universities or sponsored short stints in US think-tanks equip them to pontificate on matters strategic.
If India is ever held back from its destined run to emerge as a “Key Global Power”, the blame can squarely be laid on its Prime Ministers, the Indian policy establishment and the bureaucracy for their lack of strategic vision and grasp of international power politics.
India’s Strategic Vision: No Official “National Security Strategy” Document Exists
In the United States the strategic vision of the United States is encapsulated in an official White House Document known as the “National Security Strategy” Document. It is personally signed by the US President and lays down the “National Objectives” and the “National Security Strategy” to achieve the defined objectives.
This document is an important document for it provides the directives, the parameters and the national security priorities of the objectives in a declaratory and un-ambiguous manner. It provides the blueprint from where the entire United States defense planning takes off and gets further amplified through a number of other supporting defense planning documents. The whole process stands illustrated in this Author’s book referred above.
In India no such “National Security Strategy” Document exists even till today. The only conclusions that emerge can be surmised for this are as follows (1) India’s political leadership has yet to conceptualize a blueprint of India’s strategic future (2) India’s political leadership shirks from articulating a national security strategy for fear of being held accountable for wrong directions (the 1962 debacle) (3) India’s political leadership has no time for India’s strategic affairs busy as they are with political chicanery (4) Strategy articulation for counter-terrorism for example may entail hard decisions which could jeopardize political parties’ vote banks.
The end result is that in the absence of such political directives, the Indian Armed Forces have to prepare their operational plans, force-structures and strategic perspectives in the absence of the political component of the national threat assessment which should have been provided by the political leadership of the day.
India Needs a Legislated “National Security Act”
As early as 2000, this author had reviewed this imperative in SAAG Paper No. 123 dated 17.05.2000 entitled “India’s National Security Council – A Critical Review” and further reproduced as Appendix A in the Book referred.
A few excerpts from the “Concluding Observations” of this paper need repetition to add context to what is being advocated and these are:
India’s National Security Council (NSC) as currently structured and constituted reflects all the traditional shortcomings of the last 50 years (now 60 years) which have been repeated both in this paper and elsewhere ad-nauseum.”
“…highlight that ‘ad-holism’ and centralization of all security decision-making in the hands of civil bureaucrats and more specifically in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) ill-serve India’s national security decision making processes.”
“India’s NSC needs to be constituted and structured in a manner which facilitates serious deliberations of strategic threats and problems in an independent and objective manner on a whole time basis.”
“Lastly, the historical background of our national security processes in the last 50 years mandate that NSC should be legislatively institutionalized as a constitutional body so that there is a continuum in national security decisions.”
“National Security Directives should bear the signature of the incumbent Prime Minister so that accountability is assured.”
Regrettably, the National Security Council which was brought into existence by the BJP Government after half a century of opposition by vested interests stands withered and politically devalued under the present Congress Government. It exists in name and notional form only staffed by those who are close to the Government in power.
Nothing highlights the above more than the present Prime Minister constituting a number of Strategic Task Forces within the PMO to address subjects which should rightly have been addressed by the NSC.
The Indian Armed Forces hierarchy constitutionally tasked to defend India against external and internal security threats and maintain her sovereignty and integrity are singularly absent from the loop of India’s strategic decision making.
The net result in the last 60 years that not only India’s foreign policy stands personalized in the person of the Prime Minister (a Nehruvian legacy) but in the last few years India’s strategic decision making also stands personalized in the person of the Prime Minister and the bureaucrats of the Prime Minister’s Office.
India’s Foreign Policy and National Security Issues Need to be Ratified by Parliament
This author over the years has been advocating that major issues and agreements with foreign countries on foreign policy and national security issues should be reviewed and ratified by India’s Parliament.
This advocacy arises not only from the shortcomings pointed out in the preceding discussion but also India’s political history of the last 60 years. It has now come to a head and more focus in 2007 on the issue of the US-India Nuclear Deal.
The Congress Prime Minister and his policy establishment deliberately wrapped the negotiating process in a veil of secrecy and froze the text of the finalized Agreement for a week or two. It added more fuel to the fire when it started maintaining that as per the Constitution, the Government was not obliged to go back to the Parliament for ratification of external agreements arrived at by the Executive.
This is only correct in a narrow technical context. Recently three retired Supreme Court judges, and being constitutional experts, have highlighted certain clauses of India’s Constitution which oblige the Government of the day to get ratification from the Parliament.
Even if it were not so, the other argument that comes to the fore is in an era of coalition Governments cobbled together by pooling in numbers of disparate so called secularist parties with no foreign policy moorings or strategic perspectives, foreign policy and national security formulations or issues having a bearing on them, should be ratified by the Parliament.
India’s national security cannot be allowed to become the unguarded preserve of any particular political party which may be enjoying a single digit lead over the other leading political party minus the opportunistic components of the coalitions.
In the pursuit of India’s ambitions to achieve a “Key Global Power” status “National Cohesion” is an important attribute. This attributes’ reflection would come into focus when India’s foreign policy and national security and strategic formulations are arrived through a process of bi-partisan political support and consensus.
India’s Nuclear Security Doctrine Yet to Be Finalized
This has deliberately been listed as the last strategic reflection as it exemplifies the sum total of all the strategic failings of India’s political leadership examined above.
The ‘Draft Nuclear Doctrine’ was unveiled by the then BJP Government’s National Security Adviser, Brajesh Mishra on August 17, 1999, and was released for public debate. The aim of releasing it to public domain seemed to have been to generate more opinion on India’s Nuclear Doctrine before finalizing it.
The BJP Government was in power till April 2004 and thereafter the Congress Government has been in power. In a span of eight years, neither Government of different political dispensations has sought fit to finalize this document due to a strange mix of circumstances which can be said to reflect the shortcomings being repeated, namely (1) Finalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine would need some hard strategic decisions (2) Vulnerability to external pressures on the Government of the day on crucial aspects of India’s nuclear deterrence policies (3) Finalization of Doctrine conveniently tucked away in favor of more politically attractive domestic issues (4) Strategic issues not on the priority lists of political parties agenda.
India’s ascendancy towards “Key Global Power” status cannot progress if India’s political leadership continues to demonstrate the above shortcomings on strategic issues.
India as a “Key Global Power” has to have a “Credible Nuclear Deterrence Doctrine”. A finalized Nuclear Doctrine should reflect India’s firm resolve in the strategizing of her Nuclear Warfare strategy. India’s Nuclear Deterrence becomes “Credible” only when its adversaries primarily, and others too recognize in the Nuclear Doctrine formulations that India is firm in the use of its strategic nuclear assets when others cross the ‘red lines’ de-lineated by it in terms of her vital national security interests. India’s Nuclear Doctrine should be devoid of ambiguities and any apologetic formulations or statements.
It is rather strange that India’s community of noted strategic experts have not been vociferous in demanding the finalization of the Draft Nuclear Doctrine document which continues as a “Draft” for the last eight years. It seems that the ‘Draft’ has become a ‘Drift’.
The Nuclear Doctrine in a finalized form would be the blueprint on which India’s Armed Forces have to operationalize India’s responses to or for nuclear warfare, if an eventuality so arises. Based on it the entire “Command, Control and Communications” and Nuclear Targeting has to be planned. Can successive Indian Governments be allowed to get away with such political lethargy?
Concluding Observations
India’s political leadership should not be misled into the belief that the international fawning that is being bestowed on India is a recognition of India having acquired a “Key Global Power” status. The present international fawning on India strategically is only in recognition of its emerging power potential. It is limited only and limits India emergence to a “Key Global Player”. President Bush’s assertion some time back of US assistance was only to assist India to become a “Key Global Player”. That is a far cry from “Key Global Power”.
The above arises from two factors: (1) As mentioned earlier on in the paper, no global power will assist the emergence of another global power for strategic reasons, and (2) India’s political leadership in the last 60 years has not demonstrated the essential and vital ingredient of a Great Power or a Regional Power and that is the “WILL TO USE POWER” to secure its national security interests and to ensure that its strategic sensitivities are respected at least in its neighborhood.
The most striking strategic reflection that this Author wishes to make while reflecting on the strategic record of “India at Sixty” is that a complete structural transformation of India’s strategic set-up, its institutional mechanisms and strategy formulation processes is called for.
India’s political leadership in the last sixty years was content with grudging add-ons to the strategic set-up left behind by the British. It is ill-equipped and ill-structured to meet head on the challenging strategic environment of today.
Lastly, a more somber reflection needs to be added. Who will liberate the mindsets of India’s political leaders from their various inconsequential political “ISMS” namely secularism, minorityism, socialism and casteism and equip themselves with the strategic fibre, the strategic vision and the strategic “WILL TO USE POWER” to lead India to “KEY GLOBAL POWER” status?
Myanmar Unrest Not Only Anti-Junta, But Also Anti-Chinese
Myanmar Unrest Not Only Anti-Junta, But Also Anti-Chinese
By B. Raman
The protest demonstrations by students and monks, which have been sweeping across lower and central Myanmar since August 19, 2007, are not only anti-Junta, but also anti-Chinese. This is evident from the fact that the demonstrators have been receiving maximum public response in areas, where a large number of Chinese engineers and other workers are working in projects for the exploration of oil and gas and for mining.
2. The most impressive protest demonstrations so far have been reported from Sittwe (Akyab) in the Arakan State (now called Rakhine by the Junta), where around 2,000 Buddhist monks and others have been demonstrating almost daily. Sittwe is also the place where police officers, who were asked by the Army on September 18, 2007, to disperse the monks, ran away instead of using force against the monks. The Army had to intervene, use tear-smoke and fire in the air in order to disperse the monks and their supporters. On September 19, 2007, about 3000 monks, watched and encouraged by a crowd of about 10,000 onlookers, occupied the office of the Rakhine State Peace and Development Committee in Sittwe for hours to demand the release of four monks and 16 others detained by the Army the previous day. They dispersed peacefully after four hours. It is not known whether the Army conceded their demand.
3. A number of Chinese companies has been given contracts for the exploration of oil and gas in the Arakan area. The Junta has also permitted the Chinese to construct a gas pipeline from the Arakan to the Yunnan Province of China. About a hundred Chinese engineers have reportedly already arrived in the Arakan to work in these projects. The resentment against the Chinese has been building up since February, 2007, due to the following reasons:
China's veto of a resolution moved by the West in the UN Security Council calling for economic sanctions against the military for its continued violation of the human rights of the Myanmar people.
Resentment over Chinese engineers and other workers taking away local jobs at a time when there is an acute unemployment in the State and consequent economic hardship. This is similar to the resentment in Pakistan's Balochistan against the Chinese engineers working in the Gwadar port development project.
4. Following the Chinese veto in the UN Security Council, a till then unknown organisation called the Young Monks' Union distributed leaflets in Sittwe and other towns of the Arakan State in the beginning of February, 2007, calling for a boycott of Chinese goods in protest against the Chinese support to the suppression of democracy by the Junta. An unnamed office-bearer of the Union was quoted by a news report disseminated by Myanmar political exiles abroad as saying as follows: "The distribution of leaflets to the people is the first step in our plan. We will be conducting other activities to effectively target the Chinese Government very soon."
5. On April 28, 2007, about 40 villagers from Yenanttaung, 15 miles from Kyaukphyu in western Arakan, attacked the local office of a Chinese gas exploration company to protest against the Chinese preventing the local people from continuing with their traditional methods of gas exploration. It was alleged that the Chinese and the Junta had confiscated from the local people equipment such as the traditional drills used by them for their exploration.
6. The steep increase in diesel and cooking gas prices imposed by the Junta on August 15,2007, has exacerbated not only the anger against the Junta, but also against the Chinese, who have been accused of trying to take away Myanmar's gas and oil, when the local people are facing severe shortages .
7. The demonstrations till now have been confined to lower and central Myanmar, where the Burmans (Buddhists) are in a majority. The ethnic minorities in the North, who are largely Baptists, and the Rohingya Muslims of the Arakan State, who are of Bangladeshi origin, have by and large kept away from the demonstrations.
By B. Raman
The protest demonstrations by students and monks, which have been sweeping across lower and central Myanmar since August 19, 2007, are not only anti-Junta, but also anti-Chinese. This is evident from the fact that the demonstrators have been receiving maximum public response in areas, where a large number of Chinese engineers and other workers are working in projects for the exploration of oil and gas and for mining.
2. The most impressive protest demonstrations so far have been reported from Sittwe (Akyab) in the Arakan State (now called Rakhine by the Junta), where around 2,000 Buddhist monks and others have been demonstrating almost daily. Sittwe is also the place where police officers, who were asked by the Army on September 18, 2007, to disperse the monks, ran away instead of using force against the monks. The Army had to intervene, use tear-smoke and fire in the air in order to disperse the monks and their supporters. On September 19, 2007, about 3000 monks, watched and encouraged by a crowd of about 10,000 onlookers, occupied the office of the Rakhine State Peace and Development Committee in Sittwe for hours to demand the release of four monks and 16 others detained by the Army the previous day. They dispersed peacefully after four hours. It is not known whether the Army conceded their demand.
3. A number of Chinese companies has been given contracts for the exploration of oil and gas in the Arakan area. The Junta has also permitted the Chinese to construct a gas pipeline from the Arakan to the Yunnan Province of China. About a hundred Chinese engineers have reportedly already arrived in the Arakan to work in these projects. The resentment against the Chinese has been building up since February, 2007, due to the following reasons:
China's veto of a resolution moved by the West in the UN Security Council calling for economic sanctions against the military for its continued violation of the human rights of the Myanmar people.
Resentment over Chinese engineers and other workers taking away local jobs at a time when there is an acute unemployment in the State and consequent economic hardship. This is similar to the resentment in Pakistan's Balochistan against the Chinese engineers working in the Gwadar port development project.
4. Following the Chinese veto in the UN Security Council, a till then unknown organisation called the Young Monks' Union distributed leaflets in Sittwe and other towns of the Arakan State in the beginning of February, 2007, calling for a boycott of Chinese goods in protest against the Chinese support to the suppression of democracy by the Junta. An unnamed office-bearer of the Union was quoted by a news report disseminated by Myanmar political exiles abroad as saying as follows: "The distribution of leaflets to the people is the first step in our plan. We will be conducting other activities to effectively target the Chinese Government very soon."
5. On April 28, 2007, about 40 villagers from Yenanttaung, 15 miles from Kyaukphyu in western Arakan, attacked the local office of a Chinese gas exploration company to protest against the Chinese preventing the local people from continuing with their traditional methods of gas exploration. It was alleged that the Chinese and the Junta had confiscated from the local people equipment such as the traditional drills used by them for their exploration.
6. The steep increase in diesel and cooking gas prices imposed by the Junta on August 15,2007, has exacerbated not only the anger against the Junta, but also against the Chinese, who have been accused of trying to take away Myanmar's gas and oil, when the local people are facing severe shortages .
7. The demonstrations till now have been confined to lower and central Myanmar, where the Burmans (Buddhists) are in a majority. The ethnic minorities in the North, who are largely Baptists, and the Rohingya Muslims of the Arakan State, who are of Bangladeshi origin, have by and large kept away from the demonstrations.
PAKISTAN: THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE NEW TROIKA
PAKISTAN: THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM THE NEW TROIKA
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations
Pakistan’s autumn of 2007 is witnessing the regrettable spectacle of an illegitimate Presidency being imposed by external powers along with a contrived “governance troika” of General Musharraf, as a President in civilian clothes, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto absolved of corruption charges by an Ordinance signed by the military dictator as the next Prime Minister and General Ashfaq Kiyani as the new Chief of Army Staff of the Pakistan Army entrusted with underwriting the existence of the new ‘governance troika’.
General Musharraf has been an illegitimate self-appointed President of Pakistan for the last eight years. At every stage he has re-invented his indispensability to serve the strategic interests of external powers. General Musharraf has once again convinced the external powers which control Pakistan’s destiny that without him at the helm, Pakistan could become a strategic liability for them.
Succumbing to such fears raised by him General Musharraf and he brutally suppressing the demonstrations for restoration of democracy in Pakistan he has managed with external support to contrive his continuance in power as the President for the next five years. Constitutional respectability of a questionable nature has been sought to be imparted by the Legal Framework Order decreed by him after his military coup, “re-election by outgoing Assemblies rigged by him in 2002 and now ending their tenure, and Pakistan’s Supreme Court seeming to opt for the “doctrine of necessity” out of sheer coercive pressure by the military ruler.
So in the autumn of 2007, what does one find in Pakistan? The picture obtainable today is:
A politically illegitimate President of Pakistan in whose so-called “re-election” the people of Pakistan did not participate.
Political popularity of General Musharraf is at its lowest ebb in Pakistan. His duration at the helm of Pakistan till 2012 will not rest on popular Pakistani will but at the “strategic pleasure” of external powers.
The emerging “governance troika” in Pakistan is being termed in Pakistan as an “Americanized Troika”.
The emerging “governing troika” is a politically and morally tainted one except for the new Army Chief. General Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto stand morally and politically tainted by their record of broken political pledges made to the people of Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto has been in exile to evade corruption charges and conviction. Musharraf becomes an “accessory and accomplice to the fact” by pardoning her through an Ordinance as part of the political deal to contrive the new troika.
General Kiyani gets politically tainted in Pakistan as a “political stooge” of the United States. Pakistani news papers indicate that he has been in touch with the US Secretary of State from November 2006.
Essentially, the new troika continues to be a Pakistan Army- dominated one with Benazir Bhutto added as a civilian lightweight to give a façade of democracy.
In the past one of the bogeys that has been consistently raised in terms of regional and global security has been the dangers of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal falling into the hands of Pakistan’s Islamic fundamentalists or rogue elements of the Pakistan Army.
Where is the guarantee that the emerging “governance troika” of Pakistan comprising of military and political adventurers would prove to be “safe custodians” of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal? Yes, if this troika entrusts Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal to safe custody of the United States, then one could concede that dangers to global and regional security would cease.
Coming to the main theme of this paper, one needs to examine the strategic implications of an illegitimate Presidency in Pakistan on the strategic interests of the United States, Afghanistan, Iran, China and India.
United States: The Major Strategic Implications
The United States as the principal patron of the Musharraf-Benazir Bhutto combine and having strategically invested in Pakistan heavily since 9/11 stands the risk of being impacted sharply by the uncertainties of an illegitimate presidency in Pakistan.
The United States must face the facts that the newly contrived political dispensation in Pakistan cannot be expected to last out till 2012. In its very composition, the political stakes are predominantly stacked against the United States.
Any or a combination of the following events can take place in Pakistan as a reaction to the present illegitimate political imposition (1) General Musharraf is assassinated (2) General Musharraf is eased out of power by Pakistan Army (3) Benazir Bhutto breaks away from the political combine (4) Intensification of separatist movements in Pakistan’s explosive western frontiers (5) Rise in Islamic Jihadi terrorism and suicide attacks on the Pakistan Army.
As this author has pointed out in a number of his earlier papers, the resultant situation in Pakistan for the United States would be reminiscent of the Shah of Iran in 1979. The Shah of Iran too was treated as an indispensable strategic asset of the United States like Musharraf is being perpetuated now.
In short, the end-game of the United States in terms of major strategic impact would be that Pakistan turns into a strategic liability for the United States like Afghanistan and Iraq today.
With Pakistani public opinion sidelined in American strategic calculations today, another likely prospect that Pakistan like Iran could become a long term adversarial nation with a nuclear weapons arsenal.
Some analysts have gone to the extent that any Sino-US armed conflict in the future could likely be over Pakistan rather than Taiwan as Pakistani public shifts away from USA to a full Chinese embrace in reactive anger.
The Impact on Afghanistan
Afghanistan is one country which is likely to be impacted most heavily by the emergence of the Musharraf-Benazir Bhutto combine and the new troika in general.
The credentials of Benazir Bhutto and General Musharraf in relation to the Taliban (which is the main threat to stability in Afghanistan) are dubious.
The Taliban as a potent force to further Pakistani interests in Afghanistan was created in the regime of Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister of Pakistan. General Musharraf was then her Director General of Military Operations. He operationalised the Taliban for execution of Pakistan’s military designs in Afghanistan and creating a Pakistani proxy regime there.
With both Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto in power in Pakistan,once again they can be logically expected to proactively pursue Pakistani interests in Afghanistan through the Taliban, especially when it is a prime agenda of the Pakistan Army?
The approach of the Mushrraf-Bhutto combine towards ensuring Pakistan’s primacy in Afghanistan can be expected to be two fold(1) Political persuasion of the United States to pesssurize President Karzai to co-opt the Taliban in the governing structure (2) Prod and assist Taliban in stepping up military activities in Southern Afghanistan to destabilize the Karzai regime.
On both counts, the strategic interests of the United States, NATO and Afghanistan’s emergence as a moderate democratic Muslim nation are likely to suffer at Pakistan’s hands.
The Implications for Iran
Iraq with its de-stabilized political and military situation can no longer provide a secure base for any United States military intervention in Iran. The confrontational rhetoric between USA and Iran is getting shriller and military strikes by USA as an option cannot be ruled out.
In the given situation, Pakistan will be called upon to provide the main base for US strikes against Iran supplementing the US war effort from aircraft carriers within and outside the Gulf.
Iran should read the signs realistically. The Musharraf-Bhutto combine at the helm as political protégés of the United States would be hard pressed to deny Pakistan as a base for US military operations against, Iran. In any case the Musharraf regime has been permitting US Special Forces teams to operate in Iran from Pakistani territory.
The flip-side of the coin is that what does the United States do in case Pakistan under pressure of domestic public opinion, Islamist parties pressure and pressure from Pakistan Army shies away from its role as an “enduring ally” of USA?
China: The Biggest Gainer from the Ongoing Situation in Pakistan
The emerging troika in Pakistan may be an “Americanized Troika” as perceived within Pakistan. However, there is a caveat here. It is a troika which is likely to continue as an “Americanized Troika” only and up till the time the United States imparts political legitimacy to it and assists their perpetuation in power.
If this troika is pressurized by the United States to deliver on the strategic agenda that America has in view to bring them into power, the troika can be expected to become a “China Protégés Troika”.
One wonders as to why the United States policy establishment and think-tanks do not deliberate on this eventuality openly?
Pakistan has deep strategic ties with China generated by mutual convergence of strategic interests and in the case of Pakistan an eternal gratitude to China for providing it willingly with the sinews of its power-nuclear weapons and missiles arsenal.
China stands to be the biggest gainer from the emerging troika in Pakistan; let us not forget that while the Pakistan army and Musharraf have strong links with China, it was the Bhutto family which crafted Pakistan’s pro-China polices and a strategic tie-up besides brokering the Sino-US rapprochement.
India: The Major Implications
It would be futile for India to think that an “Americanized Troika” in Pakistan would not endanger India’s military interests for fear of US displeasure. In fact the contrary could turn out to be true.
In these last two weeks, General Musharraf has not made exactly any friendly statements towards India. He has accused India of participating in the fomenting of separatist troubles in Baluchistan and NWFP.
The emerging troika is likely to face violent turbulence in Pakistan which it will find hard to control militarily. As it is General Musharraf is facing stiff armed resistance on its peripheries which looks to penetrate the hinterland. Military solution by the new establishment in Pakistan would generate further turbulence and armed attacks on the Pakistan Army.
It has been the historical record that whenever domestic turbulence in Pakistan threatens to get out of control, Pakistan military rulers tend to divert domestic attention to military adventurism against India.
In current circumstances, while an all out war is not a possibility, dangers exist of Pakistan embarking on a greater de-stabilization in Kashmir, stoking active insurgencies in the North-East and intensified terrorist activity in the Indian heartland through Pakistan funded sleeper cells. The terrorist attack yesterday at the much revered Muslim Sufi shrine at Ajmer is the latest example.
All in all, a worsening internal security situation within India and proxy war or the peripheries seems to be distinct possibility arising from the emergence of a new military dominated troika in Pakistan notwithstanding that it is an American creation.
Concluding Observations
The inherent contradiction in the combination, nature and attitudinal inclinations of the new Pakistan governing dispensation does not augur well for South Asian and regional stability.
The record of the Musharraf military regime in serving United States strategic interests has been dubious. Osama Bin Laden continues to be esconced in a Pakistani city (as remarked yesterday by former DG, ISI, Lt General Durraun), the Taliban continue to de-stabilize US interests in Afghanistan and China continues to enlarge its strategic hold over Pakistan.
The United States by adding Benazir Bhutto to the Pakistan Army duo of General Musharraf even without uniform and General Kiyani does not necessarily ensure its strategic interests by a predominantly military troika. This new troika is likely to generate added political turbulence and armed militancy in Pakistan to the detriment of the United States.
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations
Pakistan’s autumn of 2007 is witnessing the regrettable spectacle of an illegitimate Presidency being imposed by external powers along with a contrived “governance troika” of General Musharraf, as a President in civilian clothes, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto absolved of corruption charges by an Ordinance signed by the military dictator as the next Prime Minister and General Ashfaq Kiyani as the new Chief of Army Staff of the Pakistan Army entrusted with underwriting the existence of the new ‘governance troika’.
General Musharraf has been an illegitimate self-appointed President of Pakistan for the last eight years. At every stage he has re-invented his indispensability to serve the strategic interests of external powers. General Musharraf has once again convinced the external powers which control Pakistan’s destiny that without him at the helm, Pakistan could become a strategic liability for them.
Succumbing to such fears raised by him General Musharraf and he brutally suppressing the demonstrations for restoration of democracy in Pakistan he has managed with external support to contrive his continuance in power as the President for the next five years. Constitutional respectability of a questionable nature has been sought to be imparted by the Legal Framework Order decreed by him after his military coup, “re-election by outgoing Assemblies rigged by him in 2002 and now ending their tenure, and Pakistan’s Supreme Court seeming to opt for the “doctrine of necessity” out of sheer coercive pressure by the military ruler.
So in the autumn of 2007, what does one find in Pakistan? The picture obtainable today is:
A politically illegitimate President of Pakistan in whose so-called “re-election” the people of Pakistan did not participate.
Political popularity of General Musharraf is at its lowest ebb in Pakistan. His duration at the helm of Pakistan till 2012 will not rest on popular Pakistani will but at the “strategic pleasure” of external powers.
The emerging “governance troika” in Pakistan is being termed in Pakistan as an “Americanized Troika”.
The emerging “governing troika” is a politically and morally tainted one except for the new Army Chief. General Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto stand morally and politically tainted by their record of broken political pledges made to the people of Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto has been in exile to evade corruption charges and conviction. Musharraf becomes an “accessory and accomplice to the fact” by pardoning her through an Ordinance as part of the political deal to contrive the new troika.
General Kiyani gets politically tainted in Pakistan as a “political stooge” of the United States. Pakistani news papers indicate that he has been in touch with the US Secretary of State from November 2006.
Essentially, the new troika continues to be a Pakistan Army- dominated one with Benazir Bhutto added as a civilian lightweight to give a façade of democracy.
In the past one of the bogeys that has been consistently raised in terms of regional and global security has been the dangers of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal falling into the hands of Pakistan’s Islamic fundamentalists or rogue elements of the Pakistan Army.
Where is the guarantee that the emerging “governance troika” of Pakistan comprising of military and political adventurers would prove to be “safe custodians” of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal? Yes, if this troika entrusts Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal to safe custody of the United States, then one could concede that dangers to global and regional security would cease.
Coming to the main theme of this paper, one needs to examine the strategic implications of an illegitimate Presidency in Pakistan on the strategic interests of the United States, Afghanistan, Iran, China and India.
United States: The Major Strategic Implications
The United States as the principal patron of the Musharraf-Benazir Bhutto combine and having strategically invested in Pakistan heavily since 9/11 stands the risk of being impacted sharply by the uncertainties of an illegitimate presidency in Pakistan.
The United States must face the facts that the newly contrived political dispensation in Pakistan cannot be expected to last out till 2012. In its very composition, the political stakes are predominantly stacked against the United States.
Any or a combination of the following events can take place in Pakistan as a reaction to the present illegitimate political imposition (1) General Musharraf is assassinated (2) General Musharraf is eased out of power by Pakistan Army (3) Benazir Bhutto breaks away from the political combine (4) Intensification of separatist movements in Pakistan’s explosive western frontiers (5) Rise in Islamic Jihadi terrorism and suicide attacks on the Pakistan Army.
As this author has pointed out in a number of his earlier papers, the resultant situation in Pakistan for the United States would be reminiscent of the Shah of Iran in 1979. The Shah of Iran too was treated as an indispensable strategic asset of the United States like Musharraf is being perpetuated now.
In short, the end-game of the United States in terms of major strategic impact would be that Pakistan turns into a strategic liability for the United States like Afghanistan and Iraq today.
With Pakistani public opinion sidelined in American strategic calculations today, another likely prospect that Pakistan like Iran could become a long term adversarial nation with a nuclear weapons arsenal.
Some analysts have gone to the extent that any Sino-US armed conflict in the future could likely be over Pakistan rather than Taiwan as Pakistani public shifts away from USA to a full Chinese embrace in reactive anger.
The Impact on Afghanistan
Afghanistan is one country which is likely to be impacted most heavily by the emergence of the Musharraf-Benazir Bhutto combine and the new troika in general.
The credentials of Benazir Bhutto and General Musharraf in relation to the Taliban (which is the main threat to stability in Afghanistan) are dubious.
The Taliban as a potent force to further Pakistani interests in Afghanistan was created in the regime of Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister of Pakistan. General Musharraf was then her Director General of Military Operations. He operationalised the Taliban for execution of Pakistan’s military designs in Afghanistan and creating a Pakistani proxy regime there.
With both Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto in power in Pakistan,once again they can be logically expected to proactively pursue Pakistani interests in Afghanistan through the Taliban, especially when it is a prime agenda of the Pakistan Army?
The approach of the Mushrraf-Bhutto combine towards ensuring Pakistan’s primacy in Afghanistan can be expected to be two fold(1) Political persuasion of the United States to pesssurize President Karzai to co-opt the Taliban in the governing structure (2) Prod and assist Taliban in stepping up military activities in Southern Afghanistan to destabilize the Karzai regime.
On both counts, the strategic interests of the United States, NATO and Afghanistan’s emergence as a moderate democratic Muslim nation are likely to suffer at Pakistan’s hands.
The Implications for Iran
Iraq with its de-stabilized political and military situation can no longer provide a secure base for any United States military intervention in Iran. The confrontational rhetoric between USA and Iran is getting shriller and military strikes by USA as an option cannot be ruled out.
In the given situation, Pakistan will be called upon to provide the main base for US strikes against Iran supplementing the US war effort from aircraft carriers within and outside the Gulf.
Iran should read the signs realistically. The Musharraf-Bhutto combine at the helm as political protégés of the United States would be hard pressed to deny Pakistan as a base for US military operations against, Iran. In any case the Musharraf regime has been permitting US Special Forces teams to operate in Iran from Pakistani territory.
The flip-side of the coin is that what does the United States do in case Pakistan under pressure of domestic public opinion, Islamist parties pressure and pressure from Pakistan Army shies away from its role as an “enduring ally” of USA?
China: The Biggest Gainer from the Ongoing Situation in Pakistan
The emerging troika in Pakistan may be an “Americanized Troika” as perceived within Pakistan. However, there is a caveat here. It is a troika which is likely to continue as an “Americanized Troika” only and up till the time the United States imparts political legitimacy to it and assists their perpetuation in power.
If this troika is pressurized by the United States to deliver on the strategic agenda that America has in view to bring them into power, the troika can be expected to become a “China Protégés Troika”.
One wonders as to why the United States policy establishment and think-tanks do not deliberate on this eventuality openly?
Pakistan has deep strategic ties with China generated by mutual convergence of strategic interests and in the case of Pakistan an eternal gratitude to China for providing it willingly with the sinews of its power-nuclear weapons and missiles arsenal.
China stands to be the biggest gainer from the emerging troika in Pakistan; let us not forget that while the Pakistan army and Musharraf have strong links with China, it was the Bhutto family which crafted Pakistan’s pro-China polices and a strategic tie-up besides brokering the Sino-US rapprochement.
India: The Major Implications
It would be futile for India to think that an “Americanized Troika” in Pakistan would not endanger India’s military interests for fear of US displeasure. In fact the contrary could turn out to be true.
In these last two weeks, General Musharraf has not made exactly any friendly statements towards India. He has accused India of participating in the fomenting of separatist troubles in Baluchistan and NWFP.
The emerging troika is likely to face violent turbulence in Pakistan which it will find hard to control militarily. As it is General Musharraf is facing stiff armed resistance on its peripheries which looks to penetrate the hinterland. Military solution by the new establishment in Pakistan would generate further turbulence and armed attacks on the Pakistan Army.
It has been the historical record that whenever domestic turbulence in Pakistan threatens to get out of control, Pakistan military rulers tend to divert domestic attention to military adventurism against India.
In current circumstances, while an all out war is not a possibility, dangers exist of Pakistan embarking on a greater de-stabilization in Kashmir, stoking active insurgencies in the North-East and intensified terrorist activity in the Indian heartland through Pakistan funded sleeper cells. The terrorist attack yesterday at the much revered Muslim Sufi shrine at Ajmer is the latest example.
All in all, a worsening internal security situation within India and proxy war or the peripheries seems to be distinct possibility arising from the emergence of a new military dominated troika in Pakistan notwithstanding that it is an American creation.
Concluding Observations
The inherent contradiction in the combination, nature and attitudinal inclinations of the new Pakistan governing dispensation does not augur well for South Asian and regional stability.
The record of the Musharraf military regime in serving United States strategic interests has been dubious. Osama Bin Laden continues to be esconced in a Pakistani city (as remarked yesterday by former DG, ISI, Lt General Durraun), the Taliban continue to de-stabilize US interests in Afghanistan and China continues to enlarge its strategic hold over Pakistan.
The United States by adding Benazir Bhutto to the Pakistan Army duo of General Musharraf even without uniform and General Kiyani does not necessarily ensure its strategic interests by a predominantly military troika. This new troika is likely to generate added political turbulence and armed militancy in Pakistan to the detriment of the United States.
BANGLADESH: Where is India in Dhaka’s New Foreign Policy?
BANGLADESH: Where is India in Dhaka’s New Foreign Policy?
Guest Column by Bhaskar Roy
According to Bangladesh’s Foreign Affairs Advisor Iftekar A. Choudhury Dhaka needs to cultivate relations with five key global powers i.e. the USA, Russia, UK, Japan and China. Choudhury was addressing a press conference in New York in October 2007. He was part of Chief Advisor Fakruddin Ahmed’s delegation attending the 62nd UN General Assembly session.
The Foreign Affairs Advisor also spoke about strengthening “balanced relationship” with the neighbouring nations and member states of SAARC, Bangladesh-India-Myanmar Science and Technological Co-operation (BIMSTECH). Developing linkages with the ASEAN, EU, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Commonwealth.
Earlier, speaking at a conference of OIC Foreign Ministers in New York, Iftekar Choudhury spoke about safeguarding the rights of Muslims where they were a minority and prevent unilateral actions against Muslims States.
During his visit to India earlier in the year, the suave, glib talking diplomat had charmed a number of Indian journalists, till they realized after his departure that he had sold them a cuckoo. Therefore, Choudhury’s statement calls for a very close reading. Choudhury’s personal inclinations are reportedly more western and Pakistan oriented, and his India directed foreign relations thoughts would call for greater clarifications. While he has no objection at all to western governments’ comments on Bangladesh’s internal political affairs, he took strong exception to an Indian minister’s observation that India hopes to see a free and fair elections in Bangladesh and emergence of a democratic, secular polity. Choudhury criticized the Indian comments as interference in Bangladesh’s internal affairs.
Over the past 37 years since Bangladesh came into existence with no small assistance from India, the relationship between the two countries, at least at the political and diplomatic level have never been really smooth. During Bangladesh’s war of liberation, the Mujibnagar government (the liberation government) functioned from Kolkata (Calcutta). It was, therefore, inexplicable how relations between the two governments soured so quickly after 1971.
Sk. Mujibur Rehman, the Father of Bangladesh (nation) was not only deified in his own country but was also a hero in India. Unfortunately, he also contributed through his policies to certain developments which literally startled the Indians. Even then, New Delhi reposed faith in him. Some of Sk. Mujib’s policies ensured reduction of India’s space in Bangladesh which was filled in by those same forces that Bangladeshis fought against. According to some critics, India had only Pakistan (West and East) to contend with, but after the liberation of Bangladesh India had to be concerned with both Pakistan and Bangladesh. There is a lot of truth in this criticism in hindsight. According to an India Army officer who as a captain fought in the war and was present during Pakistan’s surrender ceremony in Dhaka, soon after the event they were faced by abuses on the streets like ‘Indian dogs, go back’. Some Bangladeshis, a small minority, still feel strongly that India should not have withdrawn its troops from Bangladesh so quickly. But Prime Minister Indira Gandhi did not want to lay India open to accusations of keeping an occupation army in Bangladesh.
Iftekar Choudhury’s foreign policy exposition in New York spoke about strengthening ‘balanced relationship’ with members of SAARC and BIMSTEC. The statement is open to wide interpretations. It has to be clarified if the word ‘balance’ was used in bilateral terms or multi-lateral framework of SAARC member states.
If ‘balanced’ is in bilateral terms, Bangladesh may have to answer a lot, and in a wide area of the relationship. The two countries share a 4000 km border, generally porous, unguarded in many segments, undemarcated in some areas with disputes over enclaves, and rampant smuggling. There are smugglers on both sides of the border that the border guards should be vigilant over. That is not happening because the goods smuggled are mainly from the Indian side and encouraged and facilitated from the other. It is, because, Bangladesh requires the Indian goods, especially basic foodstuffs and beef on hooves to keep their markets running.
More importantly, the earlier Director of the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) Maj. Gen. Rezzakul Hyder accused India of being involved in the August 17, 2005 countrywide terrorist bombings in Bangladesh. As he spoke in India, he was promoted on his return home. Dhaka has also blocked the Asian highway coming from Myanmar through Bangladesh into India, something that BIMSTEC cooperation may suffer from. The list is long.
India continues with the ‘Gujral doctrine’ on relations with neighbours i.e. give more to neighbours who are smaller, and expect less. Bangladesh and India cannot run away from each other given the geographical position. The realistic position is Bangladesh cannot exclude India from its economic development but if does so it will be hurt, and so will India be to some extent. If Iftekar Choudhury advises his country to adopt the policy to cut its nose to spite its face, it would be unfortunate for all concerned.
If India is to be ‘balanced’ with the other members of the SAARC family, Mr. Choudhury would have to expand further on his postulation. Will India’s economic involvement be balanced with the others in Bangladesh? In that case Dhaka would have to brush up its mathematics. None of the other members of SAARC have the economic competitiveness and wherewithal as India. Even the Pakistani business establishment is pushing for more direct trade and economic relations with India, since they have to import Indian goods through Hong Kong, Singapore and Dubai at a far higher cost.
Iftekar Choudhury may be thinking in terms of China as a SAARC member. China has just become an observer member of SAARC through the good offices of Bangladesh and Pakistan primarily. Trying to bring in China to counter India in Bangladesh may not be a good idea especially for Bangladesh. Encouraging competitiveness is good; fomenting contention is self –defeating. This is not ‘balance’.
Enhancing relationship with the ‘big five’ is a good idea. Bangladesh’s man power at a certain level has substantial intellectual property. What they need is opportunity to invest this property for the development of the country.
Bangladesh is still energy starved and supplementing through nuclear energy. Russia can step in here with good and cheaper reactors. Indigenously manufactured Chinese nuclear plants are substandard. One has only to ask Pakistan about it. But if Choudhury is looking to bring in international politics he must understand Bangladesh does not have the capability to manage such situations.
Obviously, Iftekar Choudhury had India in mind when he spoke about safeguarding the rights of Muslims where they are a minority. It is hardly thinkable that Bangladesh will take up issues with the USA, the UK or China. This zeros down to India, and Bangladesh has in the past criticized India on treatment of Muslim minorities.
Whether Iftekar Choudhury was playing to the OIC gallery or if he had something else on his mind is difficult to say. But basically from India’s point of view it was a mischievous statement. Where India is concerned people like Choudhury jump into the fray with alacrity if there is an opportunity. He must understand that the Muslim population in India is larger than that of Bangladesh, most of whom do not subscribe to his ideas. After this statement, Indians would wonder if Choudhury is supportive of Bangladeshi Islamic terrorists involved in several terror incidents in India.
The foregoing raises very serious questions. Is there a regret in some sections of Bangladeshi leadership i.e. bureaucrats, politicians, military personnel over the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan? Or are they still confused between “goolami” and nationalism? So only when they sort this out one could expect a smoother India-Bangladeshi relationship.
Guest Column by Bhaskar Roy
According to Bangladesh’s Foreign Affairs Advisor Iftekar A. Choudhury Dhaka needs to cultivate relations with five key global powers i.e. the USA, Russia, UK, Japan and China. Choudhury was addressing a press conference in New York in October 2007. He was part of Chief Advisor Fakruddin Ahmed’s delegation attending the 62nd UN General Assembly session.
The Foreign Affairs Advisor also spoke about strengthening “balanced relationship” with the neighbouring nations and member states of SAARC, Bangladesh-India-Myanmar Science and Technological Co-operation (BIMSTECH). Developing linkages with the ASEAN, EU, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Commonwealth.
Earlier, speaking at a conference of OIC Foreign Ministers in New York, Iftekar Choudhury spoke about safeguarding the rights of Muslims where they were a minority and prevent unilateral actions against Muslims States.
During his visit to India earlier in the year, the suave, glib talking diplomat had charmed a number of Indian journalists, till they realized after his departure that he had sold them a cuckoo. Therefore, Choudhury’s statement calls for a very close reading. Choudhury’s personal inclinations are reportedly more western and Pakistan oriented, and his India directed foreign relations thoughts would call for greater clarifications. While he has no objection at all to western governments’ comments on Bangladesh’s internal political affairs, he took strong exception to an Indian minister’s observation that India hopes to see a free and fair elections in Bangladesh and emergence of a democratic, secular polity. Choudhury criticized the Indian comments as interference in Bangladesh’s internal affairs.
Over the past 37 years since Bangladesh came into existence with no small assistance from India, the relationship between the two countries, at least at the political and diplomatic level have never been really smooth. During Bangladesh’s war of liberation, the Mujibnagar government (the liberation government) functioned from Kolkata (Calcutta). It was, therefore, inexplicable how relations between the two governments soured so quickly after 1971.
Sk. Mujibur Rehman, the Father of Bangladesh (nation) was not only deified in his own country but was also a hero in India. Unfortunately, he also contributed through his policies to certain developments which literally startled the Indians. Even then, New Delhi reposed faith in him. Some of Sk. Mujib’s policies ensured reduction of India’s space in Bangladesh which was filled in by those same forces that Bangladeshis fought against. According to some critics, India had only Pakistan (West and East) to contend with, but after the liberation of Bangladesh India had to be concerned with both Pakistan and Bangladesh. There is a lot of truth in this criticism in hindsight. According to an India Army officer who as a captain fought in the war and was present during Pakistan’s surrender ceremony in Dhaka, soon after the event they were faced by abuses on the streets like ‘Indian dogs, go back’. Some Bangladeshis, a small minority, still feel strongly that India should not have withdrawn its troops from Bangladesh so quickly. But Prime Minister Indira Gandhi did not want to lay India open to accusations of keeping an occupation army in Bangladesh.
Iftekar Choudhury’s foreign policy exposition in New York spoke about strengthening ‘balanced relationship’ with members of SAARC and BIMSTEC. The statement is open to wide interpretations. It has to be clarified if the word ‘balance’ was used in bilateral terms or multi-lateral framework of SAARC member states.
If ‘balanced’ is in bilateral terms, Bangladesh may have to answer a lot, and in a wide area of the relationship. The two countries share a 4000 km border, generally porous, unguarded in many segments, undemarcated in some areas with disputes over enclaves, and rampant smuggling. There are smugglers on both sides of the border that the border guards should be vigilant over. That is not happening because the goods smuggled are mainly from the Indian side and encouraged and facilitated from the other. It is, because, Bangladesh requires the Indian goods, especially basic foodstuffs and beef on hooves to keep their markets running.
More importantly, the earlier Director of the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) Maj. Gen. Rezzakul Hyder accused India of being involved in the August 17, 2005 countrywide terrorist bombings in Bangladesh. As he spoke in India, he was promoted on his return home. Dhaka has also blocked the Asian highway coming from Myanmar through Bangladesh into India, something that BIMSTEC cooperation may suffer from. The list is long.
India continues with the ‘Gujral doctrine’ on relations with neighbours i.e. give more to neighbours who are smaller, and expect less. Bangladesh and India cannot run away from each other given the geographical position. The realistic position is Bangladesh cannot exclude India from its economic development but if does so it will be hurt, and so will India be to some extent. If Iftekar Choudhury advises his country to adopt the policy to cut its nose to spite its face, it would be unfortunate for all concerned.
If India is to be ‘balanced’ with the other members of the SAARC family, Mr. Choudhury would have to expand further on his postulation. Will India’s economic involvement be balanced with the others in Bangladesh? In that case Dhaka would have to brush up its mathematics. None of the other members of SAARC have the economic competitiveness and wherewithal as India. Even the Pakistani business establishment is pushing for more direct trade and economic relations with India, since they have to import Indian goods through Hong Kong, Singapore and Dubai at a far higher cost.
Iftekar Choudhury may be thinking in terms of China as a SAARC member. China has just become an observer member of SAARC through the good offices of Bangladesh and Pakistan primarily. Trying to bring in China to counter India in Bangladesh may not be a good idea especially for Bangladesh. Encouraging competitiveness is good; fomenting contention is self –defeating. This is not ‘balance’.
Enhancing relationship with the ‘big five’ is a good idea. Bangladesh’s man power at a certain level has substantial intellectual property. What they need is opportunity to invest this property for the development of the country.
Bangladesh is still energy starved and supplementing through nuclear energy. Russia can step in here with good and cheaper reactors. Indigenously manufactured Chinese nuclear plants are substandard. One has only to ask Pakistan about it. But if Choudhury is looking to bring in international politics he must understand Bangladesh does not have the capability to manage such situations.
Obviously, Iftekar Choudhury had India in mind when he spoke about safeguarding the rights of Muslims where they are a minority. It is hardly thinkable that Bangladesh will take up issues with the USA, the UK or China. This zeros down to India, and Bangladesh has in the past criticized India on treatment of Muslim minorities.
Whether Iftekar Choudhury was playing to the OIC gallery or if he had something else on his mind is difficult to say. But basically from India’s point of view it was a mischievous statement. Where India is concerned people like Choudhury jump into the fray with alacrity if there is an opportunity. He must understand that the Muslim population in India is larger than that of Bangladesh, most of whom do not subscribe to his ideas. After this statement, Indians would wonder if Choudhury is supportive of Bangladeshi Islamic terrorists involved in several terror incidents in India.
The foregoing raises very serious questions. Is there a regret in some sections of Bangladeshi leadership i.e. bureaucrats, politicians, military personnel over the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan? Or are they still confused between “goolami” and nationalism? So only when they sort this out one could expect a smoother India-Bangladeshi relationship.
INDIA-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: STRATEGIC REVERBERATIONS FROM RUSSIA AND CHINA CREATE IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA’S SECURITY
INDIA-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: STRATEGIC REVERBERATIONS FROM RUSSIA AND CHINA CREATE IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA’S SECURITY
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations
In an earlier paper of this Author entitled “India-United States Strategic Partnership: The Reverberations From China And Russia” SAAG Paper No. 2320 dated 02.08.2007 attention was drawn to the fact that the India-US strategic partnership being sought to be evolved with more intensity by the present Indian Government is not without strategic costs for India from other major powers so impacted.
The major observations made in the earlier paper by the Author were as under:
India’s strategic and foreign policy establishment must recognize that India’s management of its strategic partnerships, both existing and evolving must be adroitly done
India’s strategic stances must not generate reverberations from other global power centers, until India reaches the culminating stage of emerging as an independent power center in the world.
Since a substantive India-US Strategic Partnership has the potential to alter the global strategic balance and so also the Asian strategic balance, the evolving Indo-US Strategic Partnership has been under intense scrutiny by China and Russia. In particular India’s participation in the “strategic geometries” sponsored in East Asia by the United States has raised strategic concerns in China and Russia and their reverberations have not been long in coming in a subtle manner.
In the Indian strategic calculus, China and Russia cannot be discounted for a number of good reasons. China figures in Indian threat perceptions in a major way because of past armed conflicts and the chronic unsettled boundary disputes. While India and China are today engaged in transforming their relationship from one of mutual suspicions to that of mutual trust, both countries cannot ignore their national security interests and strategic priorities.
In China’s threat perceptions, a substantive India-US Strategic Partnership carries with it the potential of initiatives for Indo-US containment of China and use of Tibet as a strategic pressure point.
Russia’s strategic sensitivities in relation to India’s future strategic moves need to be paid due respect as the Indo-Russian Strategic Partnership is a time tested one. Unlike the United States and China which have resorted to creation of “spoiler states” like Pakistan, to checkmate India, Russia has not resorted to such policies against India.
Strategic reverberations from Russia and China do create strategic implications for India and these are discussed at the end of the paper.
An Indian strategic tilt towards the United States would have been justifiable if the United States could address India’s threat perceptions from China and Pakistan. Politically the United States is not so inclined and is ever unlikely to underwrite India’s security against any such threats. With no such surety ever likely to emerge from the United States would it be prudent for India to endanger her security by a strategic tilt?
India’s security and foreign policy establishment needs to do some hard thinking on this account.
Strategic Reverberations from Russia: President Putin Misses Traditional Meetings with India’s External Affairs Minister and Indian Defence Minister During their Moscow Visits in October 2007
The Indian External Affairs Minister and the Indian Defense Minister paid visits to Moscow this month to attend the inter-governmental panel discussions held annually. In the case of the External Affairs Minister’s visit it was being projected that his Moscow visit was also undertaken as a preparatory visit for the Indian Prime Minister forthcoming visit to Moscow in November 2007.
The Indian External Affairs Minister was unable to meet the Russian Foreign Minister and the Russian President and both these were significant departures from past precedents. The reasons advanced by the Russians were that both were busy with discussions with the visiting US Secretary of State and the US Defense Secretary. Further that President Putin was leaving for Iran and was busy.
The Indian Defense Minister did sign some defense agreements during his Moscow visit and also had discussions on overdue defense deliveries from Russia. Again, departing from precedents the Russians could not arrange a call by the Indian Defense Minister on President Putin.
The strategic reverberations from Russia stand discussed in the Author’s earlier paper. But what has happened now is something serious. While both Russia and India can dismiss diplomatically that everything is normal and undue importance should not be accorded to the visiting Indian Ministers not being given audience by President Putin, one cannot also ignore that obviously something is amiss and the Russians are trying to signal some messages.
In his earlier paper this Author had reflected that more serious Russian strategic reverberations are likely to occur if the present Indian Government allots the $ 7 billion orders for combat planes for the Indian Air Force to the United States as a single vendor. It was further emphasized that this is a deal which can send out strong distorted strategic messages and the present Indian Government needs to tread seriously and with care when deciding on this deal.
Is it likely that the Russians have got a whiff from their Indian sources that the Indian Government is politically inclined to award the $ 7 billion contract for combat planes to the United States? Is the political could shouldering by President Putin of not meeting the Indian External Affairs Minister and the Indian Defense Minister during their Moscow visits this month is a manifestation of Russia’s strategic displeasure?
While the above may only be speculative analysis but the underpinning reality of it being a likelihood cannot also be dismissed.
In addition to the above, recent reverberations from Russia over India’s strategic tilt have manifested in Russia giving permission that China could use Russian aircraft engines for Chinese fighter aircraft being supplied to Pakistan. There are also reports to indicate that China is interceding with Russia on Pakistan’s behalf that Russia should open upto Pakistan which the Russians have so far avoided respecting India’s strategic sensitivities.
China’s Strategic Displeasure on India-United States Strategic Partnership Emergence Persist
In the Author’s last paper on this subject after listing at least eight different strategic displeasure reverberations on India’s strategic tilt towards USA under the present Government, two questions were asked and both answered.
The first question that this Author raised was whether India should really be concerned with China’s manifested strategic displeasures? It was opined that “Not really, one should think so, as India has the right to indulge in counter-strategic pressure points against China as China was doing so all along so far by using Pakistan against India.”
The second question raised in the paper was whether India should take note of it. It was opined that “very certainly and absolutely must do so. As India proceeds on its trajectory towards global power status, China must seriously and significantly figure in India’s strategic calculus, irrespective of what contours the US-India Strategic Partnership assumes”.
In addition to the reverberations listed earlier, some more which needs to be added to the list are: (1) Last round of boundary negotiations held recently could not make any progress; the stalemate persists (2) China’s lodging protests alleging that India had constructed military bunkers on the Chinese side of the border in Sikkim (3) Border incursions into Bhutan in a bid to pressurize the India-friendly Bhutanese Government and also to highlight India’s helplessness on the issue (4) Postponing of joint China-India military exercises.
Russia’s and China’s Reverberations: Implications for India’s Security
Some may like to be dismissive of the manifested strategic reverberations from Russia and China on the India-US Strategic Partnership emerging contours on the grounds that these are inconsequential. But what must not be forgotten in strategic analysis is that the “inconsequentials” are the first indicators of a “trend-in-the-making”.
What is at issue here is the “persistence” of both India on one hand to indulge in a monochromatic strategic partnership with USA and on the rebound the “persisttence” of Russia and China to raise the profile and stakes of their strategic reverberations against India.
In terms of strategic implications for India arising from the issues under discussion, the following factors need to be considered by India’s strategic and foreign policy establishment:
Just as India cannot become a global key player in confrontation with USA, so also India cannot become a global key player by impinging on the strategic sensitivities of Russia and China, especially those which intersect with USA.
As an emerging global power, India cannot be strategically type- casted as an alliance partner of one or the other powers. Strategically, India would have to be even-handed and maintain an autonomous strategic posture.
Russia enjoys strategic leverages over India in terms of India’s predominantly Russian-origin military inventories. This cannot be wished away overnight.
If India can participate in “strategic geometries” in East Asia along side USA it can also participate in the “strategic geometries” of “heartland Asia” alongside the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (SCO) A global power in the making should have that much of strategic autonomy. The absence of India’s present Prime Minister avoiding attendance of SCO summit meetings is noticeable. The Indian Prime Minister’s absence indicates a strategic tilt towards USA.
To emerge as a key global play India would have to first carve a niche in the Asian strategic pecking order and the Asian security calculus. This cannot emerge in opposition to the strategic interests and sensitivities of Russia and China.
Lastly, India’s security problems can be compounded should Russia and China, singly or in conjunction with each other attempt to counter India’s strategic tilt towards the United States.
The present Indian Government has already got a foretaste on the India-US Strategic Partnership on the strong political opposition to the Nuclear Deal. It can ill-afford more divisiveness within the country.
Concluding Observations
In conclusion, nothing more apt can be stated, than to re-emphasize what this author has highlighted in the ‘Introductory Observations’ namely:
India’s strategic and foreign policy establishment must recognize that India’s management of its strategic partnerships, both existing and evolving must be adroitly done
India’s strategic stances must not generate reverberations from other global power centers, until India reaches the culminating stage of emerging as an independent power center in the world.
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations
In an earlier paper of this Author entitled “India-United States Strategic Partnership: The Reverberations From China And Russia” SAAG Paper No. 2320 dated 02.08.2007 attention was drawn to the fact that the India-US strategic partnership being sought to be evolved with more intensity by the present Indian Government is not without strategic costs for India from other major powers so impacted.
The major observations made in the earlier paper by the Author were as under:
India’s strategic and foreign policy establishment must recognize that India’s management of its strategic partnerships, both existing and evolving must be adroitly done
India’s strategic stances must not generate reverberations from other global power centers, until India reaches the culminating stage of emerging as an independent power center in the world.
Since a substantive India-US Strategic Partnership has the potential to alter the global strategic balance and so also the Asian strategic balance, the evolving Indo-US Strategic Partnership has been under intense scrutiny by China and Russia. In particular India’s participation in the “strategic geometries” sponsored in East Asia by the United States has raised strategic concerns in China and Russia and their reverberations have not been long in coming in a subtle manner.
In the Indian strategic calculus, China and Russia cannot be discounted for a number of good reasons. China figures in Indian threat perceptions in a major way because of past armed conflicts and the chronic unsettled boundary disputes. While India and China are today engaged in transforming their relationship from one of mutual suspicions to that of mutual trust, both countries cannot ignore their national security interests and strategic priorities.
In China’s threat perceptions, a substantive India-US Strategic Partnership carries with it the potential of initiatives for Indo-US containment of China and use of Tibet as a strategic pressure point.
Russia’s strategic sensitivities in relation to India’s future strategic moves need to be paid due respect as the Indo-Russian Strategic Partnership is a time tested one. Unlike the United States and China which have resorted to creation of “spoiler states” like Pakistan, to checkmate India, Russia has not resorted to such policies against India.
Strategic reverberations from Russia and China do create strategic implications for India and these are discussed at the end of the paper.
An Indian strategic tilt towards the United States would have been justifiable if the United States could address India’s threat perceptions from China and Pakistan. Politically the United States is not so inclined and is ever unlikely to underwrite India’s security against any such threats. With no such surety ever likely to emerge from the United States would it be prudent for India to endanger her security by a strategic tilt?
India’s security and foreign policy establishment needs to do some hard thinking on this account.
Strategic Reverberations from Russia: President Putin Misses Traditional Meetings with India’s External Affairs Minister and Indian Defence Minister During their Moscow Visits in October 2007
The Indian External Affairs Minister and the Indian Defense Minister paid visits to Moscow this month to attend the inter-governmental panel discussions held annually. In the case of the External Affairs Minister’s visit it was being projected that his Moscow visit was also undertaken as a preparatory visit for the Indian Prime Minister forthcoming visit to Moscow in November 2007.
The Indian External Affairs Minister was unable to meet the Russian Foreign Minister and the Russian President and both these were significant departures from past precedents. The reasons advanced by the Russians were that both were busy with discussions with the visiting US Secretary of State and the US Defense Secretary. Further that President Putin was leaving for Iran and was busy.
The Indian Defense Minister did sign some defense agreements during his Moscow visit and also had discussions on overdue defense deliveries from Russia. Again, departing from precedents the Russians could not arrange a call by the Indian Defense Minister on President Putin.
The strategic reverberations from Russia stand discussed in the Author’s earlier paper. But what has happened now is something serious. While both Russia and India can dismiss diplomatically that everything is normal and undue importance should not be accorded to the visiting Indian Ministers not being given audience by President Putin, one cannot also ignore that obviously something is amiss and the Russians are trying to signal some messages.
In his earlier paper this Author had reflected that more serious Russian strategic reverberations are likely to occur if the present Indian Government allots the $ 7 billion orders for combat planes for the Indian Air Force to the United States as a single vendor. It was further emphasized that this is a deal which can send out strong distorted strategic messages and the present Indian Government needs to tread seriously and with care when deciding on this deal.
Is it likely that the Russians have got a whiff from their Indian sources that the Indian Government is politically inclined to award the $ 7 billion contract for combat planes to the United States? Is the political could shouldering by President Putin of not meeting the Indian External Affairs Minister and the Indian Defense Minister during their Moscow visits this month is a manifestation of Russia’s strategic displeasure?
While the above may only be speculative analysis but the underpinning reality of it being a likelihood cannot also be dismissed.
In addition to the above, recent reverberations from Russia over India’s strategic tilt have manifested in Russia giving permission that China could use Russian aircraft engines for Chinese fighter aircraft being supplied to Pakistan. There are also reports to indicate that China is interceding with Russia on Pakistan’s behalf that Russia should open upto Pakistan which the Russians have so far avoided respecting India’s strategic sensitivities.
China’s Strategic Displeasure on India-United States Strategic Partnership Emergence Persist
In the Author’s last paper on this subject after listing at least eight different strategic displeasure reverberations on India’s strategic tilt towards USA under the present Government, two questions were asked and both answered.
The first question that this Author raised was whether India should really be concerned with China’s manifested strategic displeasures? It was opined that “Not really, one should think so, as India has the right to indulge in counter-strategic pressure points against China as China was doing so all along so far by using Pakistan against India.”
The second question raised in the paper was whether India should take note of it. It was opined that “very certainly and absolutely must do so. As India proceeds on its trajectory towards global power status, China must seriously and significantly figure in India’s strategic calculus, irrespective of what contours the US-India Strategic Partnership assumes”.
In addition to the reverberations listed earlier, some more which needs to be added to the list are: (1) Last round of boundary negotiations held recently could not make any progress; the stalemate persists (2) China’s lodging protests alleging that India had constructed military bunkers on the Chinese side of the border in Sikkim (3) Border incursions into Bhutan in a bid to pressurize the India-friendly Bhutanese Government and also to highlight India’s helplessness on the issue (4) Postponing of joint China-India military exercises.
Russia’s and China’s Reverberations: Implications for India’s Security
Some may like to be dismissive of the manifested strategic reverberations from Russia and China on the India-US Strategic Partnership emerging contours on the grounds that these are inconsequential. But what must not be forgotten in strategic analysis is that the “inconsequentials” are the first indicators of a “trend-in-the-making”.
What is at issue here is the “persistence” of both India on one hand to indulge in a monochromatic strategic partnership with USA and on the rebound the “persisttence” of Russia and China to raise the profile and stakes of their strategic reverberations against India.
In terms of strategic implications for India arising from the issues under discussion, the following factors need to be considered by India’s strategic and foreign policy establishment:
Just as India cannot become a global key player in confrontation with USA, so also India cannot become a global key player by impinging on the strategic sensitivities of Russia and China, especially those which intersect with USA.
As an emerging global power, India cannot be strategically type- casted as an alliance partner of one or the other powers. Strategically, India would have to be even-handed and maintain an autonomous strategic posture.
Russia enjoys strategic leverages over India in terms of India’s predominantly Russian-origin military inventories. This cannot be wished away overnight.
If India can participate in “strategic geometries” in East Asia along side USA it can also participate in the “strategic geometries” of “heartland Asia” alongside the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (SCO) A global power in the making should have that much of strategic autonomy. The absence of India’s present Prime Minister avoiding attendance of SCO summit meetings is noticeable. The Indian Prime Minister’s absence indicates a strategic tilt towards USA.
To emerge as a key global play India would have to first carve a niche in the Asian strategic pecking order and the Asian security calculus. This cannot emerge in opposition to the strategic interests and sensitivities of Russia and China.
Lastly, India’s security problems can be compounded should Russia and China, singly or in conjunction with each other attempt to counter India’s strategic tilt towards the United States.
The present Indian Government has already got a foretaste on the India-US Strategic Partnership on the strong political opposition to the Nuclear Deal. It can ill-afford more divisiveness within the country.
Concluding Observations
In conclusion, nothing more apt can be stated, than to re-emphasize what this author has highlighted in the ‘Introductory Observations’ namely:
India’s strategic and foreign policy establishment must recognize that India’s management of its strategic partnerships, both existing and evolving must be adroitly done
India’s strategic stances must not generate reverberations from other global power centers, until India reaches the culminating stage of emerging as an independent power center in the world.
THE GULF REGION: TUSSLE FOR REGIONAL STRATEGIC PREDOMINANCE
THE GULF REGION: TUSSLE FOR REGIONAL STRATEGIC PREDOMINANCE
By Dr. Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations
The Gulf Region comprising of the littoral countries of The Gulf is the most important strategic component of the entire Middle East. The term “The Gulf” is a recent coinage to detract the connotation of its original historic appellation “The Persian Gulf”. Persia or Iran as it is now known straddles the entire eastern littoral of this strategic expanse of water as opposed to the western littoral which comprises a number of monarchial kingdoms owing political and military allegiance to the United States, predominant of which is Saudi Arabia.
The strategic significance of The Gulf region lies in the vast reservoirs of oil and natural gas that are located in both the littorals which cater for the entire global energy needs. Despite the existence of a number of pipelines from the region to the Eastern Mediterranean the bulk of this oil and gas is carried by shipping tankers which traverse. The Gulf and then head for the Arabian Sea after passing the strategic chokepoint of the straits of Hormuz astride which sits Iran as the major predominant country.
The tussle for regional strategic supremacy or predominance in The Gulf region has been a consistent feature in both the 19th and 20th Centuries, despite the change in external and regional actors.
In the United States strategic calculus The Gulf Region has acquired a central focus and the United States has been extremely sensitive to the emergence of any regional power inimical to American strategic interests. It is in this vein that the United States was prompted to launch its new strategy of pre-emptive military interventions against Iraq in Gulf War I in the early 1990s and Gulf War II in the first years of the 21st century.
Strategically ironical is the fact that Iran which was built up by the United States as the regional policemen in the 1970s and as a twin pillar of US security edifice in the region along with Saudi Arabia should now figure as a potent threat in United States perceptions and possibly the next target of American military intervention.
So as things stand today the strategic dynamics in The Gulf Region suggest that a new tussle for regional strategic predominance has set-in in the region between Saudi Arabia and Iran both due to external stimuli and regional dynamics.
To understand the factors and impulses which drive the unfolding power struggle, this paper attempts to examine the following aspects:
The contextual Strategic Setting in The Gulf
Iran and Saudi Arabia: A Comparative Strategic Analysis in Terms of Regional Power
The Gulf Region: The External Intrusive Powers and Their Strategic Interests
The Imponderables of The Gulf Region
The contextual Strategic Setting in The Gulf
The contextual strategic setting in The Gulf which provides a back-drop for the power struggle for regional strategic summary can be outlined as follows: (1) The United States has got bogged down militarily in Iraq following its military intervention (2) The United States military presence in Iraq may have to continue for a number of years and thereby seriously distracting America strategically (3) The American image in the Moslem World and The Gulf Region has taken a beating because of Iraq (4) As a result of United States strategic distractions, Iran has acquired a strikingly higher strategic profile (5) Iran as the largest Shia Moslem nation in the world also commands loyalties of Shia Moslem majority in Iraq and in the Gulf Sheikhdoms (6) Saudi Arabia’s relations with the United States have been uneasy ever since 9/11 and with the United States facilitating the emergence of a Shia Moslem majority government in Iraq (7) President Putin of Russia has made three strategic forays in the region in a span of two years and engaging staunch US military allies in the region (8) China has substantial relationship with both Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Over-arching and over-riding this contextual strategic setting is the intense brinkmanship between the United States and Iran on the issue of the American insistence that Iran should roll back its nuclear program. While the United States can claim that it has Iran in a strategic cleft-stick hemmed in between the American military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan and that it enjoys the support of all monarchial kingdoms in The Gulf Region, Iran stands regionally all above strategically in the region but with the tacit support of Russia and China.
While the odds may be stacked against Iran but on the other hand the United States too cannot be doubly sure of the support of Gulf Sheikh done with their restive Shia majorities.
Iran and Saudi Arabia: A Comparative Strategic Analysis in Terms of Regional Power
Since the regional tussle for strategic predominance in The Gulf is centered on Iran and Saudi Arabia, it would be in order, to carry out a comparative strategic analysis of both these countries.
Analyzing strictly from the natural attributes of power as postulated by Morgenthan it appears that Iran is comparatively more well-placed in The Gulf Region strategically in terms of geo-strategic location, population, resources and conventional military power. Its long coastline along the eastern littoral of The Gulf and in the South along the Arabian Sea endows it with a significant maritime dimension in these strategic waters.
Saudi Arabia, though large in size and equally if not richer than Iran in terms of oil resources, has a serious limitation in terms of manpower resources to provide her with manpower for sizeable military forces. Its security depends on the strategic munificence of the United States.
Iran enjoys a significant military edge over Saudi Arabia in terms of combat potential. The Iranian Armed Forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps along with Baseej militia were battle hardened during the eight year long Iran-Iraq War. Hardening them further is the martyrdom psyche which is spiritually exalted by the Shia faith and the ‘siege mentality’ of Iran under United States and Western sanctions and isolation.
Saudi Arabia’s armed forces are a fraction of the Iranian military might and have had no significant combat experience which limits their fighting capabilities.
Though Saudi Arabia was the first Gulf nation to deploy long range missiles (Chinese CSS.3 IRBMS) it is Iran that has a large missiles arsenal of varying ranges. Iran has battle experience in missile warfare arising from the “War of Cities” with Iraq during the eight year old war.
Iran has considerable military superiority over Saudi Arabia in the naval and air force fields.
In the overall analysis in terms of strategic predominance as a regional power in The Gulf, it is Iran that emerges as the natural choice in terms of attributes of power in its comprehensive sense.
Iraq was a powerful contender for regional power status in The Gulf and as a counter-foil to checkmate Iran. But Iraq today stands destroyed and incapacitated by the United States Military interventions.
The Gulf Region: The External Intrusive Powers and Their Strategic Interests
As on today the three significant external intrusive powers in The Gulf Region are the United States, Russia and China. Of the three the intrusive presence in terms of political influence and military alliance linkages with Gulf nations is that of the United States.
Russia and China had substantial military linkages and political influence with Iraq under President Saddam. Both Russia and China have now substantial linkages with Iran in all fields. Both Russia and China have opposed United States war rhetoric, sanctions and isolation of Iran over the nuclear program confrontation.
Post 9/11, the United States image in the Muslim world and the Arab world in particular has taken a severe beating and this greatly dilutes America’s standing and political influence in The Gulf. It makes America’s hands that much weaker when competing with Russia and China for influence in the region.
President Putin’s strategic forays in this region in the last two years to traditional and strong American allies in the Region is indicative of US Arab allies widening their options in terms of their external engagements.
Coming to the interests of the external intrusive powers in The Gulf Region it should be evident that the United States prime strategic interest in this region centers as control of global oil resources concentrated in this region and in pursuance of this has been sensitive and intolerant of any regimes inimical to it.
Russia is rich in energy resources and its strategic interests in the region are different from those of the United States. In a manner of speaking events and developments in this Region affect Russia’s security especially the hosting of US military bases by the Gulf countries. Russia’s strategic interest in The Gulf is therefore focused on limiting United States influence in the region to offset this threat perception and also to create strategic pressure points against the United States in the region.
China has significant strategic interests in The Gulf Region in terms of garnering oil and gas supplies from this region for her long term energy security needs. What has emerged of late is that Iran has emerged as the most significant long term partner in this region.
Of the external intrusive powers in The Gulf Region, Russia and China have a strategic convergence on Iran for both their individual and joint strategic interests. To that extent both these major powers within certain parameters are likely to encourage and facilitate the emergence of Iran as the Predominant regional power in The Gulf.
The Imponderables of The Gulf Region
In a highly volatile region like The Gulf Region where the strategic interests of major global powers intersect and conflict with each other, and local emotions run high on religious grounds and perceived wrongs against them a fair number of imponderables are likely to hover over the horizon.
Some of the imponderables worth considering are: (1) United States forced exit from Iraq and its implications for Gulf security and on Saudi Arabia in particular (2) Domestic turbulence in the Gulf monarchial kingdoms closely allied to United States (3) Russia’s strategic resurgence acquiring more strident contours (4) United States military intervention in Iran or selective military strikes against Iran and its spillover effects in the Gulf region and against the United States itself (5)Overthrow of present regime in Iran.
The last needs to be commented on as it is relevant to the theme of this discussion. Iran under any new regime whatsoever will not divest itself of its national ambitions to emerge as the pre-eminent regional power in The Gulf Region.
Concluding Observations
Historically, nations of The Gulf Region which were being built up as regional powers by external powers did not survive for long. Their inherent domestic conflicts so caused brought the external props down. Iran under the Shah regime is the major example on this score and so was Iraq under the monarchial rule.
There is a natural order of things in strategic affairs and so also there is a natural balance of power in a region. Ultimately this alone prevails despite any efforts to impede it. Outside The Gulf Region, India is one such example in South Asia.
By Dr. Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations
The Gulf Region comprising of the littoral countries of The Gulf is the most important strategic component of the entire Middle East. The term “The Gulf” is a recent coinage to detract the connotation of its original historic appellation “The Persian Gulf”. Persia or Iran as it is now known straddles the entire eastern littoral of this strategic expanse of water as opposed to the western littoral which comprises a number of monarchial kingdoms owing political and military allegiance to the United States, predominant of which is Saudi Arabia.
The strategic significance of The Gulf region lies in the vast reservoirs of oil and natural gas that are located in both the littorals which cater for the entire global energy needs. Despite the existence of a number of pipelines from the region to the Eastern Mediterranean the bulk of this oil and gas is carried by shipping tankers which traverse. The Gulf and then head for the Arabian Sea after passing the strategic chokepoint of the straits of Hormuz astride which sits Iran as the major predominant country.
The tussle for regional strategic supremacy or predominance in The Gulf region has been a consistent feature in both the 19th and 20th Centuries, despite the change in external and regional actors.
In the United States strategic calculus The Gulf Region has acquired a central focus and the United States has been extremely sensitive to the emergence of any regional power inimical to American strategic interests. It is in this vein that the United States was prompted to launch its new strategy of pre-emptive military interventions against Iraq in Gulf War I in the early 1990s and Gulf War II in the first years of the 21st century.
Strategically ironical is the fact that Iran which was built up by the United States as the regional policemen in the 1970s and as a twin pillar of US security edifice in the region along with Saudi Arabia should now figure as a potent threat in United States perceptions and possibly the next target of American military intervention.
So as things stand today the strategic dynamics in The Gulf Region suggest that a new tussle for regional strategic predominance has set-in in the region between Saudi Arabia and Iran both due to external stimuli and regional dynamics.
To understand the factors and impulses which drive the unfolding power struggle, this paper attempts to examine the following aspects:
The contextual Strategic Setting in The Gulf
Iran and Saudi Arabia: A Comparative Strategic Analysis in Terms of Regional Power
The Gulf Region: The External Intrusive Powers and Their Strategic Interests
The Imponderables of The Gulf Region
The contextual Strategic Setting in The Gulf
The contextual strategic setting in The Gulf which provides a back-drop for the power struggle for regional strategic summary can be outlined as follows: (1) The United States has got bogged down militarily in Iraq following its military intervention (2) The United States military presence in Iraq may have to continue for a number of years and thereby seriously distracting America strategically (3) The American image in the Moslem World and The Gulf Region has taken a beating because of Iraq (4) As a result of United States strategic distractions, Iran has acquired a strikingly higher strategic profile (5) Iran as the largest Shia Moslem nation in the world also commands loyalties of Shia Moslem majority in Iraq and in the Gulf Sheikhdoms (6) Saudi Arabia’s relations with the United States have been uneasy ever since 9/11 and with the United States facilitating the emergence of a Shia Moslem majority government in Iraq (7) President Putin of Russia has made three strategic forays in the region in a span of two years and engaging staunch US military allies in the region (8) China has substantial relationship with both Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Over-arching and over-riding this contextual strategic setting is the intense brinkmanship between the United States and Iran on the issue of the American insistence that Iran should roll back its nuclear program. While the United States can claim that it has Iran in a strategic cleft-stick hemmed in between the American military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan and that it enjoys the support of all monarchial kingdoms in The Gulf Region, Iran stands regionally all above strategically in the region but with the tacit support of Russia and China.
While the odds may be stacked against Iran but on the other hand the United States too cannot be doubly sure of the support of Gulf Sheikh done with their restive Shia majorities.
Iran and Saudi Arabia: A Comparative Strategic Analysis in Terms of Regional Power
Since the regional tussle for strategic predominance in The Gulf is centered on Iran and Saudi Arabia, it would be in order, to carry out a comparative strategic analysis of both these countries.
Analyzing strictly from the natural attributes of power as postulated by Morgenthan it appears that Iran is comparatively more well-placed in The Gulf Region strategically in terms of geo-strategic location, population, resources and conventional military power. Its long coastline along the eastern littoral of The Gulf and in the South along the Arabian Sea endows it with a significant maritime dimension in these strategic waters.
Saudi Arabia, though large in size and equally if not richer than Iran in terms of oil resources, has a serious limitation in terms of manpower resources to provide her with manpower for sizeable military forces. Its security depends on the strategic munificence of the United States.
Iran enjoys a significant military edge over Saudi Arabia in terms of combat potential. The Iranian Armed Forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps along with Baseej militia were battle hardened during the eight year long Iran-Iraq War. Hardening them further is the martyrdom psyche which is spiritually exalted by the Shia faith and the ‘siege mentality’ of Iran under United States and Western sanctions and isolation.
Saudi Arabia’s armed forces are a fraction of the Iranian military might and have had no significant combat experience which limits their fighting capabilities.
Though Saudi Arabia was the first Gulf nation to deploy long range missiles (Chinese CSS.3 IRBMS) it is Iran that has a large missiles arsenal of varying ranges. Iran has battle experience in missile warfare arising from the “War of Cities” with Iraq during the eight year old war.
Iran has considerable military superiority over Saudi Arabia in the naval and air force fields.
In the overall analysis in terms of strategic predominance as a regional power in The Gulf, it is Iran that emerges as the natural choice in terms of attributes of power in its comprehensive sense.
Iraq was a powerful contender for regional power status in The Gulf and as a counter-foil to checkmate Iran. But Iraq today stands destroyed and incapacitated by the United States Military interventions.
The Gulf Region: The External Intrusive Powers and Their Strategic Interests
As on today the three significant external intrusive powers in The Gulf Region are the United States, Russia and China. Of the three the intrusive presence in terms of political influence and military alliance linkages with Gulf nations is that of the United States.
Russia and China had substantial military linkages and political influence with Iraq under President Saddam. Both Russia and China have now substantial linkages with Iran in all fields. Both Russia and China have opposed United States war rhetoric, sanctions and isolation of Iran over the nuclear program confrontation.
Post 9/11, the United States image in the Muslim world and the Arab world in particular has taken a severe beating and this greatly dilutes America’s standing and political influence in The Gulf. It makes America’s hands that much weaker when competing with Russia and China for influence in the region.
President Putin’s strategic forays in this region in the last two years to traditional and strong American allies in the Region is indicative of US Arab allies widening their options in terms of their external engagements.
Coming to the interests of the external intrusive powers in The Gulf Region it should be evident that the United States prime strategic interest in this region centers as control of global oil resources concentrated in this region and in pursuance of this has been sensitive and intolerant of any regimes inimical to it.
Russia is rich in energy resources and its strategic interests in the region are different from those of the United States. In a manner of speaking events and developments in this Region affect Russia’s security especially the hosting of US military bases by the Gulf countries. Russia’s strategic interest in The Gulf is therefore focused on limiting United States influence in the region to offset this threat perception and also to create strategic pressure points against the United States in the region.
China has significant strategic interests in The Gulf Region in terms of garnering oil and gas supplies from this region for her long term energy security needs. What has emerged of late is that Iran has emerged as the most significant long term partner in this region.
Of the external intrusive powers in The Gulf Region, Russia and China have a strategic convergence on Iran for both their individual and joint strategic interests. To that extent both these major powers within certain parameters are likely to encourage and facilitate the emergence of Iran as the Predominant regional power in The Gulf.
The Imponderables of The Gulf Region
In a highly volatile region like The Gulf Region where the strategic interests of major global powers intersect and conflict with each other, and local emotions run high on religious grounds and perceived wrongs against them a fair number of imponderables are likely to hover over the horizon.
Some of the imponderables worth considering are: (1) United States forced exit from Iraq and its implications for Gulf security and on Saudi Arabia in particular (2) Domestic turbulence in the Gulf monarchial kingdoms closely allied to United States (3) Russia’s strategic resurgence acquiring more strident contours (4) United States military intervention in Iran or selective military strikes against Iran and its spillover effects in the Gulf region and against the United States itself (5)Overthrow of present regime in Iran.
The last needs to be commented on as it is relevant to the theme of this discussion. Iran under any new regime whatsoever will not divest itself of its national ambitions to emerge as the pre-eminent regional power in The Gulf Region.
Concluding Observations
Historically, nations of The Gulf Region which were being built up as regional powers by external powers did not survive for long. Their inherent domestic conflicts so caused brought the external props down. Iran under the Shah regime is the major example on this score and so was Iraq under the monarchial rule.
There is a natural order of things in strategic affairs and so also there is a natural balance of power in a region. Ultimately this alone prevails despite any efforts to impede it. Outside The Gulf Region, India is one such example in South Asia.
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